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Abstract 
The aim of the current research was to investigate the presence and roles of inflated 
responsibility and thought-action fusion in psychopathology. The three underlying 
research themes were to examine the relationship between thought-action fusion and 
inflated responsibility, the roles that they play in psychopathology, and the possible 
etiology of these types of beliefs. It is proposed that these responsibility beliefs are 
not specific to obsessive compulsive disorder, as commonly assumed, and that they 
play important roles in the maintenance of a range of psychological symptoms. This 
thesis presents the results of four studies. The first study was designed to investigate 
the presence of Thought-Action Fusion (TAF) and Inflated Responsibility (IR) 
alongside symptoms of depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, with 
thought suppression playing an intermediary role. Study 2 examined the interaction 
between responsibility beliefs and locus of control on obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms with non-clinical and clinical participants. The third study focussed on the 
etiology of responsibility beliefs, taking Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, and 
Freeston’s (1999) theory of Pathways to Inflated Responsibility and empirically 
testing this with both clinical and non-clinical samples. Study 4 focussed on the 
relationship between responsibility beliefs and religiosity, using participants of 
Protestant Christian beliefs and Atheists. These studies collectively show that 
Thought-Action Fusion and Inflated Responsibility are both important and 
contributing factors in psychopathology, especially playing a part in the maintenance 
of symptoms and feelings of distress. Results indicated that while TAF tends to be 
specific to obsessive compulsive symptoms, IR is more of a general cognitive bias. 
Results also indicate that critical experiences in one’s life can lead to biases in 
responsibility beliefs. Additionally, results show that these biases are not always 
indicative of psychopathology when they are acceptable within a particular set of 
morals, for example religion.  These findings are of both theoretical and clinical 
significance because they add to the growing understanding of TAF and IR in 
psychopathology. The current research was conducted with observational, self-report 
measures; further research using longitudinal studies is needed for more clarity on 
causality.  
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Preface 
Over the last decade there has been an increasing emphasis on the power of 
thought in our lives, and the ability to change events using only thoughts. There are 
numerous examples in everyday life, for example ‘thinking positively’ is now a 
widely accepted piece of advice, and it is assumed that this will make some difference 
to the outcome. In 2006 the self-help book ‘The Secret’ by Rhonda Byrne became a 
best seller, sold more than 19 million copies, was translated into 46 languages, and 
was a repeat feature on the Oprah Winfrey Show. The underlying premise of this 
book was that positive thinking leads to increased wealth, health and happiness. It 
described the law of attraction in this sense, is that if we send positive thoughts into 
the universe, we will receive positivity back to us, even to the point of curing cancer 
and overcoming obesity through the power of thought.    
What happens however, when the thoughts are not so positive? While there 
has been a lot of attention on the power of thoughts for positive events, many people 
battle negative, intrusive thoughts, leading to anxiety and depression. While most 
people experience negative cognitive intrusions (Salkovskis, 1985, 1996), it is how 
we react to and process these that can make the difference between brushing them off 
as nothing more than thoughts, or developing severe anxiety and depression. Two 
ways of processing negative thoughts that have been associated particularly with 
Obsessive Compulsive symptoms, are the Inflated Responsibility and Thought-Action 
Fusion biases.  
This thesis presents a comprehensive investigation of Thought-Action Fusion 
and Inflated Responsibility in psychopathology. Chapter 1 presents a detailed 
literature review of both topics. Chapter 2 investigates the response of thought 
suppression on responsibility beliefs. Chapter 3 then examines responsibility beliefs 
alongside an external locus of control. Chapter 4 covers how childhood experiences 
and critical events in one’s life can lead to cognitive biases. The work in Chapter 5 
examines Thought-Action Fusion alongside religious and atheist beliefs. Finally, 
Chapter 6 discusses the full body of research and what value it adds to current theory, 
clinical implications, and directions for future research in this area. There are three 
overarching research foci for this thesis, namely the specific relationship between 
Thought-Action Fusion and Inflated Responsibility, their roles in psychopathology, 
and the etiology of these types of beliefs.   
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“Much more surprising things can happen to anyone who, when a disagreeable or 
discouraged thought comes into his mind, just has the sense to remember in time and 
push it out by putting in an agreeable, determinedly courageous one. Two things 
cannot be in one place.”  
 
Frances Hodgson Burnett, The Secret Garden 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW   
1.1  Overview  
 This thesis presents a collection of studies that aim to demonstrate that both 
inflated responsibility and thought-action fusion play significant roles in 
psychopathology. While both cognitive biases have been traditionally considered in 
relation to obsessive compulsive disorder, it is proposed that they are more general 
cognitive beliefs implicated in other disorders such as anxiety and depression. There 
are a number of theories that attempt to address how these two types of responsibility 
beliefs are related, but the overall picture is far from clear. The goal of the current 
research is to bring some clarity to this relationship and identify similarities and 
differences between these concepts. Additionally, inflated responsibility and thought-
action fusion will be considered alongside other variables such as early experiences, 
thought suppression and locus of control to establish their roles in psychopathology.  
1.2 Thought-Action Fusion 
Thought-action fusion (TAF) is a phenomenon whereby an individual has 
difficulty separating intrusive thoughts and their corresponding behaviours (Marino, 
Lunt & Negy, 2008). Rachman and Shafran (1999) defined TAF as “the psychological 
phenomenon in which the patient appears to regard the obsessional thought and the 
forbidden action as being morally equivalent and/or feeling that the obsessional 
thought increases the probability of the feared event” (p. 72). TAF has since been 
dichotomised into moral and likelihood components. Moral TAF is the notion that 
unacceptable cognitive intrusions about disturbing events are morally equivalent to 
the actual occurrence of these events (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam & Kalsy, 
2003). For example, Rachman and Shafran (1999) describes the case of a religious 
woman who experienced intrusive sexual images of Jesus while praying. This led the 
woman to believe that she by having such an image, had sinned and was therefore an 
immoral person. Likelihood TAF refers to the idea that thinking about a distressing 
event causes that event to become more probable. Likelihood TAF is further divided 
into likelihood-self where the individual believes their thoughts increase the 
probability that a distressing event will happen to themselves. For example ‘if I think 
about being in a car accident, this makes it more likely to happen to me’, and 
likelihood-other where the individual believes their thoughts will increase the 
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probability of negative events occurring to other people, for example ‘if I think about 
my best friend being in a car accident, it is more likely that they will be in an 
accident’ (Abramowitz, et al., 2003).  
  The term ‘thought-action fusion’ is relatively recent; however long before its 
conceptualisation, clinicians had identified these characteristics in patients. For 
example, Bleuler (1934) described patients who feared “that they might destroy their 
beloved ones through a thought” and referred to this as ‘omnipotence of thought’ (p. 
561). Similar concepts of magic and magical thinking have also long been used by 
anthropologists, writers and psychoanalysts (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). The early 
concept of TAF arose from observations of patients with obsessional thinking, who 
assumed that their thoughts were equivalent to actions (Salkovskis, 1985). This led on 
to the first study investigating the link between perceived responsibility and TAF in 
relation to obsessionality, which found TAF to be significantly correlated with OCD 
(Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran & Woody, 1995). The development of a TAF scale 
came shortly after, in an attempt to be able to measure and assess TAF in a systematic 
manner (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996; Shafran & Rachman, 2004).  
TAF exists on a continuum rather than being represented as a categorical 
construct, with many non-clinical individuals endorsing TAF statements typically to a 
lesser extent than clinical participants (Rassin, 2001). While clinical samples tend to 
score significantly higher on measures of TAF, some overlap between clinical and 
non-clinical samples has been found (e.g., Abramowitz et al., 2003). Berle and 
Starcevic (2005) suggest a number of dimensions within TAF which can influence 
this, including: strength of belief, degree of insight, degree of distress caused by TAF, 
and strength of urge to neutralise the effects of TAF. 
TAF has been studied experimentally in the laboratory examining the 
relationship between the frequency of thought intrusions and the distress caused by 
them. One example of this research is that by Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris and Spaan 
(1999) using university students as participants, who were told that if they thought of 
the word ‘apple’, another participant would receive an electric shock in a separate 
room (which did not really happen). The students were connected to EEG electrodes 
and told that this would allow the researchers to see when they thought of the word 
‘apple’ and ‘administer the electric shock’. This was compared to a control condition, 
where there was no threat of electric shock to another participant. The results 
demonstrated that the experiment effectively produced an actual TAF-likelihood-
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others condition such that one’s thoughts did directly affect another person. 
Compared to the control condition, those participants in the experimental condition 
reported significantly more thoughts of the word ‘apple’, as well as more discomfort, 
more self-directed anger, and more resistance to thinking the word ‘apple’. The 
researchers of this study concluded that TAF may play a role in increasing the 
frequency and distress of intrusive thoughts leading to significant distress. 
1.3 Inflated Responsibility  
If a person believes that his or her thoughts contribute to increasing the 
probability that a negative event will happen (i.e., the likelihood component of TAF), 
then they are likely to perceive themselves to be at least partially responsible for this. 
Additionally, the individual may consider it their direct responsibility to prevent this 
from occurring, for example by engaging in neutralising behaviours (Shafran, 
Thordarson & Rachman, 1996). It has been found in previous research that those 
individuals who demonstrate high levels of TAF are likely to also experience a higher 
level of responsibility because of these dysfunctional beliefs (Shafran, Thordarson & 
Rachman, 1996). Responsibility in this case, which characterises obsessional 
problems, can be defined as:   
“the belief that one has the power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent 
subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These outcomes are perceived as 
essential to prevent. They may be actual, that is having consequences in the 
real world, and/or at a moral level” (Salkovskis et al., 1996; cited in 
Salkovskis et al., 1999, pp. 1058).  
 
In this way, the individual believes that they will be responsible for harm (to 
themselves or a loved one) unless they take action to prevent it, and is considered to 
be an internal source of inflation of responsibility (Shafran, et al., 1996). This is 
different from an external sense of inflated responsibility which is more likely to arise 
from sources outside of the individual (e.g., door locks, knives and bacteria) which 
commonly lead to compulsive checking and washing. However, both internal and 
external triggers are similar in that they both produce the urge to take action to 
prevent the event occurring (Rachman, 1993). TAF and also this inflated sense of 
responsibility are considered to be fundamental components of the catastrophic 
misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts (Shafran et al., 1996).  
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Berle and Starcevic (2005) argued that the responsibility beliefs experienced 
by people with intrusive thoughts take one of two forms. The first of these is the 
feeling of being responsible for harm prevention. That is, after the occurrence of an 
intrusive thought, the individual feels personally responsible for preventing the 
negative event from actually happening. The second type of belief is the perceived 
responsibility for the existence of the negative thoughts themselves. This represents 
the individual’s feelings of moral responsibility and attribution of great significance 
for having the thoughts themselves.  
1.4 Relationship between the two 
Despite being theoretically connected, the particular relationship between TAF 
and inflated responsibility remains unclear. Clarity on this has not been helped by the 
ever changing definitions of each construct. For example, Berle and Starcevich (2005) 
describe the ongoing debate as to whether inflated responsibility refers to specific 
situations, or is a more general attitude. Researchers (Rassin et al., 1999; Shafran et 
al., 1996) have described TAF as being closely related to inflated responsibility, but 
also distinct. This related-but-separable perspective is supported by numerous studies 
demonstrating only moderate correlations between the two variables (e.g. Gwilliam, 
Wells, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Rachman, et al., 1996; Smari & Holmsteinsson, 
2001; Yorulmaz, Yilmazl & Gencoz, 2004). What is clear, at least, is that TAF and 
inflated responsibility do not represent completely overlapping concepts. This leaves 
at least two plausible options: (A) There is some conceptual overlap and they may co-
occur, but the presence of one neither enhances nor inhibits the presence of the other, 
or; (B) TAF is a subordinate or specific type subsumed under the more superordinate 
concept of inflated responsibility. In this subordinate/superordinate relationship, TAF 
cannot occur in the absence of inflated responsibility (see Figure 1.1). Based on the 
extant research, the former relationship seems more likely than the latter.  
 
 
 
 
 
(A)      (B) 
Figure 1.1 Inflated Responsibility (IR) and Thought-Action Fusion (TAF)  
 
IR 
IR TAF 
TAF 
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Some research suggests that TAF can lead to inflated responsibility (e.g. 
Rachman, 1993; Rachman et al., 1995; Rassin, Merckelback, Muris & Spaan, 1999; 
Shafran et al., 1996). Clark (2004) proposes that TAF inflates responsibility, 
especially in the presence of aggressive, blasphemous and sexually themed intrusive 
thoughts. Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman (1996) described TAF as a possible 
cause or antecedent of an inflated sense of responsibility, which plays an important 
role in the transition of normal thoughts into clinical obsessions. That is, patients with 
the TAF bias are prone to inflated responsibility because of their TAF beliefs, which, 
in turn lead to increased feelings of guilt (Rachman, 1993; Shafran et al., 1996). 
Additionally, as well as being a product of TAF, inflated responsibility may also 
contribute to the occurrence of TAF, this way representing both an antecedent and 
consequence of the TAF bias in a mutually reinforcing relationship (Rachman, 1997; 
Clark, 2004).  
Salkovskis (1985) suggests that individuals with TAF believe there is a link 
between their thoughts and the event occurring, leading to the need for action to 
prevent this happening, indicating that the person feels responsible for negative events 
unless they take appropriate action to prevent them. Having an inflated sense of 
responsibility can contribute both to the development of TAF, and may also be one of 
the effects of TAF (Rachman, 1997; Clark, 2004). A further consequence of this 
inflated responsibility is the need for mental neutralising; for example, reconstructing 
the intrusive thought or image such that the people involved are no longer harmed or 
injured. This form of neutralising can also be interpreted as a form of TAF, i.e. the 
individual believes they can influence the likelihood of events by changing their 
thoughts or images (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996).  
 Shafran et al. (1996) showed that likelihood TAF has a higher correlation with 
responsibility than moral TAF; TAF moral is not as directly linked to responsibility 
possibly because there is no harm for the patient to prevent. Shafran et al. further 
describe TAF as being closely related to, but distinct from, responsibility whereas 
Rachman (1997) posits the theory that TAF is a ‘variation’ of inflated responsibility. 
There is, however, limited evidence to support this claim, with previous studies 
showing TAF to be only moderately correlated with responsibility (Berle & Starcevic, 
2005). TAF likelihood appears to have a closer association with responsibility 
compared with TAF moral, especially responsibility for preventing harm, both to 
others and the self (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Throughout previous research, measures 
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of overall TAF beliefs have typically shown only moderate positive correlations with 
measures of responsibility (e.g. Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant & Teachman, 
1996; Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001), with one study by Rachman et al. (1996) 
reporting no significant correlation between TAF moral and responsibility beliefs  
1.5 Magical Thinking  
While the precise relationship between TAF and inflated responsibility 
remains unclear, this is further complicated by magical thinking. Magical thinking 
refers to the belief in the personal power to control events beyond culturally accepted 
laws of causality (Woolley, 1997). This does not necessarily mean that there is an 
influence of thoughts upon events (Berle & Starcevich, 2005). Moulding and Kyrios 
(2006) suggest that magical thinking can increase one’s sense of control and provide a 
way of coping for people under stress. Interestingly, Einstein and Menzies (2004a, 
2004b) propose that TAF is a specific type of magical thinking. This was based on 
their research with both clinical and undergraduate samples that found that TAF 
beliefs were only related to OC symptoms through magical ideation. Specifically, 
Einstein and Menzies suggest that the TAF likelihood component is a type of magical 
thinking, whereas the TAF moral component is not so closely related (though perhaps 
more aptly related to other variables such as religiosity). This may be because TAF 
likelihood is more like magical thinking in that thoughts are assumed to have causal 
influence over events and probability of their occurrence (Berle & Starcevich). Figure 
1.2 represents the theoretical relationship between Inflated Responsibility (IR), 
Thought-Action Fusion (TAF), and Magical Thinking. Although TAF is subordinate 
within the more superordinate concept of magical thinking, it remains related, but 
separate from inflated responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(C)  
Figure 1.2 Inflated Responsibility (IR), Thought-Action Fusion (TAF), and Magical 
Thinking  
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1.6 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
 Not surprisingly, TAF and inflated responsibility are often referred to in the 
context of their occurrence in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). OCD is a 
debilitating characterised by intrusive, disturbing thoughts/obsessions, and repetitive, 
compulsive behaviours (Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins & Sahakian, 
2005). The obsessions of OCD typically involve distressing thoughts of 
contamination, socially unacceptable thoughts and behaviours, and harm or death of a 
loved one. They can also involve a preoccupation with counting and symmetry 
(Chamberlain, et al., 2005).  Compulsions can include behaviours such as excessive 
hand washing, making objects symmetrical and repeated checking (e.g. light switches 
and door locks; Chamberlain, et al., 2005).  
 1.6.1  Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and TAF 
Previous studies have repeatedly demonstrated a relationship between TAF 
and OCD, with stronger positive correlations for TAF-likelihood than for TAF-moral 
(Amir, et al., 2001). TAF has been described as being a contributing factor in the 
maintenance and development of OCD for two main reasons. First, the belief that 
thoughts are the moral equivalent of their occurrence is likely to cause the individual 
to become distressed (Abramowitz, et al., 2003). Second, as a consequence of the 
belief that their thoughts will increase the probability of an unwanted event occurring, 
OCD patients may engage in certain behaviours and compulsions in order to prevent 
these negative events from occurring (Abramowitz, et al., 2003).  
Research by Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary and Brigidi (2001) showed 
individuals with OC symptoms were more likely to endorse beliefs that the likelihood 
of negative events happening was a result of their thoughts. They also found that there 
were no significant differences between OC participants and healthy controls on 
measures tapping the moral component of TAF. Similar research has also found 
anxiety to be specifically related to the TAF likelihood component, whereas the TAF 
moral component correlates more strongly with measures of depression. Studies such 
as these have led many to believe that the likelihood component has a closer 
relationship with OCD than the moral component of TAF, which tends to become 
significant only when mediated by other variables, for example depression and 
religiosity (Coles, Mennin & Heimberg, 2001).  
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1.6.2 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Inflated Responsibility  
 Inflated responsibility also plays a significant role in OCD (Rachman, 
Thordarson, Shafran & Woody, 1995). As Salkovskis and Kirk (1989) describe, 
obsessional thought often involves some fear of personal responsibility for preventing 
harm, either to the self or others. Many experimental and correlational studies support 
the role of responsibility beliefs in OCD (e.g. Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran & 
Woody, 1995; Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001; Yorulmaz, Altin & Karanci, 2008). One 
example is of Lopatka and Rachman (1995) who used an experimental design to 
manipulate feelings of perceived personal responsibility for a negative event in 
patients with OCD. The results showed that participants showed a decrease in 
discomfort and the need to neutralise after a manipulation leading to a reduction in 
their responsibility beliefs. Conversely, neutralising attempts and feelings of 
discomfort increased following a manipulation which induced inflated responsibility. 
The changes in overall discomfort were not found to be associated with the person’s 
sense of control over the activity. Similar findings were shown in a study by Rachman 
(1993), where it was shown that OCD patients’ neutralising symptoms and feelings of 
discomfort decreased upon first being admitted at a hospital, and returned a few days 
after arriving at the new environment. Rachman interpreted this finding as a 
demonstration of inflated responsibility – when patients first arrived at the hospital, 
they felt less in control (therefore less personally responsible); but over time they 
developed a sense of belonging and began to feel more responsible towards their 
surroundings.  
Rachman (2002) discussed the role of inflated responsibility, in combination 
with other variables, in increasing the intensity and duration of neutralising 
behaviours. He proposed that the most destructive combination is of high levels of 
inflated responsibility alongside high probability of harm and estimation of serious 
costs (Altin & Karanci, 2008). The importance of inflated responsibility in the 
development and maintenance of OCD is evident in cognitive models, for example 
Salkovskis’ (1996) cognitive model of OCD where responsibility beliefs play a 
pivotal role.    
1.7 Cognitive Models  
1.7.1 Salkovskis’ Cognitive Model of OCD 
Salkovskis’ (1985, 1996) influential model of obsessions describes how 
unwanted intrusive thoughts are a common part of everyday life and occur on the 
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‘normal’ end of a continuum of clinical obsessions. These thoughts may escalate into 
obsessions when they are misinterpreted in terms of their potential to cause harm, and 
the responsibility the individual takes for these thoughts.  Intrusive thoughts, 
therefore, are not limited to people with OCD. In their seminal study, Rachman and 
De Silva (1978) found that the classic content of obsessions seen in OCD is also 
regularly experienced by the majority of the general population. However what causes 
these intrusions to become clinical obsessions is that they are experienced with greater 
intensity and frequency, eliciting significant discomfort and the desire to resist them 
(Rassin, 2001).  
Salkovskis (1996) argues that this belief of personal responsibility for 
preventing harm either to the self or others results in overwhelming anxiety. In 
reaction to this, the individual will direct their attentional efforts towards removing 
the cognitive intrusion, and therefore decrease the sense of responsibility. However, 
as Salkovskis describes, the following outcomes are more likely: (a) increased 
anxiety, discomfort and depression; (b) cognitive intrusions becoming more 
significant and more accessible; (c) the individual becoming more focused on the 
intrusion, paying more attention to it; and (d) the individual beginning to use 
neutralising techniques in an effort to reduce anxiety and discomfort (see Figure 1.3). 
To summarise, this cognitive model of OCD proposes that symptoms are caused by 
beliefs of inflated responsibility, and are maintained by the individuals’ responses to 
this, by trying to be sure they have not caused harm (Salkovskis, 1999; Salkovskis, 
Thorpe, Wahl, Wroe & Forrester, 2003).  
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Figure 1. 3 Salkovskis’ cognitive analysis of OCD (cited in Salkovskis et al., 2000. p 
349.) 
1.7.1.1 Neutralising  
 Salkovskis (1989, p. 678) describes a neutralising response as a “voluntarily 
initiated activity which is intended to have the effect of reducing perceived 
responsibility”.  This response can be either psychological (e.g. thought suppression) 
or behavioural (e.g. checking), and usually becomes repetitive, and is very successful 
for reducing anxiety in the short term. In the long term, neutralising responses are 
counter-productive as they prevent the individual from addressing their intrusive 
thoughts and processing evidence that would disconfirm their beliefs of personal 
responsibility. In essence, neutralising techniques serve to increase overall discomfort 
and anxiety. This is because neutralising (a) increases the individual’s preoccupation 
with the negative intrusion; (b) is unsuccessful in the long term, leading to increased 
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frequency of the intrusion; (c) increases the salience and perceived importance of the 
intrusion; and (d) prevents the individual processing the intrusion and discontinuing 
the belief that thoughts are harmful (Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002).  
1.7.2 Misinterpretation of Significance Theory 
Rachman (1997; 1998) proposed a cognitive theory of obsessions examining 
how they are formed and persist over time. The central assumption of this theory is 
that obsessions are “caused by catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of 
one’s intrusive thoughts/images/impulses” (Rachman, 1998, p. 385). Rachman (1997) 
proposed that obsessions persisted as long as the misinterpretations continued, and 
would disappear or at least deteriorate if the misinterpretations were weakened or 
eliminated. These ‘catastrophic misinterpretations’ involve the individual having the 
belief that their intrusive thoughts are signs or indications of something meaningful 
and significant about their character, which then leads to negative consequences 
(Clark, 2004). Rachman (1997) went on to further define misinterpretations of 
significance and how these can be measured on five dimensions, as cited in Clark 
(2004): 
1. Importance. The intrusive thought is not viewed as meaningless or trivial, 
but reveals something important about the individual.  
2. Personalised. The significance of the thought is interpreted as being 
personalised and of importance to the individual in particular.  
3. Ego-alien. The content of the intrusive thought is ego-dystonic, and is 
considered to be uncharacteristic and unlike the individual.  
4. Potential consequences. The individual believes the cognitive intrusion to 
have potential consequences, and is not merely a passing thought.  
5. Serious consequences. The potential consequences of the intrusion are 
viewed as being serious, typically involving a degree of threat, harm or 
danger.  
 
Through misinterpreting cognitive intrusions, the thought becomes important, 
personally significant, revealing, threatening and catastrophic, all of which transform 
a normal thought into an obsession and a torment for the affected individual 
(Rachman, 1997). For example, Rachman describes the case of a 25 year old male 
computer analyst who reported having repeated thoughts and images of hurting the 
young children of a friend. He interpreted this as meaning he was a potential 
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murderer, and an evil and worthless human being. Another example is that of an 
affectionate grandmother who experienced recurrent images of throwing her grandson 
from a balcony, which caused deep distress and even suicidality, leading her to 
believe she was a dangerous psychopath incapable of love for other people (Rachman, 
1997). Not surprisingly, individuals who are affected by intrusions such as this, often 
experience a strong urge to cancel or atone for the obsession, referred to as 
neutralisation attempts (Rachman, 1997). The neutralising response includes any 
voluntary activity performed to reduce perceived responsibility and results in a 
temporary reduction in the discomfort caused by the intrusive thought (Salkovskis, 
1989). An example of neutralisation has been described by Rachman as that of a 
female patient who reported having recurrent thoughts and images of stabbing her 
own children. The patient then engaged in avoidance behaviours by avoiding all 
contact with sharp objects, and eventually installing strong locks on her kitchen doors, 
only entering while accompanied by a trusted adult.  
Compulsions such as checking and washing strongly resemble neutralisation 
and avoidance strategies in that they serve the same psychological function of 
providing some relief of the distress and discomfort caused by the obsessions 
(Rachman, 1997). Neutralisation, avoidance and compulsions persist over time 
because they succeed at reducing (although temporarily) the distress caused by the 
disturbing thoughts and images. This learned relationship, however, acts to preserve 
the pathway between obsessions, misinterpretations and their consequences, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.4 (Rachman, 1997). Avoidance strategies may also serve to 
increase the frequency of unwanted intrusions (Rachman, 1998). The avoidance of 
anxiety-inducing stimuli, and the resulting decrease in sensations of anxiety, 
reinforces the belief that exposure to those stimuli leads to the feeling of distress and 
loss of control (Clark, 2004). Additionally, the repeated pattern of using avoidance 
strategies prevents exposure to evidence that would disconfirm the individual’s beliefs 
in the danger and potential negative consequences of their thoughts (Clark, 2004; 
Rachman, 1998, 2003). Additionally, the increase in negative intrusive thoughts 
provides further evidence of the apparent significance of the intrusion (Clark, 2004).  
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Figure 1.4 The sequence of descriptions, interpretations and actions from the 
Misinterpretation of Significance Theory (from Rachman, 1997, pp. 795).  
 
In relation to this cognitive model, TAF is considered to be a cognitive bias 
which sets up a vulnerability for obsessionality. In other words individuals who 
demonstrate a TAF bias may be more likely to make negative, catastrophic 
misinterpretations of significance in response to intrusive thoughts (Clark, 2004). 
More specifically, TAF may represent a vulnerability for individuals to make 
incorrect appraisals of personal excessive responsibility about cognitive intrusions 
(Clark, 2004). Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris and Spaan (1999) describe how those 
individuals who demonstrate this inflated sense of responsibility in reaction to 
intrusive thoughts, experience more discomfort  when these thoughts occur, placing 
them at greater risk for developing clinical obsessions. 
1.8 TAF and Inflated Responsibility in other psychopathology 
TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs may not be confined to OCD. 
Associations have been found with a number of other disorders, including depression, 
eating disorders and anxiety disorders (Berle & Starcevic, 2005).  
1.8.1 Other Anxiety Disorders 
 Rachman and Shafran (1999) have described how TAF can manifest in 
anxiety disorders other than OCD. For example, they describe how people with social 
anxiety may believe that their unkind thoughts increase their chance of rejection, how 
people with panic attacks may believe that thinking about catastrophic events and 
losing control may increase the chance of it happening, and how people with post-
traumatic stress disorder may believe that thinking about the trauma may increase the 
chance of it happening again. This has been supported by empirical evidence, with 
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studies showing no differences in scores of TAF between groups of OCD patients and 
those with other anxiety disorders including panic disorder, social anxiety and post-
traumatic stress disorder (Rassin et al., 2001). Interestingly, although TAF and 
inflated responsibility beliefs are evident in a range of anxiety disorders, the 
individuals’ responses to these may differ. Berle and Starcevich (2005) suggest that 
while OCD patients will engage in various neutralising techniques in an attempt to 
reduce discomfort, individuals with other anxiety disorders with rely on avoidance 
strategies alone.  
 TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs have also been found to be important in 
the development and maintenance of pathological worry, as seen in generalised 
anxiety disorder (GAD; Hazlett-Stevens, Zucker & Craske, 2002). TAF likelihood in 
particular seems to be very similar to beliefs held by individuals with GAD about 
their worry causing the occurrence of feared events occurring. Hazlett-Stevens et al. 
investigated this with a sample of 494 undergraduate students, measuring TAF and 
pathological worry. Results indicated that while those students who endorsed high 
levels of worry (also diagnostic for GAD) also scored significantly higher on the TAF 
likelihood subscale, there were no significant results for the TAF moral subscale.  
1.8.2 Depression 
It has been suggested that depression can possibly be the product of combining 
TAF, inflated responsibility and guilt (Rachman & Shafran, 1999). There has been a 
lot of research implicating TAF beliefs in depression, particularly the moral 
component of TAF. For example, Abramowitz et al. (2003) found TAF moral 
component scores to be significantly correlated with scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987) when controlling for anxiety, but no association 
with the TAF likelihood component (which did correlate significantly with measures 
of anxiety). Abramowitz et al. speculated that unlike TAF-likelihood which seems 
more related to anxiety, TAF-moral is more directly related to depressive tendencies 
through self-blame and guilt which are common depression symptoms.  
1.8.3 Eating Disorders 
 Individuals with eating disorders often have ‘magical’ type beliefs about food 
and their weight similar to cognitive distortions of TAF (Garner & Bemis, 1982). 
Rachman and Rachman (1999) described this variation as ‘Thought-Shape Fusion’ 
(TSF), where people who are excessively concerned about their weight and body 
image form connections between negative intrusive thoughts and their body shape. 
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According to Rachman and Rachman, TSF has three underlying beliefs: (a) thinking 
that eating ‘forbidden’ food increases the likelihood of gaining weight; (b) thinking 
about eating ‘forbidden’ food is morally equivalent to actually eating it; and (c) 
thoughts about eating ‘forbidden’ foods increases the perception of fatness.  
 Shafran et al. (1999) assessed TSF in a sample of 119 undergraduate students, 
and found it to be significantly associated with eating disorder psychopathology. 
Also, results showed TAF and TSF to be significantly correlated, although the authors 
postulate that the two are distinct. Where TAF is considered to be a cognitive bias, 
TSF also involves distortions of perception (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). In a similar 
study, Shafran and Robinson (2004) compared a group of 42 women with clinical 
eating disorders with a group of 42 healthy controls and found TSF to be significantly 
associated with eating disorders, when controlling for depression.  
1.8.4 Psychotic Disorders  
An important distinction must be made when discussing TAF and 
responsibility beliefs in terms of psychosis. With disorders such as anxiety and 
depression, there remains full insight that TAF is irrational and that thoughts alone 
cannot influence events. The same cannot be said for individuals suffering from 
psychosis as there are some similarities between such beliefs and aspects of psychosis 
(Rachman & Rachman, 1999). For example, individuals with delusions can engage in 
magical thinking and form links between events. Also, thought broadcasting delusions 
can involve the individual believing that their thoughts can be seen and read by others 
and influence external events (Berle & Starcevich, 2005). Examples can also be seen 
in grandiose delusions, with individuals believing their thoughts have magical powers, 
and ideas of reference where someone may think that an event is related to something 
they have been thinking about (Berle & Starcevic).  
Based on previous research, magical thinking seems to mediate the 
relationship between psychotic disorders and TAF and responsibility beliefs. An 
example of this is shown by Lee, Cougle  and Telch (2005) who reported TAF 
likelihood to be significantly correlated with measures of schizotypy.  However, after 
controlling for depression, anxiety and OCD, TAF likelihood was only related to the 
magical ideation subscale of the schizotypy measure. While there may be evidence of 
TAF and responsibility type beliefs in psychotic disorders, it is important to 
remember the difference between these and other disorders in terms of insight, which 
in turn has implications for the ability to effectively treat.  
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1.9 Religiosity  
One theory as to why TAF beliefs may develop is that by Salkovskis et al. 
(1999), who hypothesised that an individual may come to have TAF-moral beliefs  
because of belief systems with strict behavioural and moral codes, which have been 
imbued on them by an authority figure (e.g., school teacher or religious leader). It 
may not be surprising therefore, that religiosity has been linked with TAF, typically 
showing a stronger relationship between religiosity and TAF-moral, rather than with 
TAF-likelihood (Rassin & Koster, 2003). Salkovskis et al., (1999) describe how the 
interpretation of religious teachings can trigger obsessional problems such as “sin by 
thought” (an example of TAF-moral). That fact that TAF-likelihood is not related to 
religiosity may be because it is more a type of magical thinking, in that thoughts are 
assumed to have causal influence over events and probability of occurrence (Berle & 
Starcevich). This suggests a kind of superstition along the lines of ‘tempting fate’, a 
belief not commonly held by those who believe in Divine intervention and 
predeterminism. 
It is important to note that it is not necessarily religious teachings that cause 
the development of TAF; it may be that those individuals who are predisposed to 
having TAF beliefs are more likely to have religious beliefs also (Rassin & Koster, 
2003; Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Moreover, the individual’s interpretation of their 
belief system, their personal conviction, and/or fear of punishment may be more 
important in the correlation between TAF beliefs and religiosity (Berle & Starcevic, 
2005). The extreme nature of some kinds of teachings may also play a role 
(Salkovskis et al., 1999). Marino, Lunt and Negy (2008) found that those individuals 
with unusually rigid religious beliefs were more likely to feel responsible for their 
negative intrusions. These cognitions and inflated responsibility were found to occur 
across a range of situations and contexts in everyday life, leading them to experience 
unnecessary distress.  
Shafran et al. (1996) illustrate the possible role of religious teachings in the 
development of TAF; particularly that it is sinful and wicked to have aggressive and 
blasphemous thoughts. Many religious teachings are related to the concept of 
morality; for example, the often cited passage from the Bible: “You have heard that it 
was said, “Do not commit adultery.” But now I tell you: Anyone who looks at a 
woman and wants to possess her is guilty of committing adultery with her in his 
heart”   (Matthew 5: 27-28; New American Standard Version). Depending on 
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interpretation, this can suggest that the thought is morally equivalent with the action 
itself. Further evidence of the link between religion and TAF can be seen in the 
Thought-Action Fusion Scale (Shafran et al., 1996), with three of the 19 items 
referring explicitly to religion (e.g ‘Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful 
to me as a blasphemous action’, ‘When I think about making an obscene remark or 
gesture in church, it is almost as sinful as actually doing it’, and ‘Having obscene 
thoughts in a church is unacceptable to me’).  
There is empirical evidence that suggests a link between religiosity and TAF. 
For example, Rassin and Koster (2003) investigated this relationship with a non-
clinical sample of undergraduate university students. The results of this research 
demonstrated that religiosity was positively correlated with TAF, especially the moral 
component of TAF. It is important to note that the correlational nature of this research 
means that causation cannot be inferred. Therefore Rassin and Koster concluded that 
certain aspects of religion involve particular cognitions that are considered to be 
associated with obsessionality and correspond with aspects of TAF.  
1.10 Thought Suppression 
Recent research has suggested that TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs may 
lead normal intrusive thoughts to become pathological through the process of thought 
suppression. Thought suppression is one of the most common strategies people use to 
remove unwanted thoughts (Amir, Cashman & Foa, 1997). It refers to an attempt to 
reduce/neutralise the anxiety and discomfort caused by an unwanted thought or image 
by intentionally trying to remove it from attention (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes & Scott, 
1999). However, although it is used as an attempt to avoid the negative intrusion, 
thought suppression has been found to have a counterproductive effect by increasing 
the frequency and intensity of the intrusion, a phenomenon often referred to as the 
‘white bear effect’ paradoxically increasing obsessive compulsive symptoms 
(Wegner, Schnieder, Carter & White, 1987). The studies by Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter and White (1987) showed that attempts at thought suppression were most 
likely to result in more rather than fewer cognitive intrusions, and consequently 
pathological symptoms. Additionally, Wegner et al. (1987) found that this increased 
frequency of intrusions occurred not only at the time of attempted suppression, but 
also much later on, a phenomenon known as the ‘rebound effect’. As Wegner (1989, 
p. 167) concludes: “an obsession can grow from nothing but the desire to suppress a 
thought”. 
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It has been widely suggested that the misinterpretation of the significance of 
intrusive thoughts through inflated responsibility beliefs and TAF appraisals may lead 
the individual to try to suppress these thoughts or prevent them from returning (Berle 
& Starcevic, 2005; Rassin, Muris, Schmidt & Merckelbach, 2000). Through this 
process, normal intrusive thoughts may become pathological (Berle & Starcevich, 
2005). Rassin et al. (2000) used structural equation modelling to examine TAF and 
thought suppression in relation to OCD in a sample of undergraduate students. Results 
indicated that TAF led to suppression attempts, which in turn resulted in higher OC 
symptoms. It was also found that while TAF-likelihood had a direct effect of 
increasing OC symptoms, TAF-moral increased symptoms only through the 
mediating influence of thought suppression. The authors highlighted the intermediary 
role of thought suppression between TAF and OC symptoms.  
 Berle and Starcevic (2005) suggest that intrusive thoughts, TAF and thought 
suppression together form a ‘vicious circle’, in which the individual experiences 
negative intrusions, which are interpreted using TAF appraisals, leading to thought 
suppression, which then leads to an increase in frequency and intensity of the 
intrusion. This is consistent with Rachman (1998) who claimed that the increased 
significance assigned to an unwanted thought will lead to intense efforts at 
suppression, which paradoxically increases the frequency of the thought, 
strengthening the initial misinterpretation. 
1.11 Chapter Summary  
Although they are distinct constructs, TAF and inflated responsibility share 
similar distortions in cognition which have been associated with a range of 
psychological disorders. It has been repeatedly shown that beliefs of inflated 
responsibility and TAF appraisals play a role in psychopathology, especially OCD. 
Understanding this role and where these types of beliefs come from will lead to more 
specific, focused and effective psychological interventions for OCD in particular, as 
well as other disorders. Research has shown promising results of inflated 
responsibility beliefs, TAF appraisals and thought suppression in their susceptibility 
to change through therapy. Therefore, the more we know about these, more successful 
and tailored treatment methods can be developed.  
1.12 The Current Research  
The aim of the current research was to conduct a comprehensive examination 
of thought-action fusion and inflated responsibility. The three underlying research 
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aims were to provide clarity on the specific relationship between thought-action 
fusion and inflated responsibility, to determine their roles in psychopathology, and to 
provide empirical evidence for etiological theory. There exist two substantial 
limitations in the current research on both types of cognitive bias. Firstly, most 
research tends to focus specifically on links with OCD and obsessionality, without 
considering other disorders such as depression and anxiety. It is important to elucidate 
whether these types of beliefs are specific symptoms of OCD, or rather are more 
general cognitive biases that can be seen in other disorders. This has implications for 
the treatment of such disorders. Secondly, there is a lack of research with clinical 
samples, especially in regards to wider psychopathologies than OC symptoms. The 
current studies will address these issues and examine how the findings fit in with 
existing cognitive theory. Studies 1, 2A and 2B investigate the presence of both types 
of belief alongside symptoms of OCD, depression and anxiety. Study 1 uses structural 
equation modelling to investigate these relationships as well as exploring the use of 
thought suppression. Studies 2A and 2B examine responsibility and control beliefs 
with both clinical and nonclinical samples. These results will shed light on the 
presence of responsibility biases in a range of disorders, and how they may work 
alongside thought suppression and control beliefs to maintain symptoms. Studies 3A 
and 3B aims to provide empirical evidence for Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) theory for 
the etiology of inflated responsibility, using clinical and nonclinical samples. This 
will also be the first research to investigate whether this theory applies also to 
thought-action fusion. Finally, Study 4 will consider whether both types of 
responsibility bias are solely symptoms of psychopathology, or if they can exist 
without leading to distress when they are considered culturally normative. This will 
be investigated using Christian and Atheist samples. If results show responsibility 
beliefs to be unrelated to psychopathology in the Christian sample, this provides 
evidence for them to be considered normal in particular contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
2. INFLATED RESPONSIBILITY AND THOUGHT-ACTION FUSION IN 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND THE ROLE OF THOUGHT 
SUPPRESSION 
2.1  Introduction 
Previous research has shown strong links between OC symptoms and both 
TAF and inflated responsibility. There has also been an interest in how these factors 
may be associated with other disorders such as anxiety and depression (Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005), as well as various maintenance strategies (e.g. thought suppression 
and neutralising). Studies that examine a broader range of symptoms are important for 
determining how wide-ranging responsibility beliefs are – whether they are confined 
to OCD or are more general cognitive biases that present in a variety of 
psychopathologies. Thus, the goal of the current study was to build on existing 
research of TAF and inflated responsibility by investigating their role not only 
alongside OC symptoms, but also anxiety and depression, with the inclusion of 
thought suppression. It is proposed that responsibility beliefs are not specific to OCD, 
and can be seen more generally throughout other psychological disorders.  
Rassin et al. (2000) used a structural equation modelling approach to 
investigate the relationships between TAF, thought suppression and obsessive 
compulsive symptoms in a non-clinical sample. They found that the TAF likelihood 
component had a direct effect of increasing the symptoms of OCD. The moral 
component however, also increased OCD symptoms, but through an indirect route 
involving thought suppression (Rassin et al., 2000). This is consistent with the theory 
that TAF-likelihood is more related to possible catastrophic consequences, and is 
therefore likely to lead to compulsions or avoidance as a way of preventing these, 
whereas TAF-moral tends to induce thought suppression rather than overt behaviours 
(Rassin et al., 2000). Rassin et al. argued that their findings suggested that TAF is 
more fundamental to causing OC symptoms than is thought suppression. The finding 
that thought suppression plays an intermediary role between TAF and OC symptoms 
lends supports for therapeutic interventions focusing on the cognitive biases of 
patients, thereby decreasing thought suppression attempts (Rassin et al., 2000).  
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 In a similar study, Smari and Holmsteinsson (2001) investigated the mediating 
roles of responsibility attitudes and chronic thought suppression on intrusive thoughts 
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. In this study, the researchers considered TAF 
and responsibility attitudes as representing the same underlying construct. The 
participants for this research were 211 undergraduate Icelandic university students. 
Results demonstrated that responsibility attitudes mediated between intrusive thoughts 
and chronic thought suppression, and thought suppression mediated between 
responsibility attitudes and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Regression analyses 
showed evidence of the mediating role of responsibility and thought suppression 
between intrusive thoughts and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Figure 2.1), which 
is consistent with Salkovskis’ (1996) model.  
 
Figure 2.1 Relationships between intrusive thoughts, responsibility, thought 
suppression and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (from Smari & Holmsteinsson, 
2001, pp. 15).  
Previous research shows a strong link between TAF and OCD, however there 
is a growing body of evidence that suggests TAF has implications in a wide range of 
psychopathology, including eating disorders, general anxiety, phobias, panic disorder, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression (Marino, Lunt & Negy, 2008; Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005; Shafran & Rachman, 2004). The way in which TAF is related to an 
inflated sense of responsibility, with OCD as a whole, and other psychological 
disorders is still to be determined. Berle and Starcevic (2005) suggest that to examine 
the role of TAF in a variety of disorders would involve the experimental manipulation 
and reduction of TAF and evaluating the result of these manipulations. The question 
of possible intervening variables in the relationships between TAF and disorders 
including OCD, has raised the possibility of an additional factor involved in these 
relationships, perhaps mediating the association between TAF and the disorders 
(Berle & Starvevic, 2005).  Abramowitz et al. (2003) argue that if TAF is related not 
only to OCD but a variety of disorders, then it is a more general cognitive bias rather 
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than a specific proponent of OCD. This also supports the suggestion of an additional 
variable which acts as a mediator between a disorder and TAF.  
Previous research has shown depression to be related to TAF in both adults 
and adolescents, although the correlations are usually only small to medium (Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005). Abramowitz et al. (2003) compared levels of TAF, depression and 
anxiety in patients with OCD and non-clinical participants. Their findings showed that 
negative affect accounted for at least 30% of the variation in TAF-likelihood between 
the OCD group and the non-clinical participants. The authors proposed that the OCD 
patients scored so much higher on measures of TAF because they had higher levels of 
depression and anxiety. Supporting this proposition, TAF was found to be associated 
with both anxiety and depression, supported by a significant mediation where 
negative affect mediated the relationship between OCD and TAF.  The findings of 
this research showed that higher scores of TAF were related to more severe 
depression and anxiety. When broken down into the specific TAF components, TAF-
likelihood was related to anxiety, and TAF-moral was related to depression 
(Abramowitz et al., 2003). This may be because TAF-moral is associated with 
symptoms that are evident in depression, such as blaming oneself for negative 
external events, guilt, and personalisation (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005).  
The investigation of TAF and its relation to a wide variety of disorders is 
important for understanding these disorders. If TAF is shown to be related to a range 
of disorders and variables, then it may be more helpful to consider it as a more 
general cognitive bias, rather than a specific component or symptom of OCD 
(Abramowitz et al., 2003). In the most comprehensive analysis to date, Marino, Lunt 
and Negy (2008) used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to examine the 
relationships between a number of variables associated with TAF, including 
responsibility, magical ideation, ethnicity, cognitive intrusions, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and religiosity. The participants used for this study were 714 undergraduate 
psychology students. The results from this investigation yielded many interesting 
findings. First, religiosity was found to be a significant predictor of TAF beliefs, 
partially mediated by an inflated sense of responsibility in that the more religious a 
person considers themselves to be, the higher their likelihood of engaging in TAF 
beliefs. It was also found that both TAF and OC symptoms were predictors of 
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neutralising behaviour. The results showed that magical thinking was not a predictor 
for either TAF or OC symptoms and was not a significant factor in the model, as had 
been found in previous research (Marino et al., 2008). Unlike Smari and 
Holmsteinsson (2001), who investigated thought suppression as a mediating variable 
between responsibility beliefs and OC symptoms, Marino et al. (2008) used 
neutralisation as the mediator, which was found to be significant.  
More recently, Altin and Gencoz (2011) used mediation analyses to 
investigate the relationships between TAF, thought suppression and OC symptoms, 
using a non-clinical, undergraduate sample. The results from their study indicate that 
the two components of TAF each followed different paths to OC symptomology. 
While TAF-moral was associated with inflated responsibility, TAF-likelihood was 
related to thought suppression, which aggravated OC symptoms. The authors suggest 
that believing that thoughts increase the likelihood of a negative event motivates one 
to suppress these thoughts, in turn leading to an activation of OC symptoms. These 
are in contrast with the findings of Rassin et al. (2000) discussed earlier who found 
TAF-likelihood to have a direct path to OCD, and TAF-moral to increase OCD 
symptoms through thought suppression.  
2.2   Study 1  
The goal of Study 1 was to examine the effects of both TAF and Inflated 
Responsibility on OC symptoms thus replicating the relationship previously 
demonstrated. Previous research in this area has focused solely on OCD; however the 
current study also examined the effect of these same factors on the non-OC 
psychopathologies of anxiety and depression. This will provide evidence of both 
constructs as general cognitive biases, as opposed to being specifically related to 
obsessive compulsive symptoms. Additionally, the current study examined the 
potential mediating role of thought suppression. 
2.2.1  Hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that (1) TAF and Inflated responsibility would be 
significantly correlated with OC symptoms, depression and anxiety; (2) that the 
correlation between TAF and Responsibility with anxiety and depression would 
remain significant after controlling for OC symptoms, (3) that Inflated Responsibility 
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beliefs would be predictive of OC symptoms, depression and anxiety, with these 
relationships being mediated by thought suppression; and (4) that TAF would be 
predictive of OC symptoms, depression and anxiety, with these relationships being 
mediated by thought suppression. In terms of the separate components of TAF (moral 
and likelihood), previous research findings in this area are mixed and contradictory, 
so the current analyses in this area are exploratory.  
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
 The participants for this study were 193 undergraduate Psychology students 
from Victoria University of Wellington, who participated in groups of up to 10. For 
their participation, the students received one half hour credit towards their compulsory 
research participation. The sample consisted of 125 females (64.8%) and 67 males 
(34.7%). The participants ages ranged from 16 to 39 with a mean age of 19.23 
(SD=2.59). The sample consisted mainly of New Zealand European participants 
(73.6%), 7.3% were Asian, with the remaining participants being European (4.7%), 
Maori (4.7%), Pacific Nations (3.1%), and other (5.2%).  
2.3.2 Measures   
 The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) was 
used to assess the degree to which participants experience symptoms of OCD. 
Responses were measured on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely), with a scale score calculated by summing the scores of all 18 items 
(higher scores indicated higher OC symptomology). The items included statements 
such as “I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them”, 
and “I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off”. 
Foa et al. (2002) reported an alpha of .90 for the scale. A copy of this scale is included 
in Appendix E.  
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is a 
15 item unbalanced measure which assesses the extent to which individuals suppress 
specific thoughts. The items are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items include statements such as “Sometimes I 
stay busy just to keep thoughts from intruding on my mind”, and “I often do things to 
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distract myself from my thoughts”. This scale aims to measure to what extent an 
individual tries to get rid of particular thoughts. Wegner and Zanakos (1994) reported 
reliabilities ranging from .87 to .89. The WBSI scale score was created by averaging 
the scores from all 15 items. Higher scores indicate a stronger tendency to engage in 
suppression. This scale is included in Appendix G.  
The Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (TAF-R; Shafran et al., 1996) is a 
19 item scale which assesses the degree to which participants equate their thoughts 
with actions. Twelve of the items refer to TAF Moral (e.g. “Thinking of cheating in a 
personal relationship is almost as immoral to me as actually cheating”); four for TAF 
likelihood-others (e.g. “If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, this increases the 
risk that they will lose their job”); and three for TAF likelihood-self (e.g. “If I think of 
myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill”). Each item is a statement to 
which the participants rate the extent to which they agree or disagree using a five 
point Likert scale. An overall scale score is calculated by summing the scores of all 
the items, with higher scores indicating a stronger TAF bias. A copy of this scale is 
included in Appendix H.  
The Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000) is a 26 item 
questionnaire used to assess general beliefs about responsibility. Items include 
statements such as “I must protect others from harm,” and “I am too sensitive to 
feeling responsible for things going wrong”. Participants rated how much they agreed 
or disagreed with each statement on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Totally 
agree’ to ‘Totally disagree’, with a total overall score calculated by summing all of 
the items, and higher scores indicating higher levels of inflated responsibility. This 
scale is included in Appendix F.  
The Self-Rating Depression Scale (Zung, 1965) measures depression using a 
20 item scale with items such as “I feel down-hearted and blue.” Half of the items are 
reverse-scored. Participants rate how much well each statement describes the way 
they have been feeling in the past several days on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (a 
little of the time) to 4 (most of the time). Higher overall scores indicate a higher level 
of depression. A copy of this scale is in Appendix I.  
The Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Zung, 1971) was used to measure the level of 
anxiety of participants on a 20 item scale. Items include statements such as “I feel 
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more nervous and anxious than usual,” and “I can feel my heart beating fast”. Five of 
the items are reverse-coded. Participants are required to indicate on a 4-point Likert 
scale how each item best describes the way they have felt or behaved during the past 
several days. Higher overall scores indicate higher levels of anxiety. This scale is 
included in Appendix J.  
2.3.3 Procedure 
 The questionnaires were completed in group sessions of up to 10 participants. 
Before commencing, participants were each given an information sheet to read, a 
consent form to sign and were given time to ask any questions they may have. The 
experimenter also introduced the participants to the study and informed them of the 
sensitivity of some of the questions in the survey. This was accompanied by the 
assurance that if at any time a participant chose to withdraw from the study, they 
could do so without penalty.  
After the participants had completed their surveys, which took approximately 
30 minutes, they were debriefed by the experimenter and given a debriefing sheet to 
take with them. The Victoria University Human Ethics Committee gave approval for 
this study prior to its beginning. The information sheet, questionnaire and the 
debriefing sheet are included in the Appendix A.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Analyses 
 The means, standard deviations and reliability coefficients for all latent 
variables are shown in Table 2.1, and Pearson correlations shown in Table 2.2. 
Correlations while controlling for Obsessive Compulsive symptoms are shown in 
Table 2.3. As seen in Table 2.1, all scales showed good to excellent reliability.   
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Table 2.1  
Means and standard deviations of latent variables 
 M SD α 
TAF-R 
RAS 
WBSI 
SRDS 
SRAS 
OCI-R 
20.59 
72.30 
2.83 
40.59 
37.56 
16.01 
12.59 
25.61 
.82 
10.08 
10.78 
10.89 
.91 
.93 
.92 
.87 
.90 
.90 
Note: N=193;  α: Cronbach’s alpha.                                                                                        
TAF-R: Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (Shafran et al., 1996); RAS: 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); WBSI: White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994); SRDS: Self-Rating Depression 
Scale (Zung, 1965); SRAS: Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Zung, 1971); OCI-R: 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 2002). 
Table 2.2  
Pearson correlations among latent variables with likelihood and moral TAF 
subscales  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) TAF 
(2) Moral 
(3) Likelihood 
(4)Responsibility 
(5) WBSI 
(6) Depression 
(7) Anxiety 
(8) OCI 
1 
.91** 
.59** 
.34** 
.30** 
.19** 
.26** 
.24** 
 
1 
.19* 
.28** 
.15* 
.02 
.09 
.06 
 
 
1 
.23** 
.39** 
.38** 
.41** 
.39** 
 
 
 
1 
.46** 
.40** 
.42** 
.45** 
 
 
 
 
1 
.57** 
.60** 
.61** 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.84** 
.59** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.62** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Note: N=193; **p<.01, *p<.05. TAF-R: Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised 
(Shafran et al., 1996); RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); 
WBSI: White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994); SRDS: Self-
Rating Depression Scale (Zung, 1965); SRAS: Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Zung, 
1971); OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 2002).  
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Correlation analyses show that all overall scales are significantly related to 
each other. When looking at the TAF subscales, Likelihood is significantly related to 
all other variables, while Moral does not significantly correlate with depression, 
anxiety and OC symptoms. After controlling for OC symptoms (Table 2.3), the 
correlation between TAF and thought suppression, depression and anxiety all become 
non-significant. However inflated responsibility remains significantly correlated with 
thought suppression, depression and anxiety. The two subscales of TAF produce 
mixed results. These preliminary results indicate that overall TAF is more specific to 
OC symptoms, and related to other disorders and thought suppression through these. 
However inflated responsibility remains significantly related to thought suppression, 
anxiety and depression even when OC symptoms are controlled for, suggesting it may 
be a more general cognitive bias.  
Table 2.3 
  
Pearson correlations among latent variables controlling for Obsessive-Compulsive 
symptoms   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1) TAF 
(2) Moral 
(3) Likelihood 
(4)Responsibility 
(5) WBSI 
(6) Depression 
(7) Anxiety  
1 
.91** 
.50** 
.21* 
.14 
.05 
.12 
 
1 
.09 
.23* 
.10 
-.05 
.02 
 
 
1 
.02 
.13 
.21* 
.25** 
 
 
 
1 
.24* 
.24* 
.22* 
 
 
 
 
1 
.31** 
.37** 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.76** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Note: N=193; **p<.01, *p<.05 TAF-R: Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised 
(Shafran et al., 1996); RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); 
WBSI: White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994); SRDS: Self-
Rating Depression Scale (Zung, 1965); SRAS: Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Zung, 
1971). 
  
Each of the constructs under investigation served as latent variables in the 
models used in this study. Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms were indicated by the 
checking, hoarding, neutralising, obsessing, ordering, and washing subscales 
measured by the OCI. Thought-Action fusion was indicated by the moral, likelihood-
self and likelihood-other subscales of the TAF-R. For all of the other latent variables, 
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three parcels of items from each of the scales were used in the measurement model as 
indicators of the construct.  
2.4.2 Model Analyses 
 Data analyses were performed using Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). 
Overall model fit was examined using the Chi-squared ratio (chi-square value divided 
by the degrees of freedom, which should be less than 4.0 or 5.0 (Jose, 2010)), the 
comparative fit index (CFI), the squared error of approximation (RMSEA), and 
Hoelter’s Critical Number (CN). CFI values greater than .90 (Bentler, 1992) and 
RMSEA values less than .10 (Kline, 1998) indicated acceptable model fit. The last 
goodness-of-fit statistic is Hoelter’s Critical Number (CN). According to Hoelter 
(1983), a value that exceeds 200 is indicative of a model that represents the sample 
data.  
2.4.3 Measurement Models 
  The initial measurement models allowed all latent constructs to correlate 
freely, with satisfactory x²/df, CFI, and RMSEA values shown in Table 2.4. The 
Outcome measurement model (Depression, Anxiety and OC symptoms) is shown in 
Figure 2.4, and the Predictor measurement model (Inflated Responsibility and 
Thought-Action Fusion) is shown in Figure 2.5. For variables that did not have 
subscales (Depression, Anxiety and Inflated Responsibility), parcels of items were 
created and used to indicate the variables. The parcelling of items refers to the 
creation of small bundles of individual scale items, which are then submitted to be 
analysed.  
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Figure 2.2  Outcome Measurement Model.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Predictor Measurement Model   
 
 
.59 
.62 
.84 
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.91 
.68 
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.75 
.74 
.77 
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Table 2.4 
Fit indices for Measurement Models  
Model   x² x²/df CFI RMSEA 
Outcome Measurement model  
Predictor Measurement model  
92.80 
27.74 
1.82ª 
3.47ª 
.97ª 
.96ª 
.07ª 
.10 
Note: N=193. ªIndicative of a good fit. Outcome measurement model: Depression, 
Anxiety, OC Symptoms. Predictor measurement model: Thought-Action Fusion and 
Inflated Responsibility.  
2.4.4 Structural Modelling   
 2.4.4.1     Inflated Responsibility  
  For Inflated Responsibility, models were run with thought suppression as a 
full mediator (Figure 2.4) and a partial mediator (Figure 2.5). For the partial 
mediation model, the association between depression and OC symptoms was removed 
to avoid a just identified model (and get model fit indices). A nested model (Figure 
2.6) excluding thought suppression was also run to check for a more economical 
model fit. The model fit indices for these models are shown in Table 2.5, and indicate 
that the partial mediation model best represents the sample data demonstrating the 
better fitting and more parsimonious model.  
Table 2.5 
Inflated Responsibility: Fit indices for covariance structure analyses   
Model   x² df x²/df CFI RMSEA CN 
(0.1) 
Full Mediation Model 
Partial Mediation Model 
Nested Model   
12.29 
1.94 
2.84 
3 
1 
1 
4.10 
1.94ª 
2.84ª 
.98ª 
.99ª 
.99ª 
.13 
.07ª 
.09ª 
178 
656ª 
448ª 
Note: N=193. ªIndicative of a good fit.  
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Figure 2.4 Inflated Responsibility (IR): Full mediation model with standardised 
regression weights   
 
 
Figure 2.5 Inflated Responsibility (IR): Partial mediation model with standardised 
regression weights   
 
Figure 2.6 Inflated Responsibility (IR): Nested model with standardised regression 
weights  
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2.4.4.2     Thought-Action Fusion 
Similarly for Thought-Action Fusion, models were run with thought 
suppression as a full mediator (Figure 2.7) and a partial mediator (Figure 2.8). A 
nested model (Figure 2.9) excluding thought suppression was also run to check for a 
more economical model fit. Finally, a mixed model separating TAF into Moral and 
Likelihood subscales was then run (Figure 2.10). The model included here displays a 
full mediation for TAF-moral, and partial mediation for TAF-likelihood. This is based 
on past research and manipulation of several models to find the better fit. The model 
fit indices for all models are shown in Table 2.6, and indicate that initially the full 
mediation model appears to be the better fitting option. However, TAF is made up of 
two different components (moral and likelihood). When these are separated, the 
mixed model includes thought suppression as both a partial and full mediator.  
Table 2.6 
Thought-Action Fusion: Fit indices for covariance structure analyses   
Model   x² df x²/df CFI RMSEA CN 
(0.1) 
Full Mediation Model 
Partial Mediation Model 
Nested Model   
Mixed Model  
2.55 
3.57 
4.93 
2.26 
3 
2 
1 
5 
.85ª 
1.79ª 
4.93 
2.26ª 
1.00ª 
1.00ª 
.99ª 
.99ª 
.00ª 
.06ª 
.14 
.08ª 
853ª 
495ª 
259ª 
257ª 
Note: N=193. ªIndicative of a good fit. 
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Figure 2.7 Thought-Action Fusion (TAF): Full mediation model with standardised 
regression weights   
 
Figure 2.8 Thought-Action Fusion (TAF): Partial mediation model with standardised 
regression weights   
 
Figure 2.9 Thought-Action Fusion (TAF): Nested model with standardised regression 
weights  
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Figure 2.10 Thought-Action Fusion (TAF): Mixed model of moral and likelihood 
subscales with standardised regression weights  
2.5 Study 1 Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate the relationships between inflated 
responsibility and TAF and psychopathology, namely OC symptoms, depression and 
anxiety. The overall results demonstrated interesting differences between TAF and 
inflated responsibility and their individual relationships with OC symptoms, anxiety 
and depression, as well as their relationship with thought suppression. Firstly, while 
allowing all variables to correlate freely with each other, both variables were 
significantly related to all three disorders. However, when controlling for OC 
symptoms, the relationship with inflated responsibility remained significant, while 
that for TAF became non-significant. This suggests that while inflated responsibility 
may be a more generalised, broad cognitive bias, TAF seems to be more specifically 
related to OC symptoms.  
The structural modelling results demonstrated the role of thought suppression 
between responsibility beliefs (both inflated responsibility and overall TAF), and OC 
symptoms, depression and anxiety. For inflated responsibility, overall model fit was 
better when thought suppression partially mediated the relationship with OC 
symptoms, depression and anxiety. However, for thought-action fusion, a mixed 
model produced the best results, with TAF-likelihood being directly linked to OC 
symptoms, depression and anxiety, while this association with TAF-moral was 
mediated by thought suppression. This finding dovetails nicely with the findings of 
Rassin et al., (2000) who had similar results examining only OC symptoms. Rassin et 
al. argue that TAF-likelihood is more likely to lead directly to compulsions and 
.08 .10 
.37 .03 
.17 
.14 
.32 
.54 .76 
.36 
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neutralising techniques associated with OCD and anxiety in order to prevent the 
negative event. However TAF-moral beliefs tend to lead to thought suppression and 
rumination, which go on to induce symptoms of OCD, anxiety and depression.  
According to Berle and Starcevic (2005), normal intrusive thoughts become 
pathological through the intermediary process of thought suppression. The current 
results provide some support for this idea in relation to inflated responsibility and 
TAF-moral. The underlying theory around how this may work is the paradoxical 
effects of thought suppression whereby negative, intrusive thoughts may be 
successfully suppressed short term, but will return later with increased frequency and 
intensity (Wegner et al., 1987). Therefore thought suppression is problematic in that it 
increases the negativity and salience around a thought, more than what would have 
occurred if no suppression attempts were made.  
Thought suppression in the current study was measured using the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). One major criticism of this 
scale is that some of the items are attempting to measure the presence of cognitive 
intrusions, as opposed to attempts at suppressing these, consequently producing 
misleading results. Early analyses of the WBSI structure revealed one underlying 
factor: the tendency to use suppression as a mental control strategy, however 
subsequent studies have produced alternative results. One example of this is that of 
Blumberg (2000) who found three overall factors; the presence of unwanted, intrusive 
thoughts, thought suppression, and self-distraction (as an avoidance strategy). 
Blumberg describes that overall high scores on this scale may therefore identify 
people who are not able to successfully suppress, and experience rebounds. Similarly, 
Hoping and de Jong-Meyer (2003) found two factors, unwanted intrusive thoughts, 
and thought suppression, concluding that the major variable assessed by the WBSI is 
not thought suppression, but the presence of thought intrusions. This is problematic, 
as Rassin (2003) describes, it is important to distinguish between thought suppression 
and thought intrusions, as the frequency of intrusions may be the direct result of 
unsuccessful thought suppression.  
Rachman and Shafran (1999) identified both inflated responsibility and guilt 
in the development and maintenance of depression. It is possible that rather than 
trying to suppress their negative, intrusive thoughts, individuals dwell and ruminate 
on them. Rumination and repetitive negative thinking has been repeatedly implicated 
in depression (Papageorgiou & Siegle, 2003), and can also be characteristic of anxiety 
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disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). This process would bypass the attempts at 
suppression, as upon experiencing a negative intrusive thought, the individual would 
then focus on that thought, not attempting to suppress or stifle it.  
Results revealed that TAF was not correlated with depression and anxiety 
when OC symptoms were controlled for, and that thought suppression played a 
mediating role between TAF-moral and psychopathology. This indicates that TAF is 
likely to be a specific feature of OCD, and works alongside thought suppression in 
developing and maintaining symptoms, an interaction supported by research and 
theory (e.g. Rassin, 2001; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris & Spaan, 1999; Rachman, 
1998). Along these lines, the individual experiences a TAF thought, they attempt to 
suppress it thereby paradoxically increasing its frequency and intensity, leading to OC 
symptoms and the urge to neutralise (Rassin, 2001). This would suggest that not only 
having TAF-related intrusions is important, but also the desire to suppress this kind of 
thinking is what potentially leads to distress and OC symptoms. For someone to want 
to suppress these feelings, they must be interpreting them as significantly undesirable 
and damaging in some way. It is therefore important that treatments are in place 
which can teach the individual new skills for coping with and reinterpreting negative 
intrusive thoughts, rather than attempting to avoid them.    
The repeated experience of having a negative intrusion, interpreting it using 
TAF concepts, failed attempts at suppression leading to increased symptoms, results 
in a vicious cycle which is hard for the individual to stop, and can be very resistant to 
treatment.  Exacerbating this cycle are the negative effects of attempting to suppress 
negative thoughts, which can have detrimental effects on the individual’s mood 
(Purdon & Clark, 2001). Research has shown that it is more difficult to suppress 
negative thoughts while the mood is negative (e.g. Wenzlaff, Wegner & Roper, 1988; 
Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein, 1991). Additionally, these unsuccessful attempts at 
suppressing negative thoughts can be experienced as intense failure, further fuelling 
the already negative mood (Purdon & Clark, 2001). 
2.5.1  Clinical Implications 
That inflated responsibility was found to remain significantly related to 
depression and general anxiety after controlling for OC symptoms has important 
implications for the treatment of both disorders. Inflated responsibility has always 
been considered in relation to OCD, so giving this some attention in terms of treating 
depression and other types of anxiety may be beneficial. Rachman and Shafran (1999) 
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suggest that depression can be the result of inflated responsibility beliefs and guilt. 
Targeting these thought patterns through therapy, and educating people on how these 
beliefs may be maintaining their disorders may prove to be helpful. A more specific 
example of this is applying a cognitive therapy programme targeting inflated 
responsibility to depressed and anxious patients, hopefully leading to a decrease in 
perceived responsibility, and therefore symptoms (Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume & 
Dube, 1996). Promising research in this area has shown inflated responsibility in 
OCD to be unstable and amenable to change (Rassin et al., 2000); it is anticipated that 
this will generalise to anxiety and depressive disorders.   
The finding that the association between both inflated responsibility and TAF 
with symptoms of psychopathology in terms of thought suppression has some 
implications for treatment. Those who display more general inflated responsibility 
may benefit from treatments focussed on how they interpret thoughts in terms of guilt, 
and strategies for cognitive framing as opposed to ruminating on negative thoughts. 
However, because thought suppression only acted as a partial mediator for inflated 
responsibility, and not at all for TAF-likelihood, therapies targeted at thought 
suppression may be beneficial but may leave the underlying bias somewhat intact. 
Rassin et al. (2000) suggested that responsibility beliefs are likely to be a cause of 
OCD, unlike thought suppression which plays an intermediary role (rather than 
causal, or a result of OC symptoms) and suggested that by targeting responsibility 
biases through therapeutic interventions, this would therefore decrease the desire to 
engage in thought suppression. For both inflated responsibility and TAF, it is assumed 
that targeting the underlying cognitive biases will be more effective, as concluded by 
Rachman (1997, p. 299) that “the most direct and satisfactory treatment of obsessions 
is to assist the patient in the modification of the putatively causal catastrophic 
misinterpretations of the significance of their intrusive thoughts. Bluntly, if these 
misinterpretations are ‘corrected’, the obsession should cease”.  
2.5.2  Limitations  
Study 1 has some limitations. It is important to note that while Structural 
Equation Modelling can be particularly useful for examining relationships between 
different variables, it cannot be used to infer causality (Marino et al., 2008). 
Additionally, the sample consisted of healthy volunteers, therefore findings cannot be 
generalised to those clinically affected by TAF and inflated responsibility, as well as 
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clinical OCD, depression and anxiety. Future research with clinical participants is 
therefore recommended.  
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 The overall findings of Study 1 highlight key differences between inflated 
responsibility and TAF in relation to psychopathology. It was found that inflated 
responsibility is significantly correlated with OC symptoms, depression and anxiety. 
This remained after controlling for OC symptoms, suggesting it is more of an overall 
cognitive bias which has important implications for its treatment. In contrast, while 
TAF was initially significantly correlated with OC symptoms, depression and anxiety, 
this became non-significant when OC symptoms were controlled for. This suggests 
that TAF is more of a specific symptom of OCD. It was also found that the structural 
model of inflated responsibility being related to OC symptoms, depression and 
anxiety was more parsimonious when partially mediated by thought suppression. It 
may be that upon experiencing negative intrusions, individuals will not attempt to 
suppress the thought, but will ruminate and focus on them. Additionally, thought 
suppression played a mediating role between TAF-moral and OC symptoms, anxiety 
and depression, while the association between TAF-likelihood and 
psychopathological symptoms was direct. These results have interesting implications 
for clinical treatment in terms of targeting the underlying responsibility biases that 
may lead to the desire to suppress negative thoughts.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.   RESPONSIBILITY BELIEFS AND PERCEIVED CONTROL 
The results from Study 1 highlighted the role of TAF and inflated 
responsibility in OC symptoms, depression and anxiety. The aim of Studies 2A and 
2B is to expand on these results by focusing on how responsibility beliefs may 
interact with beliefs about personal control, to exacerbate and maintain these 
symptoms. Research in this area has previously been conducted with Turkish 
adolescents (Altin & Karanci, 2008). Studies 2A and 2B extend and improve on this 
by utilising adult samples, and with Study 2B using a clinical sample of individuals 
with diagnosed anxiety disorders. Study 2B is also the first study to examine TAF 
alongside control beliefs and OC symptoms, as an alternative to inflated 
responsibility.   
3.1   Control Beliefs and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
There has been recent interest focusing on cognitive factors and their role in 
developing and maintaining problematic responsibility beliefs in relation to OC 
symptoms, particularly around control beliefs (Altin & Karanci, 2008). Most past 
research on OC symptoms and control theories focused on the need and ability to 
control thoughts. This literature focuses on two main concepts: the sense of control, 
and desire for control. Based on this research, evidence suggests that people with 
OCD report a greater desire for control over their thoughts than normal and anxious 
individuals (Clark, Purdon & Wang, 2003). In terms of sense of control, these scores 
tend to be related to higher scores of OC symptomatology (e.g. Zebb & Moore, 2003). 
Additionally, individuals with OCD demonstrate a high desire to control their 
thoughts, inconsistent with their low sense of control over their thoughts. This 
discrepancy leads to distress, as well as neutralisation behaviours and thought 
suppression (Moulding & Kyrios, 2006).  An example of such research is that of 
Moulding and Kyrios (2007) who investigated desire for control and sense of control 
and their relationship to OC symptoms with an undergraduate population. After 
controlling for depression and anxiety, higher levels of desire for control and lower 
levels of sense of control were associated with higher levels of OC symptoms and 
related beliefs.  
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3.2 Locus of Control  
Few studies have considered more general control theories in relation to OC 
symptoms, such as Locus of Control (LOC). This refers to attributions an individual 
places on the responsibility for their successes and failures in life (Rotter, 1966, 1975; 
as cited in Bernard & Krupat, 1994). People with an internal locus of control believe 
that they are in control of their lives, and they take responsibility for what happens to 
them. Alternatively, those with an external locus believe that events in their lives are 
controlled by other people or chance. Following on from this, individuals with an 
internal locus are considered to be at an advantage, as they believe they have control 
over their own lives, whereas externals believe they have little or no influence 
(Kennedy, Lynch & Schwab, 1998).  Arguably, those individuals who have an 
inflated sense of responsibility and an external locus of control, would experience 
anxiety symptoms. That is, the level of perceived responsibility is not matched by 
their sense of control over a situation and this mismatch is likely to be highly 
aversive.  
A large body of research has examined the effects of locus of control on 
symptoms of depression. The finding of greater externality in terms of locus of 
control being associated with greater levels of depression has been demonstrated to be 
quite reliable (e.g. Ganellen & Blaney, 1984; Burger, 1984; Benassi, Sweeney & 
Dufour, 1988). Other research has suggested that locus of control can act as a 
mediator between life stressors and overall mental health. For example, Anderson 
(1977 cited in Parkes, 1984) found that internals reported lower levels of overall 
distress and demonstrated particular types of coping strategies focused more on task-
centred rather than  emotion-centred behaviours. Similar research on the mediating 
effect of control beliefs was conducted by Hofman (2005) with individuals suffering 
from social anxiety. These results demonstrated a partial mediating effect of perceived 
control between estimated social cost and anxiety. Specifically, participants diagnosed 
with social anxiety disorder believed that social situations were more anxiety 
provoking when they perceived that they had little control over them.  
In a recent study by Altin and Karanci (2008), the relationship between locus 
of control, inflated responsibility and non-clinical obsessive compulsive symptoms in 
Turkish adolescents was investigated. The results showed a significant interaction 
such that higher OC symptomology was associated with the combination of inflated 
responsibility along with an external locus of control. More specifically, for those 
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individuals with inflated responsibility beliefs, OC symptoms were significantly 
higher with an external locus of control, by itself, compared to an internal locus of 
control. The overall findings suggest that simply having an external locus of control 
may not be sufficient to produce OC symptoms, but the addition of an inflated sense 
of responsibility for events and preventing harm, this may have a triggering effect on 
OC symptoms. Additionally when overall responsibility beliefs are low, and an 
external locus of control is present, the person is less likely to show OC symptoms. 
This research was limited in that it involved a very young non-clinical participant 
group (age range 16-20 years), and all measures were completed in Turkish, such that 
generalising the findings to those who have been diagnosed with OCD would be 
speculative at best.   
3.3  Study 2A 
 Study 1 examined how inflated responsibility and TAF are related to 
psychopathology (namely OC symptoms, anxiety and depression), and the influence 
of thought suppression. Thought suppression can be considered a reaction to, or 
consequence of, inflated responsibility. It is something individuals do in response to 
unwanted responsibility beliefs. By targeting the underlying beliefs about 
responsibility, this should therefore decrease thought suppression attempts. It may be 
helpful to look more closely at responsibility beliefs and how individuals interpret 
them and their level of control. For example, if someone believes that they are 
responsible for preventing harm to themselves or others, their perception of how 
much control they have over the situation may be related to the level of anxiety they 
experience. The aim of Study 2A was to replicate the research of Altin and Karanci 
(2008), by investigating the effect of having an external locus of control on the 
relationship between inflated responsibility and OC symptoms, however with an 
adult, non-clinical participant group. If individuals believe that they are responsible 
for events in theirs and others’ lives, and they also have an external locus of control, 
they would experience higher levels of OC symptoms.   
 3.3.1 Hypotheses  
 Based on previous research, it was predicted that: (1) both an inflated 
responsibility and external locus of control would significantly predict higher levels 
of OC symptoms, (2) that the interaction of the two variables would predict OC 
symptoms over and above that of each alone, (3) that for those individuals with a 
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higher inflated sense of responsibility, OC symptom severity would be higher in those 
with higher levels of external locus of control.  
3.4 Method 
3.4.1 Participants  
The participants for this study were 140 individuals who completed an online 
survey. Participants were recruited using a snowballing effect through the social 
networking site Facebook. The sample consisted of 78 females (56 %) and 24 males 
(17%); 38 did not specify gender (27%). The participants ages ranged from 16 to 66 
with a mean age of 28.23 (SD=10.69).  
3.4.2 Measures 
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa, et al., 2002), and 
the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000) were used in this 
study and are described in detail in Study 1 (Chapter 2).  
Additionally, Levenson’s (1973) Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory 
was used to measure internal and external locus of control. This is a 24 item scale, to 
which participants rated their agreement of a statement on a 6 point scale ranging 
from ‘Agree Strongly’ to ‘Disagree Strongly’. The scale measured Internal Locus and 
External Locus. External was made up of the subscales Powerful Others and Chance. 
Statements include items such as “My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others” 
(external), and “I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life” (internal). 
Participants are able to obtain high or low scores on all three dimensions, with higher 
scores indicating a stronger endorsement for that attitude. For the purposes of this 
study, the Powerful Others and Chance subscales were combined to provide a 
measure of overall Externality. Only this combined External score was used in the 
current research. A copy of this scale is included in Appendix L.  
3.4.3 Procedure  
The questionnaire data were collected via an anonymous online survey using 
Survey Monkey. The initial sample of participants was invited to complete the survey 
by the principle investigator via connections on the Facebook social networking site. 
Subsequent participants were invited by those who had already completed the survey, 
or were those who randomly came across the site, using a snowballing effect. The 
survey itself took approximately 20 minutes to complete. The Victoria University 
Human Ethics Committee gave approval for this study prior to its beginning. The 
information sheet, questionnaire and the debriefing sheet are included in Appendix B.  
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3.5 Results  
 3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 The means, standard deviations and reliability coefficients for all variables are 
shown in Table 3.1. All scales showed good to excellent reliability. 
Table 3.1  
Means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alpha.  
 M SD α 
OCI 
RAS 
LOC – External 
36.91 
69.38 
54.18 
13.59 
33.86 
11.38 
.92 
.91 
.82 
Note: OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 2002); RAS: 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); LOC: Levenson’s 
Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory (Levenson, 1973).  
 
 Pearson correlations are presented in Table 3.2 OC symptoms, inflated 
responsibility and external locus of control all significantly correlated with each other.  
 
Table 3.2  
Pearson correlations  
 1 2 3 
(1) OCI 
(2) RAS 
(3) LOC - External 
1 
.322** 
.373** 
 
1 
.476** 
 
 
1 
Note: **p<.01.  OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 
2002); RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); LOC: 
Levenson’s Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory (Levenson, 1973).  
 
 3.5.2   Multiple Regression  
  Multiple regression analyses were performed to examine whether the 
interaction of inflated responsibility with an external locus of control would predict 
the presence of OC symptoms over and above the main effects of each individual 
variable. Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for the hierarchical regression 
analysis with the total OC symptoms as the dependent variable. Inflated responsibility 
was entered into the equation as the first step and explained 14% of the variance 
(t[139] = 4.72, p<.001). External locus of control was entered in the second step 
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explaining 19% of the variance, with both inflated responsibility (t[138] = 2.97, 
p<.001) and external locus of control (t[138] = 2.87, p<.001) being significant 
predictors. On the final step, the interaction term for inflated responsibility and 
external locus of control improved the overall variance to 25%, and was a significant 
predictor of total OC symptoms (t[137]= 3.50, p<.001).  
 
Table 3.3  
The results of the multiple regression analyses 
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
           Constant 
           Inflated Responsibility 
 
47.74 
.15 
 
2.50 
.03 
 
 
.37* 
Step 2 
          Constant 
          Inflated Responsibility 
          External Locus of Control 
 
28.41 
.10 
.30 
 
7.16 
.04 
.16 
 
 
.26* 
.25* 
Step 3 
          Constant 
          Interaction 
 
-1.38 
.01 
 
10.94 
.00 
 
 
.92* 
Note: R² = .14 for Step 1, ΔR² = .05 (p<.001) for Step 2, ΔR²= .07 (p<.001) for Step 3; 
*=p<.001. Dependent variable: OC symptoms  
 
3.5.3 Moderation Analyses 
 The moderation analyses were performed using Modgraph (Jose, 2008), which 
is based on the guidelines by Aiken and West (1991). Before multiple regressions 
were performed, the two independent variables (External Locus of Control and 
Inflated Responsibility) were centred to avoid multicollinearity. Simple regression 
lines for moderated variables were plotted for significant interaction effects. As can 
be seen in Figure 3.1, inflated responsibility moderates the relationship from external 
Locus of Control to OC symptoms. That is, participants with high inflated 
responsibility showed more OC symptoms when paired with higher levels of Locus of 
Control externality. In fact, at every level of inflated responsibility, OC symptom 
severity was higher in those with higher levels of external Locus of Control.  
 The slopes of the three regression lines were tested to see if they significantly 
differed from zero. This revealed that the simple slopes for high inflated responsibility 
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(β=1.63, t[131]=3.91, p <.001), medium inflated responsibility (β=1.36, t[131]=4.23, 
p<.001), and low inflated responsibility (β=1.09, t[131]=5.54, p<.001 ) were all 
significant.
3.6 Study 2A Discussion  
 The goal of Study 2A was to investigate the influence of external locus of 
control on the relationship between inflated responsibility and OC symptoms. The 
results showed that the interaction of inflated responsibility with an external locus of 
control significantly predicted OC symptoms more than each variable independently. 
Moderation results showed that having a higher sense of responsibility predicted 
higher OC symptom severity in those that also had an external locus of control. It is 
interesting to note that for all three levels of inflated responsibility, if an external 
locus of control was present, OC symptom severity was significantly higher than 
those who showed low levels of externality. This suggests that it is not simply the 
presence of inflated responsibility that predicts anxiety, but also how those beliefs are 
interpreted in regards to control. Evidently both variables are important and work 
together to produce feelings and symptoms of anxiety.  
 The current findings seem to be at odds with Altin and Karanci’s (2008) 
findings in regards to inflated responsibility. Their results showed that when someone 
has an external locus of control, they also were only high on OC symptom severity if 
they also had high inflated responsibility.  If the person had low responsibility beliefs, 
Figure 3.1 Interaction between Inflated Responsibility and external Locus of Control in 
the prediction of Obsessive Compulsive Symptoms. 
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they were at lower risk of OC symptomatology even if they had an external locus of 
control. In the current study, however, all levels of inflated responsibility (low, 
medium, high) were related to higher OC symptomatology in the presence of external 
locus of control. Although all slopes were significant, results did show that, overall, 
higher levels of responsibility were related to OC symptom severity.   
3.7  Study 2B 
The aim of Study 2B was to replicate Study 2A with an adult clinical 
population. Results from Study 1 showed that TAF may be more specifically related 
to OC symptoms than inflated responsibility.  While Study 2A focussed solely on the 
interaction between external locus of control and inflated responsibility, in Study 2B a 
measure of thought-action fusion was included to see whether similar results would be 
found as an alternative type of responsibility belief. In the same way that inflated 
responsibility works alongside externality to exacerbate OC symptoms, the same is 
expected for TAF beliefs. This will be the first study to directly investigate thought-
action fusion alongside locus of control and OC symptoms, and will provide 
information on how similar the two types of responsibility beliefs are, and to pinpoint 
similarities and differences in psychopathology.  
 3.7.1  Hypotheses 
 It was predicted that similar results would be found with the clinical sample as 
were found with Study 2A in terms of the interaction between inflated responsibility 
and externality predicting OC symptoms. That is, (1) that both an inflated 
responsibility and external locus of control would significantly predict higher levels 
of OC symptoms, (2) that the interaction of the two variables would predict OC 
symptoms over and above that of each alone, (3) that for those individuals with a 
higher inflated sense of responsibility, OC symptom severity would be higher in those 
with higher levels of external locus of control. Additionally, it was predicted that (4) 
the interaction between external locus of control and higher scores of thought-action 
fusion would lead to higher OC symptoms, similar to inflated responsibility.  
3.8  Method 
 3.8.1  Participants  
The participants for this study were 67 individuals who were seeking 
treatment for anxiety disorders. Participants completed an online survey, taking 
approximately 15-20 minutes. Of the participants, 28.4% were diagnosed with OCD, 
26.9% with Generalised Anxiety Disorder, 28.4% with Social Anxiety, 3% with Panic 
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Disorder, 1.5% with Agoraphobia, 7.5% with some other anxiety disorder, and 4.3% 
did not say. Males made up 43.1%, and females made up 56.9% of the group. The 
mean age was 40.69 (SD=12.7) years, ranging from 18 to 67.  
 3.8.2  Measures 
The measures for Study 2B were identical to Study 2A with the addition of the 
TAF Scale. The Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (TAF-R; Shafran et al., 1996) 
as described in Study 1 (Chapter 2).  
 3.8.3  Procedure  
Individuals were invited to participate in the study via an email sent to clients, 
as well as in a newsletter of the Anxiety Clinic in Canterbury. The questionnaire data 
were collected via an anonymous online survey using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 
2013). The Central Region Ethics Committee of the New Zealand Ministry of Health 
gave approval for this study prior to its beginning. The information, consent and 
debriefing information for this study is included in Appendix C.  
3.9  Results 
 3.9.1  Descriptive Statistics 
The means, standard deviations and reliability coefficients for all variables are 
shown in Table 3.4. All scales showed excellent reliability.  
 
Table 3.4  
Means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alpha.  
 M SD α 
OCI 
RAS 
LOC – External 
TAF – Total  
TAF – Moral  
TAF – Likelihood  
66.63 
139.78 
66.53 
64.74 
39.44 
25.10 
18.57 
32.55 
14.15 
19.01 
12.77 
9.28 
.91 
.97 
.91 
.95 
.94 
.96 
Note: OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 2002); RAS: 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); LOC: Levenson’s 
Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory (Levenson, 1973); TAF:  Thought-
Action Fusion Scale Revised (Shafran et al., 1996).   
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Pearson correlations are presented in Table 3.5. All variables significantly 
correlated with each other, except for TAF-moral, which was only associated with 
overall TAF scores and TAF-likelihood.  
 
Table 3.5 
Pearson correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) OCI 
(2) RAS 
(3) LOC - External 
(4) TAF – Total 
(5) TAF – Moral 
(6) TAF - Likelihood 
1 
.469** 
.542** 
.317* 
.193 
.383** 
 
1 
.375** 
.424** 
.293 
.534** 
 
 
1 
.321* 
.153 
.436** 
 
 
 
1 
.910** 
.813** 
 
 
 
 
1 
.497** 
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05.  OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et 
al., 2002); RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); LOC: 
Levenson’s Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory (Levenson, 1973); TAF:  
Thought-Action Fusion Scale Revised (Shafran et al., 1996).   
  
3.9.2  Multiple Regression 
  3.9.2.1  Inflated Responsibility  
 Multiple regression analyses were performed to examine whether the 
interaction of inflated responsibility and external locus of control would predict OC 
symptoms over and above the effects of each individual variable. Table 3.6 shows the 
summary statistics for the hierarchical regression analyses with the total OC 
symptoms as the dependent variable. Inflated responsibility was entered into the 
equation as the first step, and explained 16% of the variance (t [66] = 3.05,p<.001). 
External locus of control was entered in the second step explaining 29% of the 
variance with both inflated responsibility (t [65] = 2.56, p<.05) and external locus of 
control (t [65] = 2.92, p<.05) being significant predictors. On the final step, the 
interaction term for inflated responsibility and external locus of control did not 
improve the overall variance accounted for and was not a significant predictor of total 
OC symptoms (t [64] = -.88, p=.38).  
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Table 3.6 
The results of the multiple regression analyses: Inflated Responsibility  
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
           Constant 
           Inflated Responsibility 
 
66.42 
.26 
 
2.39 
.08 
 
 
.40* 
Step 2 
          Constant 
          Inflated Responsibility 
          External Locus of Control 
 
66.21 
.21 
.51 
 
2.22 
.08 
.17 
 
 
.32* 
.37* 
Step 3 
          Constant 
          Interaction 
 
66.64 
-.01 
 
2.28 
.01 
 
 
-.17 
Note: R² = .16 for Step 1, ΔR² = .13 (p<.001) for Step 2, ΔR²= .01 (p=.38) for Step 3; 
*=p<.001. Dependent variable: OC symptoms  
   
3.9.2.2  Thought-Action Fusion  
 Multiple regression analyses were also performed to examine whether the 
interaction of thought-action fusion and an external locus of control would predict 
overall OC symptoms. Table 3.7 shows the summary statistics for the hierarchical 
regression analysis with OC symptoms as the dependent variable. Thought-action 
fusion was entered as the first step in the equation and explained 10% of the variance 
(t [66] =2.43, p<.05). External locus of control was entered in the second step 
explaining 32% of the variance. However, only locus of control was a significant 
predictor (t[65] = 4.01, p<.001). On the final step, the interaction term for thought-
action fusion and external locus of control did not improve the overall variance 
accounted for, and was not a significant predictor of overall OC symptoms.  
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Table 3.7 
The results of the multiple regression analyses: Thought-Action Fusion  
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
           Constant 
           Thought-Action Fusion  
 
65.88 
.32 
 
2.40 
.13 
 
 
.32* 
Step 2 
          Constant 
          Thought-Action Fusion 
          External Locus of Control 
 
66.50 
.16 
.64 
 
2.11 
.12 
.16 
 
 
.16 
.49* 
Step 3 
          Constant 
          Interaction 
 
67.53 
-.01 
 
2.18 
.01 
 
 
-.19 
Note: R² = .10 for Step 1, ΔR² = .05 (p<.001) for Step 2, ΔR²= .07 (p<.001) for Step 3; 
*=p<.05. Dependent variable: OC symptoms  
  
The results from the regression analyses with thought-action fusion reveal that 
after external locus of control is entered into the model, TAF no longer predicts OC 
symptoms. This suggests that a mediational model may apply. In order for this, all 
three variables (the mediator, the independent variable, and the dependent variable) 
must be significantly correlated (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The results of the 
correlational analyses demonstrate that external locus of control (the mediator), 
thought-action fusion (the independent variable), and OC symptoms (the dependent 
variable) were all interrelated, satisfying this condition. The association between 
thought-action fusion and OC symptoms must be reduced or non-significant with 
external locus of control in the model. The mediation analysis was performed using 
Medgraph (Jose, 2003). These results showed a full mediational model. A Sobel test 
was conducted in order to test for the indirect effect. A value of z=2.13 was found 
(p<.05; see Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2  A mediational model, with External locus of control mediating between 
Thought-Action Fusion scores and OC symptoms; **=p<.05, ***=p<.001.  
 
3.9.2.2.1  TAF-likelihood and TAF-moral  
 Multiple regression analyses were run for the two components of TAF-moral 
(Table 3.9) and likelihood (Table 3.8), with OC symptoms as the dependent variable. 
When TAF-likelihood was entered as the first step of the equation, it accounted for 
15% of the variance (t [66] =3.13, p<.05). When external locus of control was entered 
in the second step, it accounted for 30% of the variance, and was the only significant 
predictor (t[65] = 1.52, p<.001). On the final step, the interaction term for TAF-
likelihood and external locus of control did not improve the overall variance 
accounted for, and was not a significant predictor of overall OC symptoms.  
 
Table 3.8 
The results of the multiple regression analyses: TAF-likelihood   
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
           Constant 
           TAF-likelihood  
 
45.95 
.81 
 
6.98 
.26 
 
 
.38* 
Step 2 
          Constant 
          TAF-likelihood 
          External Locus of Control 
 
16.44 
.39 
.61 
 
9.98 
.26 
.16 
 
 
.13 
.46** 
Step 3 
          Constant 
          Interaction 
 
18.86 
-.02 
 
10.03 
.02 
 
 
-.14 
Note: R² = .15 for Step 1, ΔR² = .18 (p<.001) for Step 2, ΔR²= .02 (p=.16) for Step 3; 
*=p<.05, **=p<.001. Dependent variable: OC symptoms  
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The mediation analysis was performed using Medgraph (Jose, 2003). These 
results showed a full mediational model. A Sobel test was conducted in order to test 
for the indirect effect. A value of z=2.65 was found (p<.05; see Figure 3.3).  
 
 
Figure 3.3  A mediational model, with External locus of control mediating between 
TAF-Likelihood scores and OC symptoms; **=p<.05, ***=p<.001.  
 
When TAF-moral was entered as the first step of the equation, it was not a 
significant predictor of OC symptoms. When external locus of control was entered in 
the second step, it accounted for 28% of the variance, and was the only significant 
predictor (t[65] = 4.50, p<.001). On the final step, the interaction term for TAF-
likelihood and external locus of control did not improve the overall variance 
accounted for, and was not a significant predictor of overall OC symptoms. 
Table 3.9 
The results of the multiple regression analyses: TAF-moral 
 B SE B β 
Step 1 
           Constant 
           TAF-moral  
 
54.73 
.29 
 
8.20 
.20 
 
 
.19 
Step 2 
          Constant 
          TAF-moral 
          External Locus of Control 
 
15.53 
.15 
.68 
 
11.20 
.17 
.15 
 
 
.10 
.53** 
Step 3 
          Constant 
          Interaction 
 
-32.29 
-.02 
 
29.79 
.01 
 
 
-.11 
Note: R² = .04 for Step 1, ΔR² = .27 (p<.001) for Step 2, ΔR²= .04 (p=.09) for Step 3; 
*=p<.05, **=p<.001. Dependent variable: OC symptoms 
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3.10  Study 2B Discussion    
 The goal of Study 2B was to replicate the pattern of results found in study 2A 
within a clinical sample, and with the added variable of thought-action fusion. The 
results were mixed. Replicating Study 2A, both inflated responsibility and external 
locus of control were significant predictors of OC symptoms. Unlike the previous 
study, however, interactive effects of these variables on OC symptom severity were 
not significant. Thought-Action fusion also predicted OC symptoms, but only when 
locus of control externality was not included in the regression term. The interaction 
between TAF and LOC externality also failed to serve as a significant predictor of OC 
symptom severity however; mediation analyses revealed external locus of control to 
be a significant mediator of the thought-action fusion and OC symptoms relationship. 
Taken together, it is clear that locus of control externality plays an important role in 
the relationship between both types of responsibility beliefs and OC symptomology. 
 Correlational results revealed that when TAF was broken down into its 
likelihood and moral components, TAF-likelihood, but not TAF-moral was 
significantly associated with external locus of control. Similarly, for the regression 
and mediation analyses, only TAF-likelihood was a significant predictor of OC 
symptoms. This may be because the target of control beliefs may be very different 
between these two different cognitive biases. For example, TAF-likelihood is more 
focused on responsibility for external events/occurrences, so would be more 
associated with perceived control over events. However TAF-moral may be more 
associated with perceived control over one’s own thoughts, which was not covered in 
the locus of control measure used in this study. Therefore although in this study, TAF-
moral was not associated with control beliefs, if a measure incorporating control 
beliefs around thoughts was used, this result may be different.  
3.11  General Discussion  
 The overall aims of Studies 2A and 2B were to investigate how an external 
locus of control may work together with responsibility biases to produce symptoms of 
anxiety. That an external locus of control acted as a mediator between thought-action 
fusion scores and OC symptoms is in line with previous research examining the 
mediating role that control beliefs play in the stress and mental health relationship 
(specifically focused on depression and anxiety). This also supports ideas by 
Moulding and Kyrios (2006) that it is the discrepancy between perceived control 
(inflated responsibility and TAF) and sense of control (external locus of control) that 
55 
 
produces such negative psychological consequences. The results provide support for 
the theory that the discrepancy between responsibility beliefs and sense of control 
leads to OC symptoms and distress (Burger, 1992). In terms of OC symptoms, this 
discrepancy leads individuals to seek to increase their perceived control through 
compulsions and neutralising techniques (Burger, 1992; Rachman, 1993). These 
findings further bolster the evidence that targeting inflated responsibility may be 
important for therapeutic interventions, but that locus of control also plays an 
important role. 
 3.11.1  Clinical Implications  
The combined results of Studies 2A and 2B have some interesting 
implications for the treatment of pathological responsibility beliefs. Early research on 
locus of control described the differences between externals and internals, for 
example internals tend to be more independent and confident than external and use 
effective and productive coping strategies like self-monitoring, self-efficacy and self-
control; alternatively externals tend to use more maladaptive coping strategies 
(Strickland, 1989). Techniques aimed at challenging ideas around ideas of personal 
control may also benefit by teaching adaptive and effective coping strategies. 
Research focusing on decreasing externality through therapy has found that people 
can move from having an external locus of control, to becoming more internal, 
leading to an overall improvement in psychopathology (Lefcourt, 1972). 
Contrary to a focus on increasing internality, Moulding and Kyrios (2006) 
suggest that it may be beneficial to incorporate treatment of faulty control beliefs into 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. They go on to propose teaching clients the strategies 
to yield control, rather than strategies to regain a sense of control, in response to 
dysfunctional responsibility beliefs. The current findings would argue against such a 
focus on external causes for behaviour as this very externality may exacerbate 
existing biases in such a way that further reinforces the problem.  
 3.11.2  Limitations and Future Research 
 The current study focuses solely on responsibility biases, control beliefs and 
their association with OC symptoms. It would be worthwhile to extend this to more 
general anxiety and depression symptoms as well, to see whether the emerging 
patterns are generalizable to other disorders. Results from Study 1 suggest that 
responsibility beliefs may play an important maintaining role in anxiety and 
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depression, so more research in this area will be beneficial for creating effective 
treatment programs targeting these cognitive biases.  
 The results of studies 2A and 2B showed significant associations between 
responsibility biases and control beliefs. However, from these samples, it is 
impossible to know the details of this relationship, for example whether one variable 
precedes or causes the other, or whether they occur concurrently. For more 
information on these associations, longitudinal research is needed.  
 3.12  Chapter Summary  
While thought suppression can be considered a reaction/response to unwanted 
responsibility beliefs, locus of control contributes to how these beliefs are initially 
interpreted. The results from Study 2A showed that the interaction of having high 
levels of inflated responsibility and externality leads to higher OC symptom severity. 
Results from Study 2B revealed that an external locus of control fully mediated 
between thought-action fusion and OC symptoms. Locus of control is therefore an 
important factor in psychopathology when coupled with responsibility biases. The 
findings add to those of Study 1 and indicate that therapeutic strategies should focus 
on deflating responsibility to more realistic levels, and to also target and correct 
beliefs about personal control. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.  PATHWAYS TO INFLATED RESPONSIBILITY BELIEFS 
Given the growing body of evidence supporting the important role of 
responsibility beliefs in the development of psychopathology, it makes sense to 
investigate their origins and factors which lead to their development. Beck’s (1976) 
cognitive theory of emotional problems described the important role of early 
childhood and adolescent experiences in forming attitudes which may become 
dysfunctional later on in the individual’s life. Following on from this theory, 
Salkovskis et al (1999) used information from case reports to propose five primary 
pathways to the development of inflated responsibility beliefs. Understanding the 
etiology of responsibility beliefs may lead to important clinical implications. For 
example, Zucker, Craske, Barrios and Holguin (2002) found that using education 
intervention techniques in relation to cognitive vulnerability has been found to lead to 
reductions in psychological symptoms and decreased anxiety. Alternatively, 
interventions can be targeted at preventing or modifying the development of inflated 
responsibility beliefs. For example, Coles and Schofield (2008) suggest implementing 
early prevention programs designed specifically for children in environments 
characterised by the five pathways described by Salkovskis et al. (1999). The aim of 
Studies 3A and 3B was to provide empirical evidence for the pathways theory. This 
has been conducted once before using an Icelandic translation of a newly developed 
measure of the pathways (Smari et al., 2010). Thus the current studies are the first to 
utilise the English version, with both non-clinical and clinical adult participant 
groups. This is also the first research to include a measure of thought-action fusion as 
an alternative responsibility bias to examine whether the pathways theory applies here 
also.  
4.1 Pathways to Inflated Responsibility  
Having a sense of inflated responsibility has been repeatedly found to be a 
central feature of OCD, and more recently, in other types of psychopathology 
including generalised anxiety and depression (Rachman, 1998, 2002; Salkovskis, 
1985). Given the well-documented significance of inflated responsibility, research 
examining the etiology of these beliefs is lacking. This information may have 
implications for conceptualisation, treatment and prevention of anxiety disorders 
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(Coles & Schofield, 2008). As Beck (1976) describes, experiences occurring during 
childhood and adolescence are crucial to forming potentially dysfunctional attitudes 
later in life. In an attempt to explain the possible origins of inflated responsibility, 
Salkovskis et al. (1999) proposed a model of five interacting pathways. These 
theoretical pathways were developed through years of clinical observations and case 
studies. It is important to note that these experiences can overlap and co-occur, and of 
course there are many other factors which may contribute to having an inflated sense 
of responsibility (Salkovskis et al., 1999). The following factors are hypothesised to 
be involved in the development of inflated responsibility (Salkovskis et al., 1999, pp. 
1060): 
1. An early developed and broad sense of responsibility that is deliberately or 
implicitly encouraged or promoted during childhood.  
2. Rigid and extreme codes of conduct and duty. 
3. Childhood experiences where sensitivity to ideas of responsibility 
develops as a result of never being confronted by it.  
4. An incident in which one’s actions or inaction actually contributed in a 
significant way to a serious misfortune which affects oneself or others.  
5. An incident in which it appeared that one’s thoughts and/or actions or 
inaction contributed to a serious misfortune. 
 4.1.1 Heightened Sense of Responsibility  
 According to Salkovskis et al. (1999), this pathway is developed early on in 
childhood, with two possible scenarios. Firstly, some children and adolescents grow 
up in situations where they assume responsibility for themselves, siblings, and, in 
some circumstances, parents. Secondly, children grow up in environments where they 
are repeatedly used as scapegoats for negative occurrences for which they have little-
to-no or little control over. Either of these circumstances can result in the child 
growing up with an overly wide sense of responsibility, leading to a high level of 
conscientiousness. When individuals with a heightened sense of responsibility find 
themselves in a situation in which they fail to meet self-imposed standards, they 
experience strong feelings of failure, disappointment and guilt (Salkovskis, et al., 
1999).  
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4.1.2 Rigid and Extreme Codes 
 In the same way that parenting style and the home environment can play a role 
in the development of inflated responsibility, other social influences (e.g., schools and 
churches) can also impact the development of responsibility beliefs. The second 
pathway concerns the development of a strict set of personal rules and standards 
regarding thoughts and behaviours that emerge during childhood and adolescence. 
Salkovskis et al. (1999) implicate respected authoritarian sources likes schools and 
clergy, indicating that both types of institutions can teach concepts like blame, guilt, 
punishment, as well as teachings of the divine, which drives the development of 
inflated responsibility. 
 4.1.3 Overprotection 
 The third pathway describes how a child or adolescent may come to develop 
an inflated sense of responsibility as a result of being raised in an anxious home 
environment by an overprotective parent or caregiver. Specifically, Salkovskis et al. 
(1999) describe a scenario in which the parent is excessively anxious and fearful, in 
particular, worrying about the child’s ability to deal with potential dangers, and thus 
aims to protect them from harm. This, of course, leads to an over-protective parenting 
style in which responsibility is withheld from the child leading them to become 
sensitive to responsibility in adulthood. 
 4.1.4 Actions contributing to incident 
 The fourth pathway describes a situation in which a catastrophic event occurs 
that affects either the individual or somebody else. Although negative, and potentially 
traumatic, events occur normally, the important aspect here is that the individual 
strongly believes that he or she was responsible for the occurrence of the event, or 
should have done something to prevent it. Salkovskis et al. (1999) also include ‘near-
misses’ in this category, in which the person believes the misfortune did not occur 
only because of good luck or unlikely circumstances.  
 4.1.5   Perception of actions contributing to incident   
 The final pathway is similar to the fourth in that there is some serious incident, 
however in this case the occurrence of the event is entirely coincidental to the 
thoughts or behaviours of the individual. Salkovskis et al. (1999) use the example of a 
child wishing that his or her parent would die, and soon after the parent actually 
dying. Although the event itself happens by chance, the individual believes that the 
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wishes or thoughts make him or her responsible. Of the five pathways, this pathway is 
most obviously linked to Thought-Action Fusion (Salkovskis et al.).  
4.2 Study 3A 
 Until recently, this theory of multiple pathways remained untested. In 2008, 
Coles and Schofield developed a 23 item, self-report measure to directly assess this 
theory; the Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Beliefs Scale (PIRBS). As well as 
developing the measure, Coles and Schofield also had participants complete a 
measure of OCD symptoms. The results showed a significant correlation between the 
overall PIRBS score with frequency of OCD symptoms, as well as with all individual 
PIRBS subscales. This finding provides support for linking the childhood experiences 
described by Salkovskis et al. (1999) with OC symptoms in later life. However, the 
pathways theory was described as being pathways to inflated responsibility, not OC 
symptoms, so it is important to investigate the relationships between pathways and 
responsibility beliefs, with responsibility beliefs as a mediator between the pathways 
and OC symptoms.   
 An Icelandic translation of the PIRBS (Coles & Schofield, 2008) was tested 
among 300 undergraduate students in 2010 by Smari et al., who applied a mediational 
model. Results showed that the total PIRBS scores and each of the subscales 
correlated significantly with both OC symptoms and inflated responsibility. The 
results also showed strong support for inflated responsibility as a partial mediator of 
the relationship between pathways to responsibility and OC symptoms. The lack of a 
full mediation raises the possibility of the presence and influence of other cognitive 
variables, for example control beliefs and thought suppression. 
 The five theoretical pathways to inflated responsibility were also examined by 
Lawrence and Williams (2011). Sixteen adolescents with a history of OCD were 
compared to 16 non-clinical adolescent participants on an assessment of the pathways. 
This involved an original measure of the five pathways proposed by Salkovskis et al. 
(1999): the Origins Questionnaire for Adolescents (OQA); a semi-structured 
interview measuring: 1) Broad sense of responsibility; 2) Rigid codes of conduct; 3) 
Shielded from responsibility; 4) Incident associated with negative outcome; and 5) 
Extremes of responsibility. Results of this research showed that the two groups 
differed significantly only on one aspect of responsibility beliefs, that is specific 
incidents related to a negative outcome, with the clinical group reporting higher 
scores compared to the non-clinical group. However, results found the internal 
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consistency of the OQA to be only partly satisfactory. This, in conjunction with a very 
small sample size makes the findings tentative.  
Salkvoskis et al.’s (1999) theory of multiple pathways to inflated 
responsibility describes a list of childhood experiences that can lead to an individual 
developing a vulnerability towards inflated responsibility, and OC symptoms. While 
initial research by Coles and Schofield (2008) has shown promising results in support 
of this theory, it is important to note that these external experiences are likely to 
interact with internal, cognitive factors. Whilst many individuals may experience one 
or more scenarios described in Salkvoskis et al.’s model, only a few may go on to 
develop inflated responsibility of a clinical level. How one interprets and thinks about 
their experiences must also play an important role. Studies 3A and 3B will be the first 
to empirically test the pathways theory within a general adult population as well as an 
adult clinical population. The aim of this research was to provide empirical support 
for the Pathways to Inflated Responsibility model and the recently developed measure 
for this (PIRBS). This has only been done once before by Smari et al. (2010), which 
was with an Icelandic version. Study 3A will utilise the English translation for the 
first empirical test of the pathways theory within an adult population.  
4.2.1 Hypotheses   
Based on previous research, it was predicted that: (1) those individuals who 
show high scores on the PIRBS will demonstrate a higher level of inflated 
responsibility; (2) that a high overall score on the PIRBS will predict inflated 
responsibility beliefs; and (3) that each subscale of the PIRBS will be a significant 
predictor. As the PIRBS and underlying Pathways theory were devised as predictors 
of inflated responsibility in relation to OCD, a measure of Obsessive Compulsive 
symptoms was also included. Similar to the results of Smari et al. (2010), it was also 
predicted that (4) inflated responsibility would partially mediate the relationship 
between scores on the PIRBS and OC symptoms.  
4.3  Method 
4.3.1  Participants  
The participants for this study were 265 individuals from the same pool as that 
for Study 2A who completed an online survey. Participants were recruited using a 
snowballing effect through the social networking site Facebook. The sample consisted 
of 149 females (56.2%) and 45 males (17%); 71 did not provide this information 
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(26.8%). The participants ages ranged from 16 to 66 with a mean age of 28.23 
(SD=10.69). The sample consisted mainly of New Zealand European participants 
(30.9%), 3.4% were Asian, with the remaining participants being European (14%), 
Maori (2.3%), Pacific Nations (0.8%), American (12.8%), Australian (7.2), and the 
remaining being other/refused.  
4.3.2  Measures  
 The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) and 
the Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000) were used in this 
study and are described in detail in Study 1 (Chapter 2). Additionally, the Pathways to 
Inflated Responsibility Beliefs Scale (PIRBS; Coles & Schofield, 2008) is a 23 item 
scale recently devised to measure four pathways to inflated responsibility. The scale 
has four subscales: Heightened Responsibility (5 items, e.g. ‘I was responsibility for 
keeping our house functioning smoothly’); Overprotection (5 items, e.g. ‘My 
parent(s) thought that I was unable to deal with danger’); Rigid Rules (5 items, e.g. 
‘Adults around me strictly enforced rules’); and Actions Caused/Influenced (8 items, 
e.g. ‘I am confident that something I did resulted in someone else experiencing a 
serious misfortune). For each item the participant rated the statements for how 
frequently they were true for them, from 0 (‘never’) to 4 (‘always’), with higher 
overall scores indicating higher endorsement. While there are five theoretical 
pathways, this measure combines the last two into one subscale. A copy of this scale 
is in Appendix K.  
4.3.3.  Procedure 
The questionnaire data was collected via an anonymous online survey using 
Survey Monkey. The initial sample of participants was invited to complete the survey 
by the principle investigator via connections on the Facebook social networking site. 
Subsequent participants were invited by those who had already completed the survey, 
or were those who randomly came across the site, using a snowballing effect. The 
survey itself took approximately 20 minutes to complete. The Victoria University 
Human Ethics Committee gave approval for this study prior to its beginning. The 
information sheet, questionnaire and the debriefing sheet are included in Appendix B.  
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4.4  Results  
4.4.1  Descriptive Statistics  
 The means, standard deviations and reliability coefficients for all variables are 
shown in Table 4.1. All scales (and subscales of the PIRBS) showed good to excellent 
reliability.  
Table 4.1   
Means, standard deviations and reliability.  
 M SD α 
OCI 
RAS 
PIRBS – Overall 
    PIRBS – Heightened Responsibility  
    PIRBS – Rigid Rules    
    PIRBS – Actions 
    PIRBS – Overprotection 
36.91 
69.38 
38.02 
6.07 
11.43 
10.04 
8.61 
13.59 
33.86 
15.12 
4.75 
4.60 
8.03 
4.51 
.92 
.91 
.88 
.84 
.89 
.92 
.81 
Note: α: Cronbach’s alpha; OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa 
et al., 2002 RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); PIRBS: 
Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale and 4 subscales (Coles & Schofield, 2008).  
 Pearson Correlations for all variables are shown in Table 4.2. The overall 
PIRBS total, as well as each of the four subscales all correlated significantly with OC 
symptoms and inflated responsibility. All subscales were significantly correlated with 
the overall PIRBS score, and with each other, apart from Overprotection and Rigid 
Rules.  
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Table 4.2   
Pearson correlations  
 1 2 3 5 6 7 
(1) OCI 
(2) RAS 
(3) PIRBS 
(4) H Resp 
(5) Rigid Rules 
(6) Actions 
(7) Overprotect 
1 
.322** 
.521** 
.201** 
.242** 
.541** 
.268** 
 
1 
.390** 
.174** 
.252** 
.406** 
.190** 
 
 
1 
.512** 
.252** 
.802** 
.588** 
 
 
 
1 
.282** 
.271** 
-.108 
 
 
 
 
1 
.218** 
.325** 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.317** 
Note: **p<.01.  OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 2002 
RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); PIRBS: Pathways to 
Inflated Responsibility Scale (Coles & Schofield, 2008). 
4.4.2  Regression Analyses    
The overall PIRB scale was a significant predictor of inflated responsibility 
(t[169]=5.49, p<.001 ). Regression was used to assess whether the four individual 
subscales were also predictors. Variables were entered individually, and results can be 
seen in Table 4.3. Results showed that all of the subscales were significant predictors 
of inflated responsibility.  
Table 4.3 
Individual Regression Analyses: Four subscales of the PIRBS  
 
         Heightened Responsibility 
         Rigid Rules 
         Actions 
         Overprotection 
B 
-1.270 
-1.816 
-1.680 
-1.426 
SE B 
.542 
.524 
.283 
.552 
Βeta 
-.174* 
-.252** 
-.406** 
-.190* 
Dependent Variable: Inflated Responsibility                                                                            
Note: ** p < .001, *p<.05; PIRBS: Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale (Coles 
& Schofield, 2008). 
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4.4.3  Mediation Analyses 
 The mediation analysis was performed using Medgraph (Jose, 2003). In order 
for a mediational model to apply, all three variables (the mediator, the independent 
variable, and the dependent variable) must be significantly correlated (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986).  As can be seen in Table 4.2, inflated responsibility (the mediator), 
PIRBS scores (the independent variable), and OC symptoms (the dependent variable) 
were all interrelated, satisfying this condition. Secondly, there needs to be less of an 
association between the predictor and the outcome when the mediator is controlled 
for. A Sobel test was conducted in order to test for the indirect effect. A value of z = 
4.18 was found (p<.001), meaning a significant, full mediation was found (see Figure 
4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1  A mediational model, with Inflated Responsibility mediating between 
PIRBS scores and OC symptoms. **=p<.05, ***=p<.001.  
 
4.5  Study 3A Discussion 
 Study 3A aimed to investigate the influence of early experiences (measured 
using the PIRBS) on the development of inflated responsibility in a normal adult 
population. Good to excellent reliability coefficients were found for the overall scale, 
as well as the four subscales. Overall scores on the PIRBS were significantly 
correlated with inflated responsibility. Each of the four subscales also correlated 
significantly with inflated responsibility. The obtained results showed that the overall 
PIRBS scores, as well as those of the four subscales all significantly correlated with 
obsessive compulsive symptoms. Regression analyses revealed that the overall PIRBS 
score, as well as all of the individual pathways were significant predictors of inflated 
responsibility.  
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The strongest results, both correlations and regressions, were for the pathway 
combining situations in which one’s action/inaction caused/influenced misfortune 
(that relating to the fourth and fifth theoretical pathways). This supports research by 
Lawrence and Williams (2011), who suggest that incidents involving real or imagined 
responsibility for negative events and/or coincidental events where the individual 
feels to blame, can alone create an inflated sense of responsibility. Such ‘critical 
incidents’ would not necessarily trigger obsessional/compulsive symptoms alone, but 
may combine with pre-existing beliefs to trigger and maintain inflated responsibility 
(Salkovskis et al., 1999).  
Results also showed that Inflated Responsibility played a full mediatory role 
between PIRBS and OC symptoms. These results are similar to Smari et al. (2010), 
who found a partial mediation. This provides support for the theory proposed by 
Smari et al., that if inflated responsibility leads to OC symptoms, and higher 
endorsement on the pathways is associated with higher inflated responsibility, then 
the latter should mediate between the former and OC symptoms. These results also 
provide empirical support for Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) theory of multiple pathways 
leading to inflated responsibility.  
4.6  Study 3B 
The aim of Study 3B was to replicate Study 3A with an adult clinical 
population, and to include an examination of the pathways theory in relation to TAF 
as an alternative to inflated responsibility. A measure of TAF was included to 
examine whether it was predicted by any of the PIRBS subscales, similar to inflated 
responsibility. The items measuring the Actions subscale refer to situations where an 
individual believes that something they did (or did not do) contributed to a negative 
occurrence (e.g. ‘I am confident that something I did resulted in someone else 
experiencing a serious misfortune’). Additionally in the instructions for this section, it 
states “sometimes it appears that something we think or do may have results in a 
serious misfortune” (PIRBS; Coles & Schofield, 2008). This links directly to the 
concept of TAF-likelihood where one believes their thoughts may lead to a negative 
event (Abramowitz, et al., 2003). Indeed, Salkovskis et al. (1999) stated that people 
who are more prone to TAF biases are most likely to experience the type of 
responsibility beliefs measured by the Actions subscale. The items measuring the 
Rigid Rules subscale however, seem to be more related to the concept of TAF-moral. 
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These items refer to underlying personal standards and rules, often developed through 
association with strict parental codes, schools and churches (Abramowitz, et al., 
2003), ideas often included in discussions of TAF-moral. Examples from this subscale 
include “I was taught that rules were to be obeyed without discussion” and “My 
parent(s) strongly valued obedience”.  
4.6.1  Hypotheses 
 Similar to Study 3A, it was predicted that: (1) higher total scores on the PIRB 
scale would be related to higher inflated responsibility. Based on theory (Salkovskis 
et al., 1999), it was expected that: (2) the four subscales of the PIRBS would be 
predictive of inflated responsibility. It was also predicted that: (3) the overall PIRBS 
would be predictive of thought-action fusion. Additionally, when breaking the TAF 
concept down into TAF-moral and TAF-likelihood, it is predicted that: (4) the 
Actions subscale of the PIRBS would be predictive of TAF-likelihood, while (5) the 
Rigid Rules subscale would be predictive of TAF-moral. In terms of mediation, 
similar results to Study 3A were expected, (6) where each of the responsibility biases 
(inflated responsibility, TAF, TAF-moral and TAF-likelihood) would play a 
mediating role between PIRBS and OC symptoms.  
4.7  Method  
 4.7.1  Participants 
The participants for this study are from the same pool as Study 2B, and were 
67 individuals who were all seeking and receiving treatment for anxiety disorders. 
Participants completed an online survey, taking approximately 15-20 minutes. Of the 
participants, 28.4% were diagnosed with OCD, 26.9% with Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder, 28.4% with Social Anxiety, 3% with Panic Disorder, 1.5% with 
Agoraphobia, 7.5% with some other anxiety disorder, and 4.3% did not say. Males 
made up 43.1%, and females made up 56.9% of the group. The mean age was 40.69 
(SD=12.7) years, ranging from 18 to 67.  
4.7.2  Measures 
The measures for Study 3B consisted of the Pathways to Inflated 
Responsibility Beliefs Scale (PIRBS; Coles & Schofield, 2008), the Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) the Responsibility Attitude 
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Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000), and the Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised 
(TAF-R; Shafran et al., 1996).  
 4.7.3  Procedure 
Individuals were invited to participate in the study via an email sent to clients 
of the Anxiety Clinic in Canterbury. The questionnaire data was collected via an 
anonymous online survey using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 2013). The Central 
Region Ethics Committee of the New Zealand Ministry of Health gave approval for 
this study prior to its beginning.  The information sheet, questionnaire and the 
debriefing sheet are included in Appendix C.  
4.8  Results  
4.8.1  Descriptive Statistics  
 The means, standard deviations and reliability coefficients for all variables are 
shown in Table 4.4. All scales (and subscales of the PIRBS) showed good to excellent 
reliability.  
Table 4.4   
Means, standard deviations and reliability.  
 M SD α 
OCI 
RAS 
PIRBS – Overall 
    PIRBS – Heightened Responsibility  
    PIRBS – Rigid Rules    
    PIRBS – Actions 
    PIRBS – Overprotection 
TAF – Overall 
    TAF – Moral  
    TAF – Likelihood  
66.63 
139.78 
75.00 
13.87 
18.71 
26.92 
16.00 
64.74 
39.44 
25.10 
18.57 
32.55 
15.90 
4.76 
4.35 
9.52 
5.13 
19.02 
12.77 
9.28 
.91 
.97 
.91 
.87 
.92 
.96 
.90 
.95 
.94 
.96 
Note: α: Cronbach’s alpha; Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 
2002); RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); PIRBS: 
Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale and 4 subscales (Coles & Schofield, 2008); 
TAF: Thought-Action Fusion Scale Revised (Shafran et al., 1996).   
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Pearson Correlations for all variables are shown in Table 4.5. The overall 
PIRBS total, correlated significantly with OC symptoms, Inflated Responsibility and 
Thought-Action Fusion, as well as the Moral and Likelihood subscales of TAF.   
Table 4.5   
Pearson correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(1) OCI 
(2) RAS 
(3) TAF 
(4) TAF-M 
(5) TAF-L 
(6) PIRBS 
(7) HR 
(8) RR 
(9) AS 
(10) OP 
1 
.469** 
.317* 
.193 
.383** 
.392** 
.326* 
.022 
.394** 
.092 
 
1 
.327* 
.145 
.458** 
.517** 
.377** 
.067 
.409** 
-.076 
 
 
1 
.910** 
.813** 
.607** 
.324* 
.181 
.524** 
.335** 
 
 
 
1 
.497** 
.467** 
.251 
.333** 
.296* 
.339** 
 
 
 
 
1 
.592** 
.280* 
-.022 
.621** 
.266* 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.724** 
.370** 
.763** 
.678** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
.212 
.472** 
.225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
-.226 
.538** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.217 
Note: **p<.01, *p<.05. OCI: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 
2002); RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); TAF: Thought-
Action Fusion Scale Revised with 2 subscales: TAF-M (TAF-moral), TAF-L (TAF-
likelihood; Shafran et al., 1996); PIRBS: Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale 
with 4 subscales: HR (Heightened Responsibility), RR (Rigid Rules), AS (Actions), 
OP (Overprotection; Coles & Schofield, 2008). 
 4.8.2  Inflated Responsibility 
  4.8.2.1  Regression Analyses  
The overall PIRB scale was a significant predictor of inflated responsibility 
(t[66]=4.18, p<.001 ). Regression was used to assess whether each of the four 
subscales were also predictors. Variables were entered individually, and results can be 
seen in Table 4.6. Results showed that the Heightened Responsibility and Actions 
subscales were all significant predictors of inflated responsibility.  
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Table 4.6 
Individual Regression Analyses: Four subscales of the PIRBS on Inflated 
Responsibility   
 
         Heightened Responsibility 
         Rigid Rules 
         Actions 
         Overprotection 
B 
2.825 
1.059 
1.693 
.954 
SE B 
.896 
.964 
.401 
.850 
Βeta 
.385* 
.140 
.485** 
.145 
Dependent Variable: Inflated Responsibility                                                                            
Note: *p<.05, ** p < .001; PIRBS: Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale (Coles 
& Schofield, 2008). 
4.8.2.2  Mediation Analyses  
As can be seen in Table 4.5, inflated responsibility (the mediator), PIRBS 
scores (the independent variable), and OC symptoms (the dependent variable) were all 
significantly correlated, satisfying the first condition of Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Using Medgraph (Jose, 2003), a Sobel test was conducted in order to test for the 
indirect effect. A value of z = 2.91 was found (p=.004), meaning a significant, full 
mediation was found (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2  A mediational model, with Inflated Responsibility mediating between 
PIRBS scores and OC symptoms. **=p<.05, ***=p<.001.  
 
4.8.3 Thought-Action Fusion   
 4.8.3.1  Regression Analyses  
The overall PIRB scale was also a significant predictor of thought-action 
fusion (t[66]=5.61, p<.001 ). Regression was used to assess whether the four 
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subscales were also predictors. Variables were entered individually, and results can be 
seen in Table 4.7. Results showed that only the Actions and Overprotection subscales 
were significant predictors of thought-action fusion.  
Table 4.7 
Individual Regression Analyses: Four subscales of the PIRBS on Thought-Action 
Fusion 
 
         Heightened Responsibility 
         Rigid Rules 
         Actions 
         Overprotection 
B 
1.274 
.779 
.978 
1.223 
SE B 
.497 
.552 
.211 
.452 
Βeta 
.324 
.181 
.524** 
.335* 
Dependent Variable: Thought-Action Fusion                                                                       
Note: *p<.05, ** p < .001; PIRBS: Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale (Coles 
& Schofield, 2008). 
  4.8.3.2  Mediation Analyses  
As can be seen in Table 4.5, TAF (the mediator), PIRBS scores (the 
independent variable), and OC symptoms (the dependent variable) were all 
significantly correlated, satisfying the first condition of Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Using Medgraph (Jose, 2003), a Sobel test was conducted in order to test for the 
indirect effect. A value of z = 1.37 was found (p=.17), meaning no significant 
mediation was found (see Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3  A (non significant) mediational model, with TAF mediating between 
PIRBS scores and OC symptoms. **=p<.05, ***=p<.001.  
 
 
72 
 
4.8.4  Thought-Action Fusion – Likelihood  
 4.8.4.1  Regression Analyses  
The overall PIRB scale was also a significant predictor of thought-action 
fusion – likelihood (t[66]=5.64, p<.001 ). Regression was used to assess whether the 
four subscales were also predictors. Variables were entered individually, and results 
can be seen in Table 4.8. Results showed that the Heightened Responsibility, Actions 
and Overprotection subscales were significant predictors of TAF-likelihood.  
Table 4.8 
Individual Regression Analyses: Four subscales of the PIRBS on Thought-Action 
Fusion-Likelihood 
 
         Heightened Responsibility 
         Rigid Rules 
         Actions 
         Overprotection 
B 
.546 
-.046 
.589 
.480 
SE B 
.240 
.265 
.094 
.219 
Βeta 
.280* 
-.022 
.621** 
.266* 
Dependent Variable: TAF-likelihood                                                                                     
Note: *p<.05, ** p < .001; PIRBS: Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale (Coles 
& Schofield, 2008). 
4.8.4.2  Mediation Analyses 
As can be seen in Table 4.5, TAF-likelihood (the mediator), PIRBS scores (the 
independent variable), and OC symptoms (the dependent variable) were all 
significantly correlated, satisfying the first condition of Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Using Medgraph (Jose, 2003), a Sobel test was conducted in order to test for the 
indirect effect. A value of z = 2.04 was found (p=.04), meaning a significant, full 
mediation was found (see Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4  A mediational model, with TAF-likelihood mediating between PIRBS 
scores and OC symptoms. **=p<.05, ***=p<.001.  
 
4.8.5  Thought-Action Fusion – Moral  
 4.8.5.1  Regression Analyses 
 The overall PIRB scale was also a significant predictor of thought-action 
fusion – moral (t[66]=3.89, p<.001 ). Regression was used to assess whether the four 
subscales were also predictors. Variables were entered individually, and results can be 
seen in Table 4.9. Results showed that the Rigid Rules, Actions and Overprotection 
subscales were significant predictors of TAF-moral.  
Table 4.9 
Individual Regression Analyses: Four subscales of the PIRBS on Thought-Action 
Fusion-Moral 
 
         Heightened Responsibility 
         Rigid Rules 
         Actions 
         Overprotection 
B 
.667 
.969 
.378 
.837 
SE B 
.343 
.357 
.162 
.305 
Βeta 
.251 
.333* 
.296* 
.339* 
Dependent Variable: TAF-moral                                                                                            
Note: *p<.05, ** p < .001; PIRBS: Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale (Coles 
& Schofield, 2008). 
  4.8.5.2  Mediation Analyses 
 Mediation analyses were not able to be performed with TAF-moral as there 
was no significant correlation between OC symptoms and TAF-moral.  
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4.9  Study 3B Discussion  
Study 3B aimed to investigate the influence of early experiences (measured 
using the PIRBS) on the development of inflated responsibility and thought-action 
fusion in an adult, clinical population. In terms of inflated responsibility, overall 
scores on the PIRBS were found to be significantly predictive, as well as the 
Heightened Responsibility and Actions subscales. Overall PIRBS scores were also 
significantly predictive of Thought-Action Fusion, with the Actions and 
Overprotection subscales being significant. When Thought-Action Fusion was 
dichotomised into Likelihood and Moral, the hypothesis was supported for 
Likelihood, with the Actions subscale being a significant predicting subscale, as well 
as Heightened Responsibility and Overprotection. For Moral, the Rigid Rules, 
Actions and Overprotection subscales were significant predictors. Correlative results 
revealed that the overall PIRBS was significantly associated with both inflated 
responsibility and thought-action fusion (including both moral and likelihood 
subscales).  
The results also showed that inflated responsibility played a full mediating 
role between PIRBS and OC symptoms, as was found in Study 3A, providing further 
support for Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) theory. This was also the case for TAF-
likelihood; however, there was no mediation for overall TAF, and TAF-moral. A 
mediation analysis was not performed for TAF-moral, as it did not significantly 
correlate with OC symptoms.  
4.10  General Discussion  
 The overall aims of Studies 3A and 3B were to investigate the roles of 
childhood/early experiences in the etiology of responsibility biases using both clinical 
and non-clinical participant samples, and to provide further support for the newly 
developed PIRBS (Coles & Schofield, 2008) measure. These studies were the first to 
empirically test the pathways theory with an adult, English speaking sample, and with 
an adult clinical sample. Study 3B was also the first study to apply the theoretical 
pathways to TAF, as an alternative responsibility bias. In terms of the PIRBS, for both 
the clinical and non-clinical samples, the overall scale and each of the four subscales 
all showed good to excellent reliability. Overall regression analyses revealed that for 
the non-clinical sample, each of the four subscales were significant predictors of 
inflated responsibility. For the clinical sample, Heightened Responsibility and Actions 
were significant predictors of inflated responsibility. Thought-Action Fusion was only 
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measured in the clinical sample and results revealed that Actions and Overprotection 
were both significant predictors. When TAF was broken down into different types, 
TAF-moral was predicted by Rigid Rules, Actions and Overprotection, whereas TAF-
likelihood was significantly predicted by the Heightened Responsibility, Actions and 
Overprotection subscales. Overall results for Inflated Responsibility provided 
empirical support for Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) theory of multiple pathways, and 
support for the recently developed PIRBS (Coles & Schofield, 2008) measure.  
 From these overall results, it can be seen that for both participant samples and 
for all types of responsibility biases measured, the Actions subscale was the only 
common, significant predictor. This subscale aims to measure the fourth and fifth 
pathways from Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) original theory, in which one’s thoughts 
and/or actions actually contributed to a negative incident, or it appears as though 
one’s thoughts and/or actions contributed to a negative incident. This finding is 
similar to the research by Lawrence and Williams (2010) who found the only 
difference on the five theoretical pathways between adolescents with and without 
OCD was those in the OCD group showed a greater sense of responsibility for 
specific incidents. These pathways differ from the other three developmental 
pathways (Heightened Responsibility, Overprotection and Rigid Rules) in a number 
of ways. Firstly, the Actions pathway describes a sudden onset of inflated 
responsibility, whereas the other pathways tend to be more gradual and cumulative. 
Secondly, this occurs after a critical incident (or even a near-miss incident), with a 
relatively later onset, while the other theoretical pathways evolve from many 
accumulating experiences throughout early life that individually have little effect on 
responsibility beliefs (Salkovskis, et al.). Finally, Salkovskis et al. suggest that the 
inflated beliefs originating from such critical incidents tend to be a lot more specific 
and circumscribed, rather than being generalised to other aspects of daily life.  
The results also provided support for the idea proposed by Salkovskis et al. 
(1999) that endorsement of the pathways theory is associated with high inflated 
responsibility, and that inflated responsibility mediates between the pathways and OC 
symptoms. For both the non-clinical and clinical samples, a significant full mediation 
was found. When this model was applied to TAF, a full mediation was only found for 
TAF-likelihood. The lack of a mediation for TAF-moral was due to there being no 
significant correlation with OC symptoms in the clinical sample. This supports 
previous research such as that by Coles, Mennin and Heimberg (2001) that TAF-
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likelihood has a closer relationship with OCD than TAF-moral, which seems to be 
more related to depression.  
 4.10.1  Clinical Implications 
 The combined results of Studies 3A and 3B have some interesting 
implications for the treatment of responsibility beliefs within psychopathology, 
however these may be somewhat limited. As Salkovskis et al. (1999) discuss, more 
progress is made in therapy when focusing on maintaining factors, rather than 
identifying the origins of belief biases. In saying this, from the proposed pathways, 
the authors also identified the final two pathways (those measured by the Actions 
subscale of the PIRBS), as being the most amenable to change through cognitive 
behavioural therapy. This may be because the Actions pathway describes key 
events/critical incidents, rather than responsibility biases evolving from a long process 
of many small experiences. Having a target source of origin of where cognitive biases 
come from means that therapy can be focussed on replacing incorrect thoughts around 
the incident, potentially deflating the exaggerated sense of responsibility generally. 
Ideally, this would be possible early on, before the beliefs become fixed in the 
individual’s belief system (Salkovskis et al.).  
 Additionally, the results support the idea of early intervention for potentially 
preventing subsequent problematic responsibility beliefs. Firstly, in reference to the 
Actions pathway measuring critical incidents, targeted programs may be developed 
for assessing the risks of developing responsibility biases. For example, following an 
accidental death, the way in which a family member describes the occurrence may 
signal the need for cognitive restructuring, which may help to reduce longer-lasting 
inflated responsibility beliefs and related symptoms anxiety/depression. Especially for 
children, it may be appropriate to include discussing these ideas as part of immediate 
trauma and victim support counselling, in an effort to avoid this becoming a long-term 
problem. Secondly, Coles and Schofield (2008) suggest that once more is known on 
the etiology of responsibility beliefs, this knowledge can be used for developing 
prevention programs. Children who are identified as being in vulnerable environments 
(such as living with Rigid Rules, or have Heightened Responsibility e.g. living in a 
single parent home), as well as at risk for anxiety and/or depression, may be able to 
participate in specifically designed programs for targeting responsibility beliefs.  
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4.10.2   Limitations 
 The main limitation with Studies 3A and 3B is that the data on childhood 
experiences was collected retrospectively, and participants may have been providing 
information from well over thirty years ago. Consequently the data may not be an 
entirely accurate portrayal of events. Similarly, those participants who are in 
treatment for anxiety disorders may show some responsibility biases in their memory 
of past events. Lawrence and Williams (2010) describe how particularly with the 
Actions subscale, memories of how responsible the individual felt at the time of the 
critical incident may be affected by anxiety symptoms; they suggest that participants 
would report a higher level of responsibility when experiencing elevated anxiety 
symptoms. Therefore caution is recommended when interpreting this kind of 
retrospective data.  
 4.10.3  Future Research  
 The most effective way to investigate the etiology of responsibility beliefs, 
and to thoroughly examine the Pathways to Inflated Responsibility theory (Salkovskis 
et al., 1999) is to conduct longitudinal research. Due to the correlational nature of the 
current research, extrapolation of a causal pathway would be unwise. Another avenue 
to pursue in terms of the origins of responsibility beliefs is investigating the factors 
that may interact with the theoretical pathways. Salkovskis et al. (1999) identified 
some of these factors as criticism and blame, life events, prolonged stress, depressed 
mood, and situational increases in responsibility (e.g. having a baby or a work 
promotion). Although the theory of developmental pathways to inflated responsibility 
describes common patterns, it is more likely that it is the result of complex 
interactions of many variables and experiences that lead to responsibility biases 
(Alloy & Riskind, 2006). Identifying some of these may help to further our 
knowledge of how these biases develop, and therefore create more targeted 
interventions and treatments.  
4.11  Chapter Summary  
 Studies 3A and 3B aimed to empirically test the theoretical work of Salkovskis 
et al.’s (1999) pathways to inflated responsibility within both adult clinical and non-
clinical samples. Study 3B was the first to examine the pathways theory using the 
PIRBS (Coles & Schofield, 2008) with an adult, clinical population. Additionally, this 
was the first research to include thought-action fusion in the clinical sample to shed 
light on the similarities in etiology between the two different responsibility biases, 
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and whether any of the theoretical pathways were predictive of TAF. These findings 
provide support for Salkovskis et al.’s theory of multiple pathways to inflated 
responsibility, highlighting the importance of early childhood events on the later 
development of dysfunctional responsibility beliefs in adulthood. Results from both 
Studies 3A and 3B found that inflated responsibility played a full mediating role 
between endorsement of the pathways and OC symptoms. This was also found with 
TAF-likelihood in the clinical sample. The overall results identify critical incidents 
where one actually does have influence on a negative occurrence, or where it appears 
as so to the individual, can be predictive of later developing inflated responsibility 
beliefs and TAF-likelihood.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.  RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND RESPONSIBILITY BELIEFS 
The collective results of Studies 1, 2A and 2B, 3A and 3B have shown the 
importance of both TAF and inflated responsibility in psychopathology, namely 
symptoms of OCD, anxiety and depression. Existing research on these responsibility 
biases tends to consider them as maladaptive constructs, and indicative of 
psychopathology. The aim of Study 4 was to consider whether these responsibility 
biases can exist outside the realm of psychopathology, so that they are not always 
indicative of underlying psychological symptoms. This has important implications for 
treatment, as although it is clear that both TAF and inflated responsibility are 
associated with particular disorders like OCD, depression and anxiety, caution should 
be taken when making assumptions and pathologising beliefs that may be acceptable 
in some cultural and religious groups (Siev & Cohen, 2007).  
5.1 Literature Review  
Religiosity has been repeatedly linked with both thought-action fusion 
(especially the moral component) and inflated responsibility (e.g. Rassin & Koster, 
2003; Berle & Starcevic, 2005). This does not, of course, mean that all individuals 
with strong religious beliefs will also develop thought-action fusion. Abramowitz, 
Deacon, Woods and Tolin (2004) argue that pre-existing cognitive biases like inflated 
responsibility may predispose one to affiliate more strongly with their religious 
beliefs and teachings. Similarly, individuals who already score highly on TAF may go 
on to become more involved in religion. It remains unclear whether religious 
teachings (or one’s interpretations of these) can lead to TAF beliefs, and/or whether 
those who are already endorsing such beliefs are attracted to religion. In the end, the 
relationship between religiosity and responsibility beliefs is likely to be a complex 
and multiply-determined relationship taking into account internal (i.e., personality, 
biases, behavioural tendencies), and external (i.e., specific religious teachings, 
childhood experiences) factors (Abramowitz et al., 2004; Salkovskis et al., 1999). 
Most previous research in this area has been conducted by examining 
differences between Christians and Jews. For example Cohen and Rozin (2001) 
investigated how Jews and Protestants moralised mental states. That is, believing that 
one’s thoughts have moral importance, similar to the moral component of TAF. By 
using hypothetical vignettes, they found that both participant groups assigned equal 
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moral significance to particular behaviours, but that Protestants considered thoughts 
to be more morally important that Jews. Following on from this research, Cohen 
(2003) conducted three studies to look at how Jews and Protestants differ in whether 
they consider: (a) thoughts about immoral actions to be immoral themselves, and (b) 
whether they think immoral thoughts are likely to lead to action. These results built on 
previous research, showing that Jews and Protestants do not differ in the extent to 
which they view certain thoughts as moral or immoral but that Protestants more 
strongly believe that thinking about an immoral act is as bad as actually doing it. The 
author concluded that Protestants are therefore likely to use thoughts as a basis for 
negative moral judgement.  
Similar research was conducted by Siev and Cohen (2007) who looked at 
differences in thought-action fusion between Christians and Jews using an online 
survey. Results showed that the Christians scored higher on the TAF-moral subscale 
than Jews. Additionally, in the Christian group, religiosity was only found to be 
associated with TAF, and not OCD cognitions and symptoms. The authors suggest 
that TAF-moral is only a marker of psychopathology when the beliefs are not 
culturally normative; however when they are present alongside religious doctrine, 
they may not be indicative of pathology.  
The fact that TAF has been found to play a part in the development and 
maintenance of a number of psychological disorders, and that TAF has repeatedly 
been found to correlate with religiosity, may lead one to assume that religious people 
are therefore at higher risk of pathology. However, the evidence for such a 
relationship indicates a much more complex relationship. Interesting research by Siev, 
Chambless and Huppert (2010) evaluated TAF-moral alongside religious affiliation 
and OCD symptoms among undergraduate students. The findings of this research 
showed Christians endorsed higher levels of TAF-moral than Jews. Results also 
showed that among Christians, TAF-moral was related to religiosity, but not OCD 
symptoms. In contrast, for the Jewish participants, TAF-moral was related to OCD 
symptoms, but not religiosity.  
Berman, Abramowitz, Pardue and Wheaton (2010) investigated the 
association between religion and TAF using an in-vivo paradigm. Protestant Christian 
and Atheist undergraduate students completed an exercise that involved writing the 
name of a close, loved relative into both negative likelihood thoughts (“I hope ______ 
is in a car accident today”), and negative moral thoughts involving incest (“I hope I 
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have sex with ______”). After spending time writing down the thought and 
visualising its occurrence, they completed measures of anxiety, likelihood of the event 
happening, and the moral wrongness of thinking and writing the thought. In terms of 
their affective responses, the groups reported equally high levels of anxiety 
experienced due to thinking about the events. The religious participants, however, 
rated the events as more likely to occur, and that thinking and writing these thoughts 
were more morally wrong, than did the Atheist participants. Even though the religious 
groups showed higher levels of induced TAF, this was not related to higher anxiety 
levels. The authors suggested that the religious participants were able to use belief-
based anxiety reduction strategies, such as praying for forgiveness.    
5.1.2  Religious Affiliation vs. Religiosity  
A lot of research in this particular area has included a measure of religiosity. 
Religiosity can be described as “society-based beliefs and practices relating to God or 
a higher power commonly associated with a church or organised group” (Egbert, 
Mickley & Coeling, 2009; p.8). There are over 100 scales measuring religiosity and 
many of these differentiate between extrinsic and intrinsic orientations (Egbert et al., 
2009). One of the more commonly used measures is the Duke Religion Index 
(DUREL; Koenig, Meador & Parkerson, 1997), developed for use in health and 
psychiatric fields. This scale includes five items measuring external factors (e.g. 
“How often do you attend church of other religious meetings?”), and five measuring 
internal (e.g. “In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine”). Because these 
types of religiosity scales measure religiosity in general, it is difficult to attribute any 
observed differences to a particular doctrine, or to see where these differences may 
originate. The current study uses religious affiliation – either Protestant Christian or 
Atheist. This is dichotomous, as one cannot believe or disbelieve in God more than 
someone else. Religious affiliation means that the individual has self-identified with a 
particular religion, with the assumption being made that this reflects an internal 
decision to live according to that belief (whether Atheist or Christian).  
5.2 Study 4 
The aims of Study 4 were to compare TAF and inflated responsibility in 
Protestant Christians and Atheist/Agnostics, and to investigate the moderating role of 
religious affiliation on the relationships between TAF-moral and symptoms associated 
with OC and depression. Previous research has repeatedly found TAF-moral to be 
significantly associated with symptoms of depression. For example, Abramowitz, 
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Whiteside, Lynam and Kalsy (2003) examined TAF in relation to anxiety and 
depression, and whether negative affect mediates the relationship between TAF and 
OCD. The participants were made up of clinical and non-clinical groups. Results 
showed that higher scores on the TAF scale were related to more severe depression 
and anxiety. More specifically, TAF-likelihood was related to anxiety, while TAF-
moral was more related to depression. The authors propose that TAF-moral reflects 
types of cognitive distortions seen in depression such as self-blaming for external 
events. The association between TAF-moral and depressive symptoms was found for 
both the clinical and non-clinical groups. 
While most of the previous research on TAF with religious groups has been 
conducted comparing Jews and Protestants/Catholics, Study 4 will compare Protestant 
Christians with Atheists. It is anticipated that the results will add to existing research 
that religious groups show higher levels of TAF. The study will extend the work of 
Siev, Chambless and Huppert (2010) on the moderating role of religiosity on TAF-
moral and OC symptoms. It will extend and improve on this research by including a 
comparison group (Atheists), and being the first study to include a measure of 
depression. Research by Abramowitz et al. (2003) showed that TAF-moral is more 
directly related to depression. Research on religiosity shows more links with TAF-
moral than TAF-likelihood (e.g. Rassin & Koster, 2003). It is speculated that TAF-
likelihood is more akin to tempting fate and superstition which goes against the more 
Calvinist doctrine which focuses more on Divine predeterminism (Rassin & Koster). 
Predeterminism refers to the idea that events are determined in advance, and in 
Christianity this means that all future events are already decided by God (McKewan, 
2009).  
5.2.1 Hypotheses  
 Based on previous research, it was hypothesised that (a) participants with 
Protestant religious beliefs would demonstrate significantly higher levels of TAF-
moral than Atheists; and (b) that TAF-moral would be significantly associated with 
OC symptoms and depression in the Atheist group, but not for Christian participants; 
i.e. that religiosity would moderate the relationship between TAF-moral and OC 
symptoms/depression. A measure of inflated responsibility was included to see 
whether there were group differences on this measure similar to TAF. As religious 
groups often show elevated levels of TAF, a measure of thought suppression was also 
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included to see whether there was also an increase in attempts to avoid unwanted 
thoughts.   
5.3 Method  
5.3.1 Participants  
 Participants were 100 Protestant Christians, and 100 Atheists, who completed 
an anonymous online survey. Christian participants were recruited from local 
protestant (Baptist and Non-Denominational) churches and ranged from 16 to 80 
years of age (M= 31.51, SD= 12.90), with 34 males and 48 females (18 did not 
complete this question).  Regular congregation members known to the Pastors were 
sent emails with information about the research and a link to the online survey. 
Atheist participants were recruited using a snowballing effect through a social 
networking site, and through a national Atheist society; they ranged from 18 to 80 
years of age (M=35.42, SD=16.67), with 50 males and 50 females.   
5.3.2 Measures  
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), the 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000), the Thought-Action 
Fusion Scale – Revised (TAFS-R; Shafran et al., 1996), the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), and the Self-Rating Depression Scale 
(Zung, 1965) were used in this study and are described in detail in Study 1 (Chapter 
2).  
5.3.3 Procedure 
The questionnaire data were collected via an anonymous online survey using 
Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 2013). For the Christian sample, emails were sent out 
from Church leaders inviting their congregations to participate. Atheist participants 
were recruited through Facebook, using a snowballing effect. Additionally, a national 
Atheist/Rationalist society emailed their members to participate, making up the 
Atheist group. Participation took approximately 15-20 minutes. The Victoria 
University Human Ethics Committee gave approval for this study prior to its 
beginning. The information, consent and debriefing information for this study is 
included in Appendix D.  
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5.4 Results  
 5.4.1 Descriptive Analyses  
 The means, standard deviations and reliability coefficients for all variables are 
shown in Table 5.1. As can be seen, all scales showed good to excellent reliability 
(Cronbach’s alphas).  
Table 5.1 
Mean scores (and standard deviations) and reliability analyses  
 Atheist 
N=100 
Protestant 
Christian 
N=100 
Total 
N= 200 
hh 
TAF – total  
TAF – moral  
TAF – likelihood  
         -  (others)  
         -  (self)  
RAS 
SRDS 
OCI-R 
WBSI  
26.81(10.99) 
17.69 (7.27) 
8.94 (4.37) 
4.83 (2.51) 
4.11 (2.20) 
57.44 (27.23) 
35.00 (9.30) 
10.77 (8.97) 
2.23 (.88) 
44.10 (13.55) 
35.56 (12.41) 
8.52 (3.33) 
4.54 (1.69) 
3.98 (2.02) 
64.32 (25.91) 
37.6 (10.04) 
12.14 (7.83) 
2.67 (.87) 
34.55 (14.91) 
25.86 (13.38) 
8.68 (3.99) 
4.60 (2.13) 
4.07 (2.18) 
60.63 (26.77) 
36.08 (9.67) 
11.43 (8.45) 
2.44 (.90)  
0.94 
0.96 
0.93 
0.96 
0.89 
0.93 
0.87 
0.86 
0.93 
Note: α: Cronbach’s alpha.                                                                                           
TAF-R: Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised with subscales (Shafran et al., 1996); 
RAS: Responsibility Attitude Scale (Salkovskis et al., 2000); SRDS: Self-Rating 
Depression Scale (Zung, 1965); OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised 
(Foa et al., 2002); WBSI: White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994). 
 Pearson Correlations are shown in Table 5.2 for both the Christian and Atheist 
participant groups. In the Christian sample, TAF-moral correlated with OC 
Symptoms, but not with Depression. In the Atheist sample, TAF-moral significantly 
correlated with both OC symptoms and depression. Thought suppression significantly 
correlated with OC symptoms, TAF-moral and Depression in both samples.   
 
 
 
α 
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Table 5.2 
Pearson correlations  
 Protestant Christians (N=100) Atheist/Agnostic (N=100) 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
(1) TAF-Moral 
(2) OCI-R 
(3) SRDS 
(4) WBSI 
1 
.243* 
.166 
.354** 
 
1 
.575** 
.656** 
 
 
1 
.549** 
1 
.498** 
.334** 
.308** 
 
1 
.532** 
.576** 
 
 
1 
.549** 
Note: *p<.01, **p<.001.                                                                                               
TAF-Moral: subscale from TAF-R: Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (Shafran 
et al., 1996); OCI-R: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (Foa et al., 2002); 
WBSI: White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994); SRDS: Self-
Rating Depression Scale (Zung, 1965). 
5.4.2 Group Differences 
 As can be seen in Figure 5.1, Protestant Christians demonstrated higher 
overall TAF scores than Atheist participants (t[198]=9.48, p<.001). However, when 
this is divided into TAF-moral and TAF-likelihood, only TAF-moral scores are 
significantly different (t[198]=11.56, p<.001), between the groups, with the Christian 
group being higher on this measure. The two groups also differed significantly on 
thought suppression, with Protestant Christians scoring higher on this scale than the 
Atheist group (t[198]=3.47, p<.001). There were no significant differences between 
the two groups on inflated responsibility, depression, OC symptoms and TAF-
likelihood.  
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Figure 5.1 Differences between Christians and Atheists on overall TAF, TAF-moral 
and TAF-likelihood. TAF total and TAF-moral differences are significant.   
 
5.4.3 Moderation  
The moderation analyses were performed using Modgraph (Jose, 2008), which 
is based on the guidelines by Aiken and West (1991). Before analyses were 
performed, TAF-moral as an independent variable was centred to reduce 
multicollinearity. Then simple regression lines for moderated variables were plotted 
for significant interaction effects.  
 5.4.3.1   OC Symptoms 
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, religiosity moderates the relationship from TAF-
moral to OC symptoms. That is, an increase in TAF-moral scores predicted an 
increase in OC symptom severity for the Atheist participants. Comparison of this 
slope showed a significant difference from zero (β=0.16, t[196]=2.23, p<.05). In 
comparison, OC symptom severity decreased with an increase in TAF-Moral for the 
Christian participants. Comparison of the slope against zero, however, revealed that 
the simple slope for the Christian participant group was not significant (β=-0.26, 
t[196]=-1.48, p=0.14).  
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Figure 5.2 Religiosity as a moderator for TAF-Moral on OC symptoms.  
5.4.3.2   Depression  
 Figure 5.2 shows the moderating role of religiosity from TAF-moral to 
Depression scores. Even though the pattern of results resembles the pattern observed 
for OC symptoms, neither of the slopes differed significantly from zero (Christian 
sample: β=-0.04, t[196]=-0.19, p=0.85; Atheist sample: β=0.13, t[196]=1.35, p=0.18). 
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Figure 5.3 Religiosity as a moderator for TAF-Moral on Depression  
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5.5 Study 4 Discussion  
 The goal of Study 4 was to examine the moderating role of religiosity in the 
relationship between responsibility beliefs and the occurrence of OC and depression 
symptoms. The current study examined religiosity as a dichotomous “religious” (i.e., 
Protestant Christian) vs. “non-religious” (i.e., Atheist) factor. Significant differences 
were found between the two groups on TAF-moral and thought suppression, with the 
Christians scoring higher on both measures. This difference was specific to TAF-
moral, and did not generalise to TAF-likelihood or inflated responsibility. There were 
no significant differences between the two groups on depression or OC symptoms. 
Moderation analyses revealed that for the Christians, higher levels of TAF-moral was 
not associated with higher levels of OC symptoms, whereas with the Atheist group, 
higher TAF-moral scores were related to higher OC scores. It was expected that 
similar results would be found with depression. Results, however, showed that high 
TAF-moral scores were not related to higher depression scores for either group. 
 In this study, the Atheist group represented those individuals who do not 
endorse any type of religious belief. The obtained results were comparable to that of 
Siev et al. (2010) regarding OC symptoms in their Jewish sample. Within the Atheist 
sample, high scores on TAF-moral were significantly associated with higher scores on 
OC symptomatology.  Although the same pattern was hypothesised for scores on 
depression, this was not found.   
 The finding that, for those holding Christian beliefs, TAF-moral was not 
associated with OC symptoms supported the hypothesis. When this is broken down 
further, it indicates that TAF-moral thoughts do not necessarily lead to feelings of 
anxiety and/or the desire to neutralise them through compulsive behaviours, as is 
measured by the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). Arguably there may be something 
inherently different about the way that Christians process such thoughts compared to 
non-Christians. This can be related to Rachman’s (1997) Misinterpretation of 
Significance Theory which proposes that for a thought to become pathological, the 
individual misinterprets it as being personally meaningful and indicates something 
significant about their character, which may lead to negative consequences. Clark 
(2004) proposed that those who show high levels of the TAF bias are vulnerable to 
making such misinterpretations. In terms of the Christian group, there appears to be at 
least two options, either they are not making any such misinterpretations, or they are, 
and this is being offset by another factor. Given the teachings of the Bible around 
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thoughts being judged, and being morally equivalent to actions, the latter appears 
more likely. It may be that the added teachings of the unconditional mercy and 
forgiveness of God in Christian theology works to neutralise any anxiety caused by 
the thoughts.  
 5.5.1  Christian Theology  
 For the results to show twice the levels of TAF-moral in the Christian group 
compared to the Atheist group, indicates there is something within Christian teaching 
that links thoughts to actions, at least in terms of morality. Christianity is a belief 
system which places great importance on one’s thoughts and intentions (Cohen & 
Rozin, 2001). Evidence for this can be seen throughout the Bible, for example “The 
Lord knows the thoughts of man” (Psalm 94:11; New International Version); “… you 
perceive my thoughts from afar” (Psalm 139:2); “For the word of God is living and 
active… it judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart” (Hebrews 4:12), and of 
course “You have heard that it was said, “Do not commit adultery.” But now I tell 
you: Anyone who looks at a woman and wants to possess her is guilty of committing 
adultery with her in his heart”   (Matthew 5: 27-28). These passages describe that God 
knows peoples’ thoughts, and that when judged by God, people are represented by 
their thoughts. Furthermore, merely the act of thinking about a negative action is 
considered sinful (often referred to as ‘sin by thought’). It would logically follow, 
then, that those who choose to live by a certain interpretation of these words would be 
more likely to endorse TAF-moral statements.  
 This could also help to explain the significantly higher levels of thought 
suppression. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are concerns with the validity of the 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and its ability 
to measure actual thought suppression, as opposed to cognitive intrusions. Either way, 
a high score on this scale indicates that the individual experiences thoughts they do 
not want, and that they may try to suppress or avoid. This elevated rate of thought 
suppression in the Christian sample may not necessarily be related to TAF-moral 
cognitions, but may be more generalised. That is, it may be an indicator that those 
with Christian beliefs are more mindful of their thoughts, and engage in more self-
monitoring to avoid what they consider to be immoral or sinful thoughts, compared to 
non-Christians. Currently this conclusion is speculative and more research on this is 
needed.  
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5.5.2  Religious Affiliation  
 The obtained results cannot be generalised to other religions, and cross-
religion commonality should not be assumed. Even within Protestant Christianity, 
there are different denominations with variations in doctrine and practice. Rather than 
examining all existing religious groups, it may be possible to find patterns of thought 
along categories of religions; it may be that people of different religions make their 
moral judgements depending on their taught doctrine (Cohen, 2003). One way to 
distinguish between groups of religions is the degree to which they are Orthodox or 
Orthopractic. Orthodox religions emphasise internal beliefs and creed, whereas 
Orthopractic religions are more focused on law and community life (Cohen). In other 
words, Orthodox religions are more internally focussed, on thoughts and beliefs (e.g. 
Christianity), whereas orthopractic religions are more externally focused and 
emphasise the importance of behaviours and practices (e.g. Islam and Judaism). A 
similar classification system is whether religions are descent or assent in terms of how 
membership is defined. In descent religions, members are decided through birth (e.g. 
Judaism and Hinduism), whereas membership to assent religions requires the personal 
decision to adopt a particular belief structure (e.g. Christianity and Buddhism). Cohen 
(2003) speculates that assent religions would be more moralising of thoughts, i.e. that 
they would score higher on TAF-moral, as they require personal, internal beliefs. The 
same may be said for religions that are more orthodox; that they centre around belief 
structures and thoughts may mean they are more likely to endorse TAF-moral, as 
opposed to the more orthopractic religions.   
 Most previous research comparing TAF and morality between religious 
groups has been with Christian and Jews (e.g. Cohen & Rankin, 2004; Siev, 
Chambless & Huppert, 2010). Christianity is an example of a more orthodox, assent 
religion, while Judaism is more orthopractic and a religion of descent. Christianity 
emphasises the notion that one’s eternal life depends on commitment to a belief, and 
teaches few restrictions and behaviours. However, Judaism teaches behavioural 
adherence to daily routines and law, and places little importance on mental states. 
Crucial differences in doctrine, theology and practise of religion make it so important 
to not make assumptions in terms of TAF-moral and related cognitions. While many 
studies vaguely measure ‘religiosity’, this can lead readers to unintentionally relate 
this to a traditional Christian perspective, while in fact there is so much variance 
across different religions, sects and denominations.  
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 5.5.3  Clinical Implications   
 The current research has important clinical implications; sensitivity around 
religious beliefs is needed when approaching individuals about their spiritual and 
moral beliefs, as well as their perceived moral weight of thoughts, desires and 
intentions. As concluded by Siev, Chambless and Huppert (2010), when TAF beliefs 
are culturally normative, as in religious teachings, they do not necessarily signal 
pathology, and can be an example of healthy religious beliefs. Clinicians and 
researchers need to consider the context of responsibility beliefs, before assuming that 
they represent a risk factor for psychological disorder. Clinicians in particular, should 
be aware that attempting to convince religious patients that their thoughts do not 
matter or are incorrect may be insensitive and unhelpful. Rather, Siev and Cohen 
(2007) recommend focussing on the interpretation and implications for self-worth, 
based on these thoughts. Additionally, they recommend directing attention more on 
educating clients that perfection is a goal demanded by OCD and not religion, rather 
than spending time on whether the thoughts matter.  
 5.5.4  Limitations  
 Both groups of participants were very aware that they had been selected for 
being either Christians or Atheists, which may have had an influence on the way they 
responded. For example, the Christian sample may have responded in a way that they 
believe ‘good Christians’ should. Similarly, the Atheists may have responded in 
strong opposition against the more religious items as they knew their views on this 
were of interest. The thought-action fusion scale used in this study has a number of 
items that directly mention God/Church which potentially would have drawn this out, 
with the two groups of participants responding at either ends of the scale. For example 
“Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a blasphemous action”, 
and “When I think about making an obscene remark or gesture in church, it is almost 
as sinful as actually doing it”. In future research, it would be interesting to either 
exclude these items, or to use modified items to take away the religious themes, and 
see whether this may account for the differences in overall TAF scores.  
5.5.5  Future Research  
 TAF-moral is nearly always considered in terms of thoughts about doing 
negative, immoral things. Similarly, the Revised TAF Scale (TAFS-R; Shafran et al., 
1996) only describes unwanted, negative cognitions. This makes sense, given the 
associations with anxiety and OC symptoms. It would be unlikely for individuals to 
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seek help from a mental health professional because of positive, happy thoughts. As 
Shafran and Rachman (2004) describe, it is unlikely for those with OCD to believe 
that their positive thoughts will increase the likelihood of positive events. However, in 
terms of TAF-moral in relation to religious beliefs, it would be interesting to examine 
whether the same differences between Christians and Atheists could be found with 
positive thoughts. For example, does simply thinking about giving to charity make 
someone charitable, or does thinking about being a loving wife/husband make them a 
good spouse? For example, Cohen and Rankin (2004) found that Christians paid more 
attention to underlying motivations for virtuous actions; for example, selfish motives 
invalidated the moral quality of the action; this was not found for the Jewish sample. 
This is in line with Jewish views that “thoughts about immoral actions are natural and 
can be overcome, whereas thoughts about virtuous actions will be cultivated and acted 
on” (Cohen, 2003; p. 274).  
5.6 Chapter Summary  
The results of Study 4 showed that in the Christian sample, TAF-moral was 
not associated with OC symptoms or depression. This is compared to the Atheist 
group, where higher levels of TAF-moral were associated with higher scores on OC 
symptoms. TAF is often considered to be a marker of psychopathology, or a specific 
symptom of OCD. The results from Study 4 have shown that this is not always the 
case, and that TAF-moral beliefs in particular, are not necessarily maladaptive. This 
research has important implications for clinicians in considering the context of TAF 
beliefs before assuming they represent a risk factor for psychopathology. Attempting 
to correct these beliefs or convince someone that their thoughts are incorrect may be 
insensitive and damaging. As Siev and Cohen (2007) suggest, it may be more useful 
in a clinical setting, to help the individual reinterpret their thoughts in terms of the 
person’s perceived self-worth, i.e. that their thoughts matter, but are not their fault. 
This research will also provide a better understanding on the links between TAF and 
religious affiliation (Protestant Christianity) in general, leading to more effective 
intervention and treatment techniques, while being respectful to individuals' beliefs.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. RESEARCH SUMMARY AND GENERAL DISCUSSION  
6.1  Research Summary  
 This body of research has been made up of four key studies on thought-action 
fusion and inflated responsibility. Study 1 was conducted to investigate the role of 
these beliefs in psychopathology alongside thought suppression. Studies 2A and 2B 
examined the additional influence of an individual’s locus of control and how this 
effects responsibility beliefs. In Studies 3A and 3B, Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) 
pathways theory was empirically tested with both non-clinical and clinical 
participants, looking at the etiology of responsibility beliefs. Finally, Study 4 focussed 
on the relationship between responsibility beliefs and religiosity. The assessment 
methods included self-report questionnaires tapping into both TAF and inflated 
responsibility constructs.  
 6.1.1  Study 1 
 Study 1 used structural equation modelling to explore the relationships 
between both TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs and OC symptoms, depression 
and anxiety. The mediating role of thought suppression was also examined. It was 
hypothesised that both inflated responsibility and TAF would be related to symptoms 
of OCD, depression and anxiety, and that this relationship would be mediated by 
thought suppression. The results showed that while TAF was specific to OC 
symptoms, inflated responsibility was a more general construct and is also associated 
with depression and anxiety. For inflated responsibility, the best fitting structural 
model showed thought suppression to partially mediate between these responsibility 
beliefs and the three disorders. TAF-likelihood was directly linked to OC symptoms, 
depression and anxiety, while for TAF-moral this relationship was mediated by 
thought suppression. This research highlights important differences between TAF and 
inflated responsibility and how they are related to psychopathology. The findings that 
TAF-moral and inflated responsibility work alongside thought suppression have 
implications for treatment focusing on the underlying belief systems that may lead to 
the desire to suppress such thoughts, thereby potentially lessening symptoms of 
anxiety and depression, rather than the reaction of thought suppression which plays a 
more intermediary role.  
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6.1.2  Studies 2A and 2B 
 The aim of Studies 2A and 2B were to look at the function of control beliefs; 
namely having an external locus of control, and how this may work alongside 
responsibility beliefs in psychopathology. This was first investigated within a non-
clinical sample (Study 2A), and then within a clinical group of anxiety patients (Study 
2B). It was hypothesised that the interaction between responsibility beliefs and an 
external locus of control would predict OC symptoms. For the non-clinical sample, 
the results showed that the combination of having both an inflated responsibility and 
an external locus of control was predictive of OC symptoms. For the clinical sample, 
inflated responsibility and external locus of control were both individually predictive 
of higher scores on OC symptoms; however the interaction between these two 
variables was not significant. Study 2B also included a measure to TAF in order to see 
if there were similar findings for this type of responsibility belief. Results showed that 
only TAF-likelihood was related to external locus of control (and not TAF-moral). 
For overall TAF scores and TAF-likelihood, having an external locus of control fully 
mediated between these beliefs and higher OC symptoms. The combined results of 
both studies show how the two constructs of responsibility beliefs (both inflated and 
TAF) can work with an external locus of control to produce OC symptoms. It is 
proposed that it is the discrepancy between the level of responsibility one feels, and 
the level of control they have which is what leads to distress (Burger, 1992).  
 6.1.3 Studies 3A and 3B  
 Studies 3A and 3B focused on the etiology of responsibility biases and 
empirically tested Salkovskis et al.’s (1999) theory of multiple pathways to inflated 
responsibility beliefs, with a newly designed measure. This was the first study to 
empirically test this theory within a general adult population, as well as with an adult 
clinical sample. It was hypothesised that these theoretical pathways would be 
predictive of inflated responsibility and TAF. For Study 3A with a non-clinical 
sample, results showed that the Rigid Rules and Actions pathways were significant 
predictors of inflated responsibility. This is consistent with the view that, growing up 
in an environment with strict rules and standards; and secondly, experiencing a 
catastrophic event where one believes they were responsible, are both related to later 
developing an inflated sense of responsibility. The same pathways were significant 
predictors in study 3B with a clinical sample, as well as Overprotection. This pathway 
describes a childhood where the parent/s overprotected the individual in an 
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environment of anxiety and worry. Study 3B also included a measure of TAF to see 
whether the pathways theory could predict these types of responsibility beliefs. 
Results showed that TAF-likelihood was predicted by the Actions pathway, and that 
TAF-moral was predicted by the Rigid Rules and Actions pathways. The overall 
results provided some support for Salkovskis et al.’s theory in not only predictive 
inflated responsibility, but also TAF beliefs. The most convincing results for both 
studies were found for the Actions pathway, which demonstrates the importance of 
how one processes their role (whether real or imagined) in causing a catastrophic 
event.  
 6.1.4  Study 4 
 The aim of Study 4 was to take a close look at the link between responsibility 
beliefs, religious affiliation and symptoms of OC and depression, and to examine the 
implications of this for treatment. This involved a comparison of Atheists and 
Protestant Christians. Based on previous research in this area, it was hypothesised that 
the Christian group would show higher levels of TAF-moral, and that TAF-moral 
would be associated with OC symptoms and depression in the Atheist group, but not 
for the Christian group. The results for this study showed that for the Christian 
sample, scores of TAF-moral were over twice as high as those of the Atheist group. In 
terms of the link to OC symptoms, for the Christian group, higher TAF-moral scores 
were not significantly related to having higher OC scores, while they were for the 
Atheist sample. For depression scores, higher TAF-moral scores were not 
significantly related for either of the two groups. These results have important 
implications for treatment, especially for those individuals with strong religious 
beliefs. It is important to consider and be respectful of the context of such beliefs 
before assuming they are representative of psychopathology. Additionally, attempts to 
correct such beliefs may be insensitive and offensive, as well as not being effective in 
reducing symptoms.  
6.2  The relationship between Thought-Action Fusion and Inflated Responsibility 
 Across all studies in this research that included both constructs, the correlation 
between IR and TAF ranged from r=.21 to r=.58, indicating a weak to strong 
relationship. While TAF and inflated responsibility are significantly correlated, there 
are also important differences between the two. For example, Study 1 showed that 
TAF is specific to OC symptoms, while inflated responsibility seems to be a more 
general cognitive bias also evident in anxiety and depression. Overall results tend to 
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support inflated responsibility being more general, while TAF tends to be specific to 
OC symptoms and religious affiliation. This supports research by Rassin et al. (1999) 
and Shafran et al. (1996), that the two belief types are closely related and theoretically 
connected, but also distinct. In Chapter 1, two options were proposed: either the two 
belief types shared some overlap, or TAF was a subset of inflated responsibility (refer 
to Figure 1.1). Based on the overall research results throughout the studies of this 
thesis, there is support for the first option, where there is some overlap and 
correlation, but each can occur without the presence of the other. Other researchers 
(e.g. Rachman, 1993; Rachman et al., 1995; Rassin, Merckelback, Muris and Spaan, 
1999; Shafran et al., 1996) suggest that TAF leads to inflated responsibility, a 
suggestion that which would require longitudinal research to investigate.  
 6.2.1  Misinterpretation of Significance Theory 
 In addition to clarifying the relationship between TAF and inflated 
responsibility, it is also important to elucidate how this fits in with existing theory. 
Rachman’s (1997; 1998) misinterpretation of significance theory describes how 
intrusive thoughts are misinterpreted in terms of personal significance, which leads to 
and maintains psychological distress (described in detail in Chapter 1). Clark (2004) 
proposes that responsibility biases such as TAF and inflated responsibility represent a 
vulnerability for making incorrect appraisals of intrusive thoughts. Therefore those 
individuals who endorse these beliefs are more likely to make misinterpretations of 
personal significance, thereby leading to (and maintaining) distress.  
 In reference to TAF beliefs in particular, Berle and Starcevic (2005) discuss 
whether these should be considered as beliefs or appraisals. They state that it remains 
unclear whether TAF is an appraisal specific to an intrusive thought, or that TAF 
beliefs represent a more enduring way of thinking. The authors tentatively conclude 
that TAF can be both; the individual can have TAF as an underlying trait-like 
characteristic, which is then used in specific situational appraisals. They suggest that 
“TAF may be considered as an appraisal when a specific preceding mental event 
(thought, impulse or image) is necessary for its occurrence and as a belief when it can 
be evoked in the absence of any particular mental event” (pg. 266).  
 6.2.2  TAF-likelihood and TAF-moral  
 For the correlation from the current research measuring each of the TAF 
constructs, the relationship between TAF-moral and TAF-likelihood was r=.497, 
indicating a strong relationship. This is comparable to the correlation value found by 
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Shafran et al. (1996), of r=.044, and a similar strength to Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris 
and Schmidt (2001), who reported r=.032. The two constructs are clearly intertwined; 
Rachman and Shafran (1999) described that someone who believes their thoughts 
increases the likelihood of a negative event happening to someone else, is likely to 
also interpret these thoughts in terms of their morality for thinking something like this 
about another person.  
However, throughout the studies of this thesis, evidence emerged that the two 
subtypes of TAF are very different. In each of the studies measuring TAF within this 
thesis, results have demonstrated important differences between likelihood and moral. 
For example in Study 1, TAF-moral works alongside thought suppression, while 
TAF-likelihood does not.  In Study 2B, TAF-moral was not correlated with external 
locus of control while TAF-likelihood was. In Study 3B each subtype was associated 
with different theoretical pathways. Finally in Study 4, TAF-moral was associated 
with Protestant Christian beliefs, while TAF-likelihood was not. These findings 
suggest that it may not always be helpful or accurate to refer only to overall TAF 
scores. People who show high overall scores may actually only endorse one type of 
belief. This is shown in Study 4, where the Christian group showed significantly 
higher scores than the Atheists on overall TAF. However, when looking at the two 
subtypes, there was no significant difference in likelihood scores, and only a 
significant difference for moral scores. Therefore by looking only at the overall 
umbrella term of TAF, this may mask real underlying biases and therefore be 
unhelpful for identifying accurate information on these types of responsibility beliefs  
 Of course, the original study that described the psychometric properties of the 
TAF scale (Shafran, et al., 1996) identified a three-factor structure, dividing TAF into 
moral, likelihood-self and likelihood-other. More research on the similarities and 
differences between the two types of TAF-likelihood would be an interesting 
extension.  
6.3  The roles of Thought-Action Fusion and Inflated Responsibility in 
Psychopathology 
 The research presented in this thesis provides evidence that TAF is specific to 
OCD. This is consistent with research showing this relationship (e.g. Coles et al., 
2001; Rachman, 1993; Rachman et al., 1995; Shafran et al., 1996), however not other 
research showing TAF to be a cognitive bias in a wider range of disorders, for 
example anxiety (e.g. Muris et al., 2001; Abramowitz et al., 2003). The results from 
98 
 
the current studies also reveal inflated responsibility to be an easily activated 
cognitive bias related to symptoms of OCD, depression and anxiety, supporting 
research that this type of belief is more general (Abramowitz et al.).  
The results from the current body of research have provided many insights 
into the roles of both types of responsibility bias in psychopathology, namely anxiety, 
depression and OC symptoms. These symptoms are likely to be the result of a 
combination of variables including faulty responsibility beliefs, failed suppression 
attempts and external control beliefs. What can be taken from the current results is 
that inflated responsibility and TAF beliefs can play a maintaining role in particular 
psychological disorders, as these biases become imbedded in one’s way of thinking 
and interpreting their place in the world. According to Rachman’s (1997) 
misinterpretation of significance theory, distress and psychological symptoms persist 
over time, as the individual becomes stuck in a cycle where their thoughts are 
misinterpreted, leading to distress and therefore resistance, and attempts at thought 
suppression and neutralisation, rather than addressing the initial thought or image. 
Faulty belief patterns such as inflated responsibility and TAF set up the vulnerability 
to misinterpret thoughts according to these biases. Similarly, Salkovskis’ (1985; 1996) 
cognitive model proposes that symptoms are maintained by individuals’ maladaptive 
responses to intrusive thoughts in terms of their personal responsibility, by directing 
their attentional efforts towards removing these thoughts, and therefore decreasing 
their feelings of inflated responsibility. Although these models have been developed 
in reference to OCD, it is suggested that the underlying principle of maintenance can 
be generalised to symptoms of anxiety and depression.  
 Results from the current research also highlighted how responsibility biases 
interact with control beliefs. In Studies 2A and 2B an external locus of control was 
related to inflated responsibility and TAF which lead to higher scores on OC 
symptoms. For inflated responsibility this relationship was an interaction, whereas for 
TAF, external locus of control acted as a mediator. Locus of control may be 
considered similarly to responsibility biases in that it provides a way for individuals to 
interpret their thoughts. If they misinterpret these in a negative way, this can lead to 
attempts at suppressing thoughts, neutralising behaviours to reduce distress, and 
rumination. These reactions have been found to maintain disorders such as OCD, 
anxiety and depression (Rachman, 1997; 1998).  
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6.4  The Etiology of Thought-Acton Fusion and Inflated Responsibility 
 As discussed by Salkovskis et al. (1999), the development of both inflated 
responsibility and TAF beliefs is likely to be the result of many different contributing 
factors over a period of time, which are subtle and difficult to identify. This may 
include parenting style, genetics, environmental and situational factors. The results of 
Studies 3A and 3B highlight the importance of critical incidents in this development. 
This refers to one part of the multiple pathways to inflated responsibility beliefs 
theory proposed by Salkovskis et al., and in the current research was also predictive of 
TAF beliefs (both moral and likelihood). It does not seem to make a difference 
whether the individual’s role in the occurrence of the event is real or imagined. 
However, Salkovskis et al. note that the faulty responsibility beliefs that are generated 
from these types of events tend to be more specific, rather than generalising to all 
aspects of daily life. Studies 3A and 3B also show that growing up in an environment 
where there are extreme codes of conduct and behaviour are also conducive to 
developing responsibility biases (referring to the Rigid Rules pathway of Salkovskis 
et al.’s theory). In terms of the overall theory of pathways to responsibility beliefs, the 
current research provides empirical support for this idea, for both the non-clinical and 
clinical participant groups. 
 More research is needed on the factors involved in the development of biased 
responsibility beliefs. Some of these identified by Salkovskis et al. (1999) involve a 
history of being blamed, criticised and scapegoated, as well as situational increases in 
responsibility. Additionally, Berle and Starcevic (2005) suggest examining 
personality characteristics that may predispose an individual to developing faulty 
beliefs, such as neuroticism, harm avoidance and psychoticism.   
6.5  Clinical Implications  
 The findings from the research throughout this thesis have some important 
implications for treatment around responsibility biases. Firstly, support was found for 
inflated responsibility being considered as a more general cognitive bias involved in 
anxiety and depression, rather than being a specific symptom or indicator of OCD. 
This suggests that it may be worthwhile to address such belief patterns in CBT with 
disorders other than OCD. By targeting underlying beliefs around responsibility, this 
may lead to a decrease in subsequent thought suppression and neutralisation attempts, 
and resultant symptoms of distress. Additionally, Studies 2A and 2B provide support 
for the idea that it is the discrepancy between high levels of personal responsibility 
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beliefs and a low sense of control that leads to distress and psychological symptoms. 
Treatment programmes that incorporate developing more accurate attributions of 
personal control may also be helpful in decreasing the distress caused by 
responsibility biases.   
  TAF appraisals and inflated responsibility beliefs have been found to play a 
part in the development and maintenance of symptoms in a number of disorders and it 
is important to assess whether they are susceptible and amenable to change through 
therapy. Early promising research on this by Rassin et al. (2001) found that TAF 
beliefs decreased after successful cognitive-behavioural treatment of OCD and other 
anxiety disorders, although it was not specifically addressed. This suggests that 
perhaps the potency of therapy would be enhanced if there was some specific focus on 
TAF and responsibility beliefs. In a study with 72 undergraduate students, Zucker et 
al. (2002) found that providing participants who scored highly on measures of TAF 
with educational ‘anti-TAF’ scripts normalising intrusive thoughts, reduced anxiety 
and the urge to neutralise. Unfortunately there were no follow-up assessments, so it is 
unclear whether these effects persisted over time.  
 There have also been encouraging findings in terms of correcting inflated 
responsibility beliefs through therapy. For example, Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume and 
Dube (1996) evaluated the efficacy of cognitive therapy targeting only inflated 
responsibility in four patients with OCD, using four key strategies: (a) targeting 
inflated responsibility (identifying situations in the patient’s own life); (b) awareness 
of automatic thoughts; (c) correction of negative automatic thoughts; and (d) 
development of adequate perceptions of personal responsibility. All subjects reported 
a significant decrease in OC symptoms, as well as a decrease in perceived 
responsibility. These effects were maintained at follow ups (6 and 12 months) for 
three of the patients. In a more recent study, cognitive behavioural group therapy 
targeting inflated responsibility was found to significantly improve responsibility 
beliefs in 28 patients with OCD (Haraguchi, et al., 2011). Interestingly, results 
showed that while the treatment improved responsibility attitudes, the frequency of 
negative intrusive thoughts did not change. Research such as this is important in 
providing support for therapeutic techniques targeting inflated responsibility 
specifically.  
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6.6  Limitations and Directions for Future Research. 
 Much of the research in this thesis is to do with causality, which has been 
inferred based on theory and past research. In order to get stronger evidence for these 
relationships, longitudinal research is needed. An additional limitation can be seen 
with the clinical sample used for Studies 2B and 3B. Although all participants had 
been formally diagnosed with anxiety disorders, they were all in the process of 
receiving treatment for these. This may have already begun to alter their underlying 
responsibility schemas; therefore if participants had completed this research before 
they began any treatment, their overall results may have been different.  
 As previously mentioned, longitudinal research is needed for more solid 
evidence around causality. These pathways have been inferred throughout the current 
research, based mainly on previous research. An example of this type of causality is 
from Study 4; an interesting question for future research is whether it is the religious 
teachings that lead to an endorsement of TAF-moral beliefs, or whether pre-existing 
TAF-moral beliefs lead to an interest in religiosity. In terms of religiosity itself, it 
would be worthwhile for clinical treatments to see whether there are other religious or 
cultural groups for which particular types of responsibility bias are considered normal, 
and not associated with symptoms of, or a vulnerability for psychopathology.  
An additional extension to the current research is going beyond anxiety and 
depression, and investigating the potential role of responsibility beliefs in other 
disorders such as eating and psychotic disorders. For example there has been some 
work on a variation of TSF: Thought-Shape Fusion in eating disorders (Shafran et al., 
1999). In terms of psychosis, it would be interesting to look at the links between 
responsibility beliefs and grandiose delusions seen in psychosis and manic states; 
whether there was any history of inflated responsibility before the onset of delusions, 
which set up a vulnerability for this. 
Perhaps the most logical direction for future research is extending the 
investigation between TAF and inflated responsibility to also include magical 
ideation/thinking. Previous research has implicated magical thinking repeatedly in the 
discussion of responsibility beliefs, with some researchers even suggesting that TAF 
is a subtype of magical thinking (Einstein & Menzies, 2004a; 2004b). More research 
on the role of magical thinking alongside responsibility, control and 
psychopathological symptoms would be valuable. 
 
102 
 
6.7  Conclusions   
 To conclude, the studies presented in this thesis have demonstrated novel, 
empirical evidence to illustrate the significant roles and both inflated responsibility 
and TAF in psychopathology. It has been shown that both types of responsibility 
biases play different, but important roles in the development and maintenance of 
psychological symptoms related to anxiety, depression and OCD. The results support 
the idea of inflated responsibility being a general cognitive bias, while TAF is more 
specific to OC symptoms, and not always being an indicator of psychopathology. 
Considerable differences were found between TAF-moral and TAF-likelihood, 
indicating that it may not be helpful to consider these only in terms of overall TAF 
scores. By targeting underlying inflated responsibility and TAF beliefs during 
treatment, this may result in fewer attempts at thought suppression, neutralisation, and 
therefore symptoms and feelings of distress.  
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Appendix A 
Study 1 Information and Debriefing Information 
 
 
Information sheet   
 
Hi, my name is Kirsty Fraser. I am undertaking this research to investigate aspects of everyday 
life, for example daily routines and mood. You’ll also be asked questions about some sensitive 
topics (for example, your experience of disturbing, intrusive thoughts and your personal 
religious beliefs).   
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire pack. Some of 
the questions you will be asked may seem very personal. Examples of such questions include 
those about your own religious beliefs and behaviours, as well as questions about your 
experience of disturbing, intrusive thoughts. Some items will ask for your perception of 
experiences such as: "I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them."  
Remember, you can withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
As some of the questions in this study are sometimes used by other researchers to screen for 
individuals with depression, we will make contact with people whose scores indicate that they 
should seek support. Associate Professor John McDowall will write a letter to these people, 
asking them to visit him at an arranged time to discuss their scores, and support resources that 
are available to them. Though it is recommended, these people are under no obligation to 
make a subsequent appointment.  
 
Data is confidential, and will be analysed collectively. The data will also be anonymously 
available to other competent professionals. There will be no way in which these other 
competent professionals will be able to identify you from the data.  
 
If at any stage you wish to discontinue your participation in this research, you are welcome to 
withdraw from the study. If you choose to withdraw, this will not result in any penalty.  
 
Thank you for your time. 
 
Kirsty Fraser     Associate Professor John McDowall 
Masters Student    Senior Lecturer 
kirsty.fraser@vuw.ac.nz     john.mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
I have read the information sheet and I give consent for my data to be used in this study. 
 
 
Signature |              Date | 
 
Student ID number | 
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Debriefing Sheet 
 
Thank you for participating in this research. 
 
You have just completed several sets of questions used for a range of different purposes: to assess 
individuals with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), depression, anxiety, religious beliefs, along 
with questions about your experience of disturbing, intrusive thoughts, responsibility beliefs and a 
measure of Thought-Action Fusion (TAF). TAF is an extremely common phenomenon whereby people 
have difficulty separating thoughts (in particular those that are negative and intrusive) from their 
corresponding behaviours. TAF was first introduced in the context of its occurrence in OCD; however 
there is a growing body of literature that suggests that TAF has implications in a wide variety of 
disorders, including depression and general anxiety.    
 
The aim of this research was to investigate the relationships between TAF and a range of other 
variables, including Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, responsibility, depression, anxiety and religious 
beliefs. Relations between these variables and TAF have been found in previous research although in 
isolation. It is important to examine these relations and possible contributions simultaneously in order to 
elucidate how these constructs relate to one another. By investigating these relationships further, we 
hope to increase understanding and awareness of TAF and its potential role in a variety of clinical 
disturbances.  
 
If questions in this study have raised any issues (either with regard to yourself or friends/family) that you 
wish to discuss further, please do not hesitate to contact Associate Professor John McDowall at the 
School of Psychology. Alternatively, please feel free to make use of the following services provided by 
the university: 
 
Student Health Services    Counselling Services 
4 Wai-te-ata Rd     2 Wai-te-ata Rd 
Kelburn Campus     Kelburn Campus 
(04) 463 5308     (04) 463 5310 
 
Because the questionnaires in this study are used to screen for individuals with depression, we are 
obliged to make contact with people whose scores reveal that they should seek support. Associate 
Professor John McDowall will write a letter to these people, asking them to visit him at an arranged time 
to discuss the implications of their scores, and support resources that are available to them. Though it is 
recommended, these people are under no obligation to make a subsequent appointment.  
 
If you wish to know the results of this study, or wish to discuss it further, please do not hesitate to 
contact Kirsty Fraser or Associate Professor John McDowall at the School of Psychology.  
 
Thank you again for your time. 
 
Kirsty Fraser     Associate Professor John McDowall 
Masters Student    Senior Lecturer 
kirsty.fraser@vuw.ac.nz      john.mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz 
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Appendix B 
Study 2A and 3A Information and Debriefing Information 
 
Information and Consent 
 
This is an online survey investigating aspects about everyday life and anxiety. This 
research is being conducted by a PhD student at Victoria University of Wellington, 
New Zealand, and it has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee. This survey 
takes approximately 20-30 minutes to fill out. Please read through the consent form 
on the following page and click on "I agree" to proceed. You must be at least 16 years 
of age to complete the survey.  
 
Thank you for your interest. 
 
Kirsty Fraser & Associate Professor John McDowall 
Victoria University 
Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
 
Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to participate in the 
study.  
 
Purpose of the research study: This research aims to develop an understanding of the 
causes and factors related to anxiety.  
 
Who is conducting the research?: Kirsty Fraser is a PhD student in the School of 
Psychology, and this research is supervised by Associate Professor John McDowall 
and Dr. Matt Crawford. This research has been approved by the Victoria University of 
Wellington ethics committee.  
 
What is involved if you agree to participate?: If you agree to participate in this study, 
you will be asked to complete the online questionnaire. Some of the questions you 
will be asked may seem very personal. Examples of such questions include those 
about your childhood experiences and your own thoughts and behaviours. Some items 
will ask for your perception of experiences such as: "I frequently get nasty thoughts 
and have difficulty in getting rid of them." Remember, you can withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
You will also be asked for some basic demographic information. We anticipate that 
your total involvement will take approximately 20-30 minutes.  
 
Confidentiality: The questionnaire is totally anonymous so no individual's responses 
can or would be identified. We will keep the data collected here for at least five years 
after publication. You will never be identified in this research project or in any other 
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presentation or publication. The information you provide will be coded by number 
only. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and 
organisations, your coded data may be shared with other competent researchers. Your 
coded data may be used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain 
in the custody of Associate Professor John McDowall and will be kept in a locked 
cabinet in his office.  
 
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. 
 
What happens to the information that you provide?: The data you provide may be 
used for one or more of the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences; 
The overall findings may form part of a PhD thesis, Masters thesis, or Honours 
research project that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
Who to contact: Regardless of whether or not you complete the survey, if you have 
any general questions or comments about the research (excluding questions about the 
data you have provided), feel free to contact us.  
 
Kirsty Fraser  
School of Psychology 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington, New Zealand 
 
E-mail: kirsty.fraser@vuw.ac.nz  
 
Associate Professor John McDowall 
School of Psychology 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington, New Zealand 
 
E-mail: john.mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz 
 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO PRINT A COPY OF THIS PAGE FOR YOUR 
RECORDS. 
 
Agreement. Do you agree to participate in the research study described above?  
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  Debriefing Information  
 
Thank you for participating in this study 
 
Everyone has the occasional unwanted, and unwelcome, thought. It may involve 
behaviour that one may consider disturbing and very much out of character (e.g., 
imagining pushing someone in front of a bus), or a negative thought about possible 
future events (e.g., dying in a house fire). Most people are able to take these thoughts, 
dismiss them as strange, not act upon them, move on, and not think about them again. 
For others, however, these thoughts keep coming back again and again. For some 
people, these recurring unwanted thoughts can be very bothersome, for others, not so 
much. 
 
The study that you just completed, examines early childhood experiences and the 
relationship between these experiences and adult mental health. Specifically, we are 
interested in how early childhood experiences relate to an inflated sense of 
responsibility (e.g., feeling that things are your responsibility and yours alone) and 
how this might be related to how well people are able to control unwanted thoughts in 
their daily lives. 
 
By examining these questions, we can get a better understanding of how these may be 
related to the development of certain mental health issues which could provide 
invaluable information in how these might be treated for those who do have such a 
diagnosis. 
 
If you have any concerns about your own well-being as a result of some of your 
responses to items within this survey, there are a number of sources from which you 
could seek further advice, for example meeting with your GP or Student Health 
(contact details below) to discuss your concerns.   
 
Student Health Services    Counselling Services 
4 Wai-te-ata Rd     2 Wai-te-ata Rd 
Kelburn Campus     Kelburn Campus 
(04) 463 5308      (04) 463 5310 
 
 
If you have further questions, please feel free to contact either  
Kirsty Fraser (Kirsty.Fraser@vuw.ac.nz) or 
Associate Professor John McDowall (John.McDowall@vuw.ac.nz)  
at the School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. 
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Appendix C 
Study 2B and 3B Information and Debriefing Information  
 
Information and Consent 
This is a survey investigating aspects about everyday life and anxiety. This research is 
being conducted by a PhD student at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 
and it has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee. This survey takes on 
average 15-25 minutes to fill out. Please read through the consent form on the 
following page and click on "I agree" to proceed. You must be at least 16 years of age 
to complete the survey, and have been formally diagnosed as having Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder.  
 
Thank you for your interest. 
 
Kirsty Fraser & Associate Professor John McDowall 
Victoria University 
Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to participate in 
the study.  
 
Purpose of the research study: This research aims to develop an understanding of the 
causes and factors related to anxiety.  
 
Who is conducting the research?: Kirsty Fraser is a PhD student in the School of 
Psychology, and this research is supervised by Associate Professor John McDowall 
and Dr. Matt Crawford. This research has been approved by the Victoria University of 
Wellington ethics committee.  
 
What is involved if you agree to participate?: If you agree to participate in this study, 
you will be asked to complete the online questionnaire. Some of the questions you 
will be asked may seem very personal. Examples of such questions include those 
about your childhood experiences and your own thoughts and behaviours. Some items 
will ask for your perception of experiences such as: "I frequently get nasty thoughts 
and have difficulty in getting rid of them." Remember, you can withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
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You will also be asked for some basic demographic information. We anticipate that 
your total involvement will take approximately 15-25 minutes.  
 
Confidentiality: The questionnaire is totally anonymous so no individual's responses 
can or would be identified. We will keep the data collected here for at least five years 
after publication. You will never be identified in this research project or in any other 
presentation or publication. The information you provide will be coded by number 
only. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and 
organisations, your coded data may be shared with other competent researchers. Your 
coded data may be used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain 
in the custody of Associate Professor John McDowall and will be kept in a locked 
cabinet in his office.  
 
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. It is 
entirely your choice if you would like to fill out the survey. Remember, if you feel 
uncomfortable at any time, it is ok to not finish.  
 
What happens to the information that you provide?: The data you provide may be 
used for one or more of the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences; 
The overall findings may form part of a PhD thesis, Masters thesis, or Honours 
research project that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
Who to contact: Regardless of whether or not you complete the survey, if you have 
any general questions or comments about the research, feel free to contact us. Please 
note we do not have access to your specific data.  
 
Kirsty Fraser  
School of Psychology 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington, New Zealand 
 
E-mail: kirsty.fraser@vuw.ac.nz  
 
Associate Professor John McDowall 
School of Psychology 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington, New Zealand 
 
E-mail: john.mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz 
 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO PRINT A COPY OF THIS PAGE FOR YOUR RECORDS. 
 
Agreement. Do you agree to participate in the research study described above?  
  YOU MUST BE OVER 16 YEARS OF AGE TO CONTINUE 
TO THE SURVEY.  
I AGREE 
I DO NOT AGREE 
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Debriefing Information  
 
Thank you for participating in this study 
 
Everyone has the occasional unwanted, and unwelcome, thought. It may involve 
behaviour that one may consider disturbing and very much out of character (e.g., 
imagining pushing someone in front of a bus), or a negative thought about possible 
future events (e.g., dying in a house fire). Most people are able to take these thoughts, 
dismiss them as strange, not act upon them, move on, and not think about them again. 
For others, however, these thoughts keep coming back again and again. For some 
people, these recurring unwanted thoughts can be very bothersome, for others, not so 
much. 
 
The study that you just completed, examines early childhood experiences and the 
relationship between these experiences and adult mental health. Specifically, we are 
interested in how early childhood experiences relate to an inflated sense of 
responsibility (e.g., feeling that things are your responsibility and yours alone) and 
how this might be related to how well people are able to control unwanted thoughts in 
their daily lives. 
 
By examining these questions, we can get a better understanding of how these may be 
related to the development of certain mental health issues which could provide 
invaluable information in how these might be treated for those who do have such a 
diagnosis. 
 
If you have any concerns about your own well-being as a result of some of your 
responses to items within this survey, there are a number of sources from which you 
could seek further advice, for example meeting with your GP or contacting a peer 
support worker from Anxiety Support Canterbury (contact details below) to discuss 
your concerns.   
 
Anxiety Support Canterbury 
www.anxietysupport.org.nz 
Phone: (03) 377 9665 
Email: info@anxietysupport.org.nz 
 
If you have further questions, please feel free to contact either  
Kirsty Fraser (Kirsty.Fraser@vuw.ac.nz) or 
Associate Professor John McDowall (John.McDowall@vuw.ac.nz)  
at the School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. 
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Appendix D 
Study 4 Information and Debriefing Information  
 
Information and Consent 
This is an online survey investigating aspects about everyday life and mood. This 
research is being conducted by a PhD student at Victoria University of Wellington, 
New Zealand, and it has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee. This survey 
takes approximately 15-20 minutes to fill out. Please read through the consent form 
on the following page and click on "I agree" to proceed. This research has been 
approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated 
authority of Victoria University of Wellington’s Human Ethics Committee. 
You must be at least 16 years of age to complete the survey.  
 
Thank you for your interest. 
 
Kirsty Fraser & Associate Professor John McDowall 
Victoria University 
Wellington 
New Zealand 
 
Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to participate in 
the study.  
 
Purpose of the research study: This research aims to develop an understanding of the 
influences of responsibility and religious beliefs on mental health.  
 
Who is conducting the research?: Kirsty Fraser is a PhD student in the School of 
Psychology, and this research is supervised by Associate Professor John McDowall 
and Dr. Matt Crawford This research has been approved by the School of Psychology 
Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of Victoria University of 
Wellington’s Human Ethics Committee. 
 
What is involved if you agree to participate?: If you agree to participate in this study, 
you will be asked to complete the online questionnaire. Some of the questions you 
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will be asked may seem very personal. Examples of such questions include those 
about your childhood experiences and your own thoughts and behaviours. Some items 
will ask for your perception of experiences such as: "I frequently get nasty thoughts 
and have difficulty in getting rid of them." Remember, you can withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
You will also be asked for some basic demographic information. We anticipate that 
your total involvement will take approximately 15-20 minutes.  
 
Protecting your identity: The questionnaire is totally anonymous – your name will 
never be asked for in this survey. No individual's responses can or would be 
identified. We will keep the data collected here for at least five years after publication. 
You will never be identified in this research project or in any other presentation or 
publication. The information you provide will be coded by number only. In 
accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, your 
coded data may be shared with other competent researchers. Your coded data may be 
used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody of 
Associate Professor John McDowall and will be kept in a locked cabinet in his office.  
 
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. 
 
What happens to the information that you provide?: The data you provide may be 
used for one or more of the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences; 
The overall findings may form part of a PhD thesis, Masters thesis, or Honours 
research project that will be submitted for assessment. 
 
Who to contact: Regardless of whether or not you complete the survey, if you have 
any general questions or comments about the research, feel free to contact us. Please 
note we do not have access to your specific data.  
 
Kirsty Fraser  
School of Psychology 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington, New Zealand 
E-mail: kirsty.fraser@vuw.ac.nz  
 
Associate Professor John McDowall 
School of Psychology 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington, New Zealand 
E-mail: john.mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz 
 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO PRINT A COPY OF THIS PAGE FOR YOUR RECORDS. 
 
Agreement. Do you agree to participate in the research study described above?  
  YOU MUST BE OVER 16 YEARS OF AGE TO CONTINUE 
TO THE SURVEY.  
I AGREE 
I DO NOT AGREE 
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Debriefing Information  
 
Thank you for participating in this study 
 
Everyone has the occasional unwanted, and unwelcome, thought. It may involve 
behaviour that one may consider disturbing and very much out of character (e.g., 
imagining pushing someone in front of a bus), or a negative thought about possible 
future events (e.g., dying in a house fire). Most people are able to take these thoughts, 
dismiss them as strange, not act upon them, move on, and not think about them again. 
For others, however, these thoughts keep coming back again and again. For some 
people, these recurring unwanted thoughts can be very bothersome, for others, not so 
much. 
 
The study that you just completed, examines thoughts and beliefs about personal 
responsibility and the relationship between these and adult mental health. Specifically, 
particular types of responsibility beliefs have been associated with anxiety and 
depression, and interestingly also religiosity. Recent research suggests that when these 
beliefs are present in those who believe in God, they are not linked with anxiety. The 
study you just completed hopes to repeat this finding with depression as well. This 
has important implications for treatment programmes designed to change 
responsibility beliefs among those with religious beliefs. 
 
It is important to note that the current study is focused on these relationships within 
the general population rather than looking at individuals who have been diagnosed 
with a particular mental health issue. By examining these questions within a broad 
range of people within the population, we can get a better understanding of how these 
may be related to the development of certain mental health issues which could 
provide invaluable information in how these might be treated for those who do have 
such a diagnosis. 
 
If you have any concerns about your own well-being as a result of some of your 
responses to items within this survey, there are a number of sources from which you 
could seek further advice. If you are a student, you might wish to contact the student 
health organisation in your university. If you are not a student, the first step in 
receiving additional information should be to set up a meeting with your GP to 
discuss your concerns. Your GP should be able to guide you to the appropriate 
sources if he or she perceives that there is a problem. Alternatively, you may approach 
your church leader or elders for help and guidance.  
 
Again, thank you for your participation 
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If you have further questions, please feel free to contact either  
Kirsty Fraser (Kirsty.Fraser@vuw.ac.nz) or 
Associate Professor John McDowall (John.McDowall@vuw.ac.nz)  
at the School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. 
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Appendix E 
The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002).  
 
 
The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their everyday 
lives.  
Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has DISTRESSED 
or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH. 
 
 
  
I have saved up so many things that they get in the way. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I check things more often than necessary. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I get upset if objects are not arranged properly. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I feel compelled to count while I am doing things. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or 
certain people.  
0      1      2      3      4 
  
I find it difficult to control my own thoughts. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I collect things I don’t need. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I feel I have to repeat certain numbers. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated.  0      1      2      3      4 
  
I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will.  0      1      2      3      4 
  
I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later.  0      1      2      3      4 
  
I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off.  0      1      2      3      4 
  
I need things to be arranged in a particular order. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I feel that there are good and bad numbers. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary. 0      1      2      3      4 
  
I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them. 0      1      2      3      4 
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Appendix F 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
 
This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people 
sometimes hold. Read each statement carefully and decide how much 
you agree or disagree with it.  
Because people are different, there is no right answer or wrong answer 
to these statements. To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your 
way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you are like MOST of 
the time.  
 
 
 
  
I often feel responsible for things which go wrong 0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
If I don’t act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blame for any 
consequences if it happens 
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I am too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong 0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
If I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things 0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I worry a great deal about the effects of things which I do or don’t do 0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
To me, not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as making disaster 
happen  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
If I know that harm is possible, I should always try to prevent it, however 
unlikely it seems 
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I must always think through the consequences of even the smallest 
actions  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I often take responsibility for things which other people don’t think are 
my fault 
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
Everything I do can cause serious problems 0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I am often close to causing harm  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I must protect others from harm  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I should never cause even the slightest harm to others  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I will be condemned for my actions  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I must 
act to prevent it  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as 
making that disaster happen  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect 
other people  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
In all kinds of daily situations, my inactivity can cause as much harm as 
deliberate bad intentions  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
Even if harm is a very unlikely possibility, I should always try to prevent 
it at any cost  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
Once I think it is possible that I have caused harm, I can’t forgive myself  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
Many of my past actions have been intended to prevent harm to others  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I have to make sure other people are protected from all of the 
consequences of things I do  
0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
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Other people should not rely on my judgement  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to blame  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
If I take sufficient care then I can prevent any harmful accidents 0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
  
I often think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough  0     1     2     3     4     5     6 
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Appendix G 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994).  
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
Strongly                            Strongly 
Disagree                                Agree 
  
1. There are things I prefer not to think about 1            2            3           4            5        
  
2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do 1            2            3           4            5        
  
3. I have thoughts that I cannot stop 1            2            3           4            5        
  
4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot erase 1            2            3           4            5        
  
5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea 1            2            3           4            5        
  
6. I wish I could stop thinking of certain things 1            2            3           4            5        
  
7. Sometimes my mind races so much I wish I could stop it 1            2            3           4            5        
  
8. I always try to put problems out of mind 1            2            3           4            5        
  
9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head 1            2            3           4            5        
  
10. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from intruding on my mind 1            2            3           4            5        
  
11. There are things that I try not to think about 1            2            3           4            5        
  
12. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking 1            2            3           4            5        
  
13. I often do things to distract myself from my thoughts 1            2            3           4            5        
  
14. I often have thoughts that I try to avoid 1            2            3           4            5        
  
15. There are many thoughts that I have that I don’t tell anyone 1            2            3           4            5        
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Appendix H 
Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996).  
 
Do you disagree or agree with the following statements?  
 
Strongly                            Strongly 
Disagree                                Agree 
  
1. Thinking of making an extremely critical remark to a friend is almost 1            2            3           4            5        
as unacceptable to me as actually saying it  
2. If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk 1            2            3           4            5        
that they will lose their job  
3. Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a 1            2            3           4            5        
blasphemous action  
4. Thinking about swearing at someone else is almost as unacceptable 1            2            3           4            5        
to me as actually swearing  
5. If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this increases the 1            2            3           4            5        
risk that he/she will have a car accident  
6. When I have a nasty thought about someone else, it is almost as 1            2            3           4            5        
bad as carrying out a nasty action  
7. If I think of a friend/relative being injured in a fall, this increases the 1            2            3           4            5        
risk that he/she will have a fall and be injured  
8. Having violent thoughts is almost as unacceptable to me as violent 1            2            3           4            5        
acts  
9. If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk that 1            2            3           4            5        
he/she will fall ill  
10. When I think about making an obscene remark or gesture in church, 1            2            3           4            5        
it is almost as sinful as actually doing it  
11. If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm 1            2            3           4            5        
12. If I think of myself being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that I  
will have a fall and be injured 1            2            3           4            5        
13. If I think about making an obscene gesture to someone else, it is  
almost as bad as doing it 1            2            3           4            5        
14. If I think of myself being in a car accident, this increases the risk that  
I will have a car accident 1            2            3           4            5        
15. When I think unkindly about a friend, it is almost as disloyal as doing  
an unkind act 1            2            3           4            5        
16. If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill 1            2            3           4            5        
17. If I have a jealous thought, it is almost the same as making a jealous  
remark 1            2            3           4            5        
18. Thinking of cheating in a personal relationship is almost as immoral  
to me as actually cheating 1            2            3           4            5        
19. Having obscene thoughts in a church is unacceptable to me  
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Appendix I 
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SRDS; Zung, 1965).  
 
Please read each statement and decide how much of the time the statement 
describes how you have been feeling during the past several days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. I feel down-hearted and blue 1             2            3            4      
  
2. Morning is when I feel the best  1             2            3            4      
  
3. I have crying spells or feel like it 1             2            3            4      
  
4. I have trouble sleeping at night 1             2            3            4      
  
5. I eat as much as I used to 1             2            3            4      
  
6. I still enjoy sex 1             2            3            4      
  
7. I notice that I am losing weight 1             2            3            4      
  
8. I have trouble with constipation 1             2            3            4      
  
9. My heart beats faster than usual 1             2            3            4      
  
10. I get tired for no reason 1             2            3            4      
  
11. My mind is as clear as it used to be 1             2            3            4      
  
12. I find it easy to do the things I used to 1             2            3            4      
  
13. I am restless and can’t keep still 1             2            3            4      
  
14. I feel hopeful about the future 1             2            3            4      
  
15. I am more irritable than usual 1             2            3            4      
  
16. I find it easy to make decisions 1             2            3            4      
  
17. I feel that I am useful and needed 1             2            3            4      
  
18. My life is pretty full 1             2            3            4      
  
19. I feel that others would be better off if I were dead 1             2            3            4      
  
20. I still enjoy the things I used to do 1             2            3            4      
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Appendix J 
Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (SRAS; Zung, 1971).  
 
Please read each statement and decide how much of the time the statement 
describes how you have been feeling during the past several days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. I feel more nervous and anxious than usual 1             2            3            4      
  
2. I feel afraid for no reason  1             2            3            4      
  
3. I get upset easily or feel panicky 1             2            3            4      
  
4. I feel like I’m falling apart and going to pieces 1             2            3            4      
  
5. I feel that everything is all right and nothing bad will happen 1             2            3            4      
  
6. My arms and legs shake and tremble  1             2            3            4      
  
7. I am bothered by headaches, neck and back pains 1             2            3            4      
  
8. I feel weak and get tired easily 1             2            3            4      
  
9. I feel calm and can sit still easily  1             2            3            4      
  
10. I can feel my heart beating fast 1             2            3            4      
  
11. I am bothered by dizzy spells  1             2            3            4      
  
12. I have fainting spells or feel like it  1             2            3            4      
  
13. I can breathe in and out easily  1             2            3            4      
  
14. I get feelings of numbness and tingling in my fingers, toes  1             2            3            4      
  
15. I am bothered by stomach aches or indigestion 1             2            3            4      
  
16. I have to empty my bladder often  1             2            3            4      
  
17. My hands are usually warm and dry  1             2            3            4      
  
18. My face gets hot and blushes 1             2            3            4      
  
19. I fall asleep easily and get a good night’s rest  1             2            3            4      
  
20. I have nightmares  1             2            3            4      
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Appendix K 
Pathways to Inflated Responsibility Scale (PIRBS; Coles & Schofield, 2008).  
This questionnaire asks about what things were like for you as a child. 
There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in what things 
were like for you growing up. Please read each statement carefully and 
then circle a response to indicate how frequently that statement was true 
for you. 
 
 
As a child…  
… I was taught to follow a precise set of rules   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… I was responsible for protecting a family member/family members   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… I was taught that rules were to be obeyed without discussion   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… I was responsible for the cooking   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my family cares a lot about following rules   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… I was responsible for keeping our house functioning smoothly   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my parent(s) frequently preferred to do things for me rather than have me do     
them myself  
 0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my parent(s) thought that I was unable to deal with danger  0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my parent(s) strongly valued obedience  0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my parent(s) thought that I couldn’t handle things   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… adults around me strictly enforced rules   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my parent(s) thought that I couldn’t protect myself  0           1             2          3           4 
  
… I was more like a parent than most kids my age   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… my parent(s) did many things to protect me   0           1             2          3           4 
  
… I had more responsibility for taking care of myself than most kids my age  0           1             2          3           4 
Sometimes things that we do, or choose not to do, result in serious 
misfortune. For example, a surgeon’s error may cause harm to a patient. 
Or, a mechanics failure to test a car’s brakes may lead to an accident. The 
misfortune can have a catastrophic effect on the person’s health or 
welfare. Also, this misfortune can occur to others or us. We are interested 
in whether your actions have ever resulted in a serious misfortune 
occurring.  
 
I am confident that something I did resulted in someone else experiencing a 
serious misfortune 
 0           1             2          3           4 
 
  
I am confident that something I did resulted in me experiencing a serious 
misfortune  
 0           1             2          3           4 
  
I am confident that something I did not do resulted in someone else 
experiencing a serious misfortune 
 0           1             2          3           4 
  
I am confident that something I did not do resulted in me experiencing a serious 
misfortune 
 0           1             2          3           4 
  
Sometimes it appears that something we think or do may have resulted in 
a serious misfortune. For example, a child may wish an adult dead and 
soon thereafter the adult dies. Therefore, it appears like their thoughts 
contributed to the misfortune. We are interested in whether it has ever 
appeared that your thoughts or actions have resulted in a serious 
misfortune occurring.  
 
  
I believe that something I did or did not do may have  contributed to someone 
else experiencing a serious misfortune 
 0           1             2          3           4 
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I believe that something I did or did not do may have  contributed to me 
experiencing a serious misfortune 
 0           1             2          3           4 
  
I believe that my thoughts may have contributed to someone else experiencing 
a serious misfortune   
 0           1             2          3           4 
  
I believe that my thoughts may have contributed to me experiencing a serious 
misfortune  
 0           1             2          3           4 
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Appendix L 
Levenson Multidimensional Locus of Control Inventory (Levenson, 1973).  
Following is a series of attitude statement. Each represents a commonly 
held opinion. There are no right or wrong answers. You will probably 
agree with some items and disagree with others. We are interested in 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion.  
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree.  
 
 
  
Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability 1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings 1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful 
people 
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a 
driver I am 
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work  1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad 
luck happenings   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
When I get what I want, it is usually because I’m lucky  1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership 
responsibility without appealing to those positions of power  
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
How many friends I have depends on how a person I am  1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
I have often found that what is going to happen will happen  1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others   1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck   1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal 
interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things 
turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me   1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky 
enough to be in the right place at the right time   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably 
wouldn’t make many friends   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life   1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
I am usually able to protect my personal interests  1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other 
driver   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it   1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the 
desires of people  
1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
My life is determined by my own actions   1       2       3      4      5      6  
  
It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many 
friends   
1       2       3      4      5      6  
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